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Abstract
Electricity network pricing methodologies play a key role in determining whether 
providing network services is economically beneficial to both the utilities and other 
m arket participants. There are many pricing methodologies that have been developed 
since the late 80’s, especially for transmission networks. Compared to transmission 
pricing methods, distribution pricing methods are unsophisticated and pose a 
significant barrier to embedded generators. Hence, more efficient and executable 
methodologies are still desirable in open access electricity networks.
This thesis presents a series o f new long-run marginal cost (LRMC) pricing 
methodologies for both transmission and distribution networks, and demonstrates the 
processes o f evaluating and allocating the network asset costs. New reactive power 
pricing methods, based on the perpendicular approach and arc approach, have been 
proposed and demonstrated in these LRMC pricing process.
Compared with other proposed LRMC pricing schemes, the novel long-run marginal 
cost with utilisation consideration (LRM C-Util%) pricing methodology aims to 
evaluate the network asset costs based on the usage o f the network facilities. It can 
reflect the future network investment and indicate the future location o f network 
users. The advantages o f LRMC-Util% include the ability to reflect the forward 
looking costs, to distinguish between the costs o f siting at different locations, to 
recognize o f the reactive power, and to derive charges for both generation and 
demand users.
I ll
A load-flow-based pricing software package has been developed to implement all the 
proposed LRMC pricing methodologies. This software can be further employed as a 
valuable cost analysis tool for transmission and distribution companies.
The methodologies are demonstrated on the IEEE-30 bus test network and a practical 
distribution test network in the South Wales area o f England, UK. An improved and 
modified m ethodology based on the concepts developed here was proposed to the 
Western Power Distribution (WPD) company’s network for possible implementation.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
This chapter introduces background information about the electricity network pricing 
and describes the motivation o f this research, which focuses on the price o f use o f 
transmission and distribution networks. The main contributions o f the study are also 
summarized, and the layout o f this thesis is presented at the end.
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1.1 Background
Electricity: “ In early use, the distinctive property o f  ‘electric bodies ’, like amber. 
glass, etc., i.e., their power when excited by friction to attract light bodies placed  
near them; also, the state o f  excitation produced in such bodies by friction. 
Subsequently the name was given to the cause o f  this phenomenon and o f  many 
others which were discovered to be o f  common origin with it, e.g. the electric spark, 
lightning, the galvanic current, etc. . . .” Source: The Oxford English Dictionary
In June o f 1752, Benjamin Franklin promoted his investigations o f electricity and 
theories through the famous, though extremely dangerous, experiment o f flying a kite 
during a thunderstorm. Nobody could imagine that electricity would become the 
blood o f industry two hundred years later. Life has gone through a complete change 
due to the electricity supply, and will continue to do so. Since the late 20th century, 
liberalization has been a major trend in reform o f the electrical power industry in 
many developing and industrialized countries. As the power industries are 
restructured and decentralized, electricity is becoming a commodity to be bought and 
sold by generators, suppliers and other traders.
Like the transportation and telecommunication sectors, the electrical power industry 
is moving from state-owned monopolies to competitive companies. According to the 
electricity m arket’s hierarchy and architecture, these companies are split into four 
distinct groups: generation, transmission, distribution, and suppliers (or retailers). 
Generation companies (GENCOs) produce electricity and maintain power plants. 
Transmission companies (TRANSCOs) build, operate, and maintain high voltage 
transmission systems in a certain geographical region, TRANSCOs also provide 
other services for the overall reliability o f the electrical system. Distribution 
companies (DISCOs) construct and maintain distribution wires, connecting end-use 
customers to the transmission grid. Such DISCO services include laying cables in
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roads, and installing meters within properties. Suppliers (RETAILCOs) are the 
companies who buy electric power and other necessary services, and sell them to 
customers. While these four types of companies typically function separately, they 
can be interconnected with each other in the electricity system as shown in Figure 1.1.
GENERATION
Power Station
G enera to r 4 0 0 k V











To Small Factories, 
Commercial and 
Residential Areas
Figure 1.1: An interconnected electricity system [But 2001]
In the electricity market’s structure of many countries, such as Chile, Great Britain. 
Argentina, New Zealand, Australia etc, TRANSCOs provide wholesale transmission 
capacities and open access for GENCOs. To customers via RETAILCOs at several 
locations, GENCOs offer electricity that is ultimately delivered through TRANSCOs 
and DISCOs. It means that the transmission and distribution networks are 
distinguished from the generation part o f the business by their economic 
characteristics. Especially, the transmission network is usually the single electrical 
business in a territory where important economies of scale are present. Therefore, 
competition is not feasible, and natural monopolies develop. In the electricity market.
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the first challenge is efficiently regulating a monopoly that permits other market 
participants’ competition to take place, which is the role o f a regulator. The second 
challenge is defining a pricing scheme for the transmission services that provides 
coherent economic incentives for the business to efficiently operate and expand [Rud 
1995]. In practice, TRANSCOs and DISCOs recover their investment and operating 
costs o f transmission and distribution network, through connection charges and use 
o f system charges. Developing desirable pricing methodologies for calculating the 
use o f system charges is the main topic o f this thesis, which is aim to achieve the 
objectives defined in the standard conditions o f  the transmission or distribution 
licence [Edl 2007, Etl 2007]:
• Facilitating competition in the generation and supply o f  electricity, and does 
not restrict, distort, or prevent competition in the transmission or distribution 
o f electricity;
•  Reflecting the costs incurred by the licensees in their transmission or 
distribution businesses;
•  Taking account o f development in the licensee’s transmission or distribution 
business.
Technically, the use o f system charges can be traced back to wheeling rates. The 
concept o f wheeling was introduced by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) in the United States, before the electrical power industry reform. W heeling 
is defined as “the transmission o f electrical energy from a buyer to a seller, through 
transmission or distribution lines owed by a third party,” and wheeling rates 
determine payments by the buyers or sellers (or both) to the wheeling utility to 
compensate the wheeling utility for the network costs incurred [Sch 1985, Car 1986, 
Rau 1989]. From the view o f the movement o f electricity from one system to another 
over transmission facilities o f interconnecting systems, wheeling is the third party 
use o f system as an isolated transaction between three parties (buyer, seller, network), 
and the wheeling rate is to determine the impact and cost o f that transaction.
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In the competitive electrical power market environment, the use o f networks, treated 
as compositions o f various wheeling transactions, can be described as the use o f 
transmission or distribution facilities to transmit the power o f and for another entity 
or entities. The difference between “use o f system” and “wheeling” is based on 
different understanding o f the role and the characteristics o f electricity networks. 
Because “use o f system charges” and “wheeling rates” have the same aim o f creating 
open access electricity networks, the pricing methodologies can be interchanged 
between each other.
1.2 Motivation
The transmission system is the most crucial element in electricity market. The secure 
and efficient operation o f the transmission system by TRANSCOs is the key to the 
efficiency in electricity market. DISCOs are responsible for building and operating 
their electrical systems, to maintain a certain degree o f reliability and availability. 
DISCOs also have the responsibility o f responding to distribution network outages 
and power quality concerns. TRANSCOs and DISCOs consequently charge 
GENCOs and/or other DISCOs for their usage o f electricity networks. The pricing 
methodologies play a more and more important role in determining whether or not 
providing network services is economically beneficial to both the utilities and other 
market participants. Professionals in power sectors now face a new world, where 
economic efficiency is replacing technical efficiency as the cornerstone o f decision 
making.
Transmission and distribution prices do not represent a big percentage o f the total o f 
electricity bills. For example, in Figure 1.2, the pie chart shows the cost components 
o f household electricity bills in Britain in 2006. About 20% o f the total cost is 
charged to TRANSCOs and DISCOs. Nevertheless, transmission and distribution
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prices play a vital part in ensuring efficient use of the network, and improving a 
system’s security following the innovative restructuring o f the electricity market. 
Transmission and distribution price should be able to facilitate fair and equitable 
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Figure 1.2: Cost com ponents of household electricity bills [Ofg 2006]
According to the trends of electrical market development, transmission and 
distribution price should be a reasonable economic indicator used by the market to 
make decisions on resource allocation, system expansion and reinforcement. 
However, it is important to realize that the pricing o f network services, although a 
technical issue, is not simply an engineering problem. Engineering mainly analyzes 
the feasibility and cost o f providing transmission services, but this is only one of 
many considerations in the overall process o f the pricing of transmission services. 
Market and political considerations could also play major roles in determining 
network prices [Shi 1996].
In the UK, the government hopes to increase the contribution of renewable electricity 
and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) to UK energy supplies. They aim to generate 
10% of UK electricity supplied from renewable resources, and to develop lOGWe of 
installed CHP capacity, all by 2010 [Pos 2001]. Much o f this technology will be
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small-scale and situated close to where its output is used. The electricity output may 
be less predictable than from another source such as gas, coal-fired or nuclear power 
stations. The configuration, operation and regulation of current national electricity 
networks may therefore need modification [Pos 2001]. A distributed electricity 
system is drafted in Figure 1.3. The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), 
the regulator of electricity in the UK, is currently evaluating the enduring 
appropriateness of the transmission charging arrangement for distributed generation. 
At the same time, distribution charging arrangements pose a significant financial 
barrier to new smaller-scale generation, because new entrants must pay the full up­
front connection costs. OFGEM is holding a Structure of Electricity Distribution 
Charges Implementation Steering Group (ISG) [Ofg 2007] simultaneously to 
determine how regulation could help to develop embedded generation. A long term 
solution is developing within the industry during 2005 and 2006.
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Figure 1.3: A d istribu ted  electricity system [But 2001]
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Transmission and distribution prices mainly include connection charges and use o f 
system charges. Connection charges are applied to new customers who intend to 
connect to the system. They are based on the asset costs o f additional network 
facilities and the energy policies from the government. Once the tariffs o f  the 
connection charges are authorized, they are then fixed for a certain period. Use o f 
system charges are derived from pricing methodologies, depending on the degree o f 
usage o f the system for existing customers. There are m any difficulties and emphases 
in the network pricing methodologies. Firstly, there is no appropriate tool and data 
for evaluating the economic impact o f different pricing methodologies. Secondly, 
although use o f system charges provide a lot o f useful system information, they have 
not influenced the market operation even for the future energy mix. Thirdly, 
considering the various objectives and constraints o f  the electrical power system, the 
pricing methodologies are based on limited experience and political considerations. 
These should be replaced by a more economic approach.
Because o f the various factors involved in the use o f electricity networks charges, 
pricing methodologies have been emphasized from both the electrical power industry 
and academic researchers. M any researches have been developing pricing 
methodologies for different purposes. However, more efficient and executable 
methodologies are still desirable for both industry and academia, which will also be 
useful for many developed and developing countries in their electrical power 
industry evolution.
1.3 Contribution
The main purpose o f  this research is to introduce a new series o f long-run marginal 
cost pricing methodologies for both transmission and distribution networks, and to
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demonstrate the approaches in evaluating the network asset cost, and allocating the 
cost.
There are three major contributions in this research. Firstly, the long-run marginal 
cost based on DC power flow (LRMC-DC), similar with the Investment Cost Related 
Pricing (ICRP) model o f the National Gird Company (NGC) in the UK, is 
formulated and applied on a practical distribution test system. LRMC-DC 
demonstrates the advantages o f cost reflectivity and locational price signal. Secondly, 
with new developed reactive power pricing methodologies, the proposed long-run 
marginal cost-AC (LRM C-AC) is capable o f allocating cost to reactive power. 
Thirdly, a novel long-run marginal cost with network utilisation consideration 
(LRMC-Util%) is being further developed and implemented, which is based on the 
concept o f University o f Bath model [Li 2005b, Wpd 2006c]. The advantages o f 
LRM C-Util% include the ability to reflect forward looking costs, to distinguish the 
costs at different locations, to recognize the reactive power, and to balance the 
treatm ent between generation and demand.
In this thesis, a comprehensive review o f transmission and distribution pricing 
methodologies is included. M ost existing pricing methodologies are formulated and 
explained. The pricing models using by transmission and distribution companies in 
the UK are emphasized.
A load-flow-based charging software package has been developed to implement the 
different pricing paradigms, including proposed LRMC-AC and LRMC-Util%. The 
software can be further employed as a valuable cost analysis tool for transmission 
and distribution companies.
The methodologies are demonstrated on the IEEE-30 bus standard test network and 
practical distribution test networks in the South W ales area o f England. An improved 
and modified methodology based on the concept o f LRM C-Util%  was proposed to
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the W estern Power Distribution (WPD) company’s network for possible 
implementation.
1.4 Thesis Layout
There are seven chapters in this thesis. Chapter 1 is an introduction which covers the 
motivation and main achievements o f this research work. Chapter 2 defines the 
meaning o f long term marginal cost pricing methodologies in open access electricity 
networks, and the different pricing mechanisms under various market operations 
which shows the big picture behind this research. Chapter 3 and 4 are the literature 
reviews o f network pricing methodologies. Chapter 3 explains the pricing process o f 
transmission networks, and reviews existing transmission network pricing 
methodologies. Chapter 4 introduces the regulation o f distribution network pricing 
and explains the existing distribution network pricing methodologies. Chapter 5 
demonstrates the traditional long-run marginal cost based on DC load flow (LRMC- 
DC) firstly. W ith the allocation o f reactive power price, LRMC-AC is formulated 
and tested. Chapter 6 presents and implements the long-run marginal cost with 
network utilisation consideration (LRMC-Util%). The advantages o f LRM C-Util% 
compared with LRMC-AC are analyzed by different case studies. Chapter 7 includes 
the final conclusion and future work.
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Chapter 2 
Network Pricing in the Market 
Environment
Nations all over the world have committed to, or currently are in the process of, 
introducing more competition into their electrical power sectors. M oving from 
monopolies to competitive markets, network pricing is becoming a debated issue for 
network participants. Great B ritain’s (GB) system is demonstrated as an example o f a 
typical electricity innovation pioneer. After the costs components in various 
categories o f wheeling transactions are introduced, and the concept o f  long-run 
marginal cost is illustrated. The different existing pricing strategies are summarized 
into three paradigms in the market environment. Finally, the objectives o f network 
pricing are presented.
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2.1 From Monopolies to Market
2.1.1 Centralized and Decentralized
Prior to privatization, the electrical power industry was a government monopoly. A 
single, vertically integrated utility was the only electricity provider in its service 
territory. Traditionally, the main provider was owned by a national or regional 
government. In this centralized framework, the whole process o f energy generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply was highly regulated and controlled. It also 
meant that GENCOs, TRANSCOs, DISCOs, and RETAILCOs, as introduced in the 
background o f Chapter 1, were either integrated into a multifunction company or a 
group o f government holding companies. Because utilities were allowed to pass costs 
on to the customers through exclusive tariffs, there was little incentive to reduce 
costs, or to make investments with due consideration o f  risk. Serious efforts to 
calculate the cost o f providing the electricity network services separately from the 
overall cost o f the supplying electricity were unnecessary.
The growth o f the generation and information technologies and the stimulation o f the 
competitive global economy, spurred many trends in the electrical power industry, 
including the privatization o f nationally owned systems, the deregulation o f privately 
owned systems, and the internationalization o f  national systems. Essentially, 
GENCOs, TRANSCOs, DISCOs, and RETAILCOs are running as four distinct parts. 
TRANSCOs and DISCOs provide and sell market participants non-discriminatory 
access to their unbundled network service. It is also called network “open access” . 
The underlying theme o f these changes is the replacement o f a centralized monopoly 
with decentralized competition.
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In a decentralized m arket environment, an independent system operator (ISO) is a 
necessary market entity. The key roles o f the system operator are balancing the real­
time market, and maintaining the system security in the operations o f the power 
market. Depending on the ISO ’s objective and authority, power balancing during a 
certain period may be included in the ISO’s operation. The ISO with power 
balancing is an independent, non-government and non-profit entity that ensures a 
competitive market by running an auction for electricity trades. The ISO calculates 
the market clearing price based on the highest bid in the market.
2.1.2 Pool and Bilateral Contracts
In order to achieve electricity market goals, two basic models for the market 
structure have been considered.
1. Pool model
In a pool model, there are no direct transactions between producers and customers. 
All trading is done via a pool company (POOLCO), which is defined as a centralized 
marketplace that clears the market for buyers and sellers. Electric power sellers and 
buyers submit bids to the pool for the amounts o f  power they are willing to trade in 
the market. On one hand, sellers compete for the right to supply energy to the pool, 
not to specific customers. If a seller bids too high, it may not be able to sell. On the 
other hand, buyers compete for their right to buy energy not from specific generators 
but from the pool. If a buyer bids too low, it m ay not be able to buy. An ISO within a 
POOLCO would implement the economic dispatch and produce a single price for 
electricity, giving participants a clear signal for consumption and investment 
decisions.




2. Bilateral Contracts Model
Bilateral contracts are negotiable agreements on delivery and receipt o f power 
between two traders. These contracts set the terms and conditions o f agreements 
independently o f the ISO. Each contract is based on one or many network 
transactions between GENCO and RETAILCO. In this model, however, the ISO 
would verify that a sufficient transmission capacity exists to complete the 
transactions and maintain transmission security. The bilateral contract model is very 
flexible as trading parties specify their desired contractual terms.
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Figure 2.1: Pool model
Figure 2.2: Bilateral contracts model
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In both models, it is necessary to employ appropriate network pricing methodologies 
for transmission and distribution network owners. GENCOs and/or RETAILCOs 
need pay network owners for use o f their system in the market environment.
2.1.3 Market Structure and Network Pricing in GB
Great Britain is one o f  pioneers in electricity market reform. It is also a typical 
example o f developing market structure and network pricing. This section will 
describe how the electricity m arket set up and where the network prices come from 
in GB.
In Great Britain, before privatization, most electricity was generated by the Central 
Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), a government-owned nationalised industry. It 
also operated the national grid transmission system. The CEGB had a statutory 
obligation to plan and produce electricity to meet demand. The Electricity Council 
set prices at levels designed to meet financial targets set by the government. In 
England and W ales, twelve local area boards, which were also government-owned 
monopolies, ran distribution and supply activities.
The 1990s saw significant changes in the electricity industry o f England and Wales, 
in response to the requirements o f industry participants, customers and the regulator- 
the Office o f Gas and Electricity M arkets (OFGEM). The fossil fuel generation 
within the CEGB was privatized as National Power and PowerGen. Including 
Scottish Power and Hydro-Electric, there were in total four major generating 
companies. The nuclear plants were transferred to the government-owned Nuclear 
Electric and Scottish Nuclear, which have since been restructured into two 
companies, one o f which has been privatised (British Energy). Control o f  the 
transmission system went to the National Grid Company (NGC), which was initially 
owned at the time o f privatization by the twelve Regional Electricity Companies
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(RECs). The power industry has significantly changed since the Electricity Pool o f 
England and Wales was created on 31st March 1990 [Poo 2006], As an arrangement 
between generators and suppliers, the Pool provided the wholesale market 
mechanism for trading electricity. The Pool itself did not buy or sell electricity, and 
those trading in the Pool did so within a defined set o f rules. Participation in the 
market was through membership o f the Pool, and done so under the Pooling and 
Settlement Agreement.
On 27th M arch 2001, the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) for 
England and Wales went into effect [Net 2007]. Replacing the previous Pool 
arrangement, the NETA allowed market players to trade electricity up to a day ahead 
o f the requirement for physical delivery. National Grid Company (NGC) operated as 
the system owner and system operator for England and Wales, managing the high 
voltage (275KV and 400 KV) transmission system, and also providing all the 
technical and operational services normally demanded by the system to ensure its 
integrity, such as load forecasting, system security and stability, frequency control, 
and reactive power control. NGC acted at both a physical and a financial level 
through the balancing mechanism, selecting bids and offers for incremental or 
decremented supply o f electricity, in order to achieve physical balance between 
generation and demand.
The British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) 
Programme was launched in April 2005, which extends NETA to create a 
competitive Great Britain (GB, include England, Wales and Scotland) wide 
electricity market [Bet 2007]. It also proposed that the GB system operator should 
recover the total costs o f the transmission system on a GB basis. Consequently, 
National Grid Company (NGC) extended the role o f system operator for the whole 
GB and remained as the system owner for England and Wales. The transmission 
systems in Scotland are owned by the Scottish Power and Scottish & Southern 
Energy. Figure 2.3 shows the market structure o f  BETTA.








Notification of contract volumes (to
Settlement) and Final Physical 




Generators, suppliers and 
traders buy and sell 










National Grid (as System 
Operator) accepts offers and bids 
for system and energy balancing
Settlement of cash flows 
arising from the 
balancing process
Figure 2.3: Overview of BETTA m arket s tru c tu re  [Sys 2006]
Under either the NETA or BETTA program, the National Gird Company (NGC) is 
both the system owner and the system operator. The NGC charges for the usage of 
the transmission network by the generator companies, suppliers and other license 
holders. As the system owner, the NGC issues the statement of the connection 
charging methodology [Ngc 2006]. This statement explains how to charge the users" 
connection fee. It defines the boundary between infrastructure and connection assets, 
the calculation o f charges for providing those assets and the manner of sharing assets 
between the different users at the same site. As the system owner and operator, NGC 
issues the statement of the use of system charging methodology [Ngc 2006]. This 
statement covers both the Transmission Network Use o f System (TNUoS) and the 
Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) methodology.
The TNUoS charges reflect the cost o f installing, operating, and maintaining the 
transmission system for the transmission owner activity function of the transmission 
business. The Investment Cost Related Pricing (ICRP) was introduced by NGC in 
1993/4, and is applied as a DC Load Flow (DCLF) ICRP based transport model from
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April 2004. The DCLF ICRP transport model calculates the marginal costs of 
investment in the transmission system, which would be required as a consequence of 
an increase in demand or generation at each connection point. After the BETTA went 
into effect, TNUoS charges are extended to Scotland with introducing demand and 
generation tariff zones. In Scotland, with the role o f system operator shift from 
Scottish TRANSCOs to NGC, Scottish GENCOs and RETAILORS are joined the 
wholesale electrical power market o f GB. Therefore, the justification of the 
transmission charge methodology attracts more and more attention from generation 
companies and suppliers.
At the DISCOs’ side, there are seven Distribution Network Owners (DNOs) that 
operate in fourteen service zones as shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: DNOs’ location [Sys 2006]
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Each DNO has a statement o f the connection charging methodology, a statement o f 
use o f system charging methodology, and a statement o f metering and data services 
charging. The statements o f use o f system charging methodologies o f DNOs are 
taking the same responsibility as N G C ’s.
Overall, in the electrical power industry reform o f Great Britain, the electrical power 
system has changed from government owned monopolies to a pool model, followed 
by a transition to a bilateral contracts model, which is in effect at the time of this 
writing.
2.2 Cost Components in Wheeling Transactions
The extended use o f an electricity network is a composite o f various types o f 
wheeling transactions. Use o f network charge is produced with the successful 
wheeling transaction. In this section, fundamental concepts and terms regarding the 
cost components o f providing wheeling transactions services are introduced and 
explained. Then the concept o f long-run marginal cost (LRMC) is illustrated in detail. 
Note that all the terms explained are based on the decentralized market structure. 
Some o f the terms may have different meanings under different market structures.
2.2.1 Cost Components
The major components o f  the cost related to wheeling transactions are [Shi 1991]:
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1. Existing System Cost
The existing system cost o f a wheeling transaction is the allocated cost o f existing 
network facilities used by that wheeling transaction. The cost o f the existing system 
is the cost associated with the investment made in construction and the expenses 
incurred in maintaining the system. For example, the existing system cost includes 
the network asset cost, and the Operation and M aintenance (O&M) cost. It is 
important to note that a wheeling transaction does not involve any new costs relating 
to the use o f existing transmission facilities, because these facilities have been built 
already. But it incurs the expense to operate and maintain the existing network 
hardware for TRANSCOs and DISCOs. So the major issues are who should bear the 
cost o f the existing network, and how the cost should be allocated amongst the 
wheeling transactions.
2. Operating Cost
The operating cost is the fuel cost that the utilities incurs in order to accommodate 
the wheeling transaction. The operating cost are due to generation re-dispatch and 
rescheduling, which results from the operation o f the POOLCO in the Pool operation 
market model, or is mainly referred to the balancing services for ISOs in bilateral 
contracts market model. Generation re-dispatch is caused by meeting the system 
operating constraints, such as the transmission line flow and bus voltage limits. 
Generation rescheduling is impacted by factors such as the start-up time of 
generation and the spinning reserve requirements. The operating cost is mainly 
affected by the characteristic o f the generation units o f the generation companies.
3. Opportunity Cost
The opportunity cost corresponds to the unrealized benefits due to operating 
constraints that are caused by the wheeling transaction. The cost o f lost opportunities 
is incurred through two mechanisms. One is the unrealized savings in fuel cost if  the
generation companies cannot bring in cheaper energy due to transmission system
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operating constraints. Another is the unrealized contribution to the cost o f potential, 
but unrealized, firm transactions due to transmission system operating constraints. 
GENCOs cannot achieve the conceivable benefit, so it is also called “shortage cost.” 
According to the obligation o f TRANSCOs that ensure the potential transaction, it is 
also called “congestion cost” from the TRANSCOs’ point o f view.
4. Reinforcement Cost
The reinforcement cost refers to capital cost o f  new transmission facilities, or the 
facility upgrades needed to cope with changes in the pattern o f demand. It also 
includes the cost o f planned network reinforcements that are deferred by the 
wheeling transaction. Although the concept o f the reinforcement cost is 
straightforward, the evaluation o f the reinforcement cost is extremely difficult 
according to the uncertainty o f network operating constraints. The reinforcement cost 
is charged by TRANSCOs and DISCOs and absorbed by GENCOs and RETAILCOs.
Because the cost o f the existing system includes voltage control, reactive power 
compensation, frequency regulation, flow regulation, loading following service, etc., 
the existing system cost is the largest component o f the overall cost o f the 
transmission transaction. Compared with the existing system cost, the other three 
aforementioned components (operating cost, opportunity cost and reinforcement cost) 
are directly caused by the transaction. They are comm only called the incremental 
cost o f the wheeling transaction, referring to the entire cost o f a new transaction [Shi 
1991].
Other terms are used in the industry to refer to the components o f the cost o f a 
transmission transaction. These terms include “short-run incremental cost,” which 
refers to operating cost and opportunity cost, “ long-run incremental cost,” which 
refers to operating cost, opportunity cost and reinforcement cost, and “embedded 
cost,” which refers to a portion o f the existing system cost.
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2.2.2 Categories of Wheeling Transaction
The following categories may be used to identify the type o f wheeling transaction 
[Shi 1991, Lee 2001]:
1. Firm and Non-Firm
“Firm” transactions are those that are not subject to discretionary interruptions. Firm 
wheeling transactions are also known as reserved transactions, because they entail 
the reservation o f capacity on network facilities to meet transaction needs. Firm 
wheeling transactions are the results o f contractual agreements between GENCOs 
and RETAILCOs, so they are also called contractual transactions.
“Non-firm ” transactions are those that may be reduced or increased. Reducible 
transactions are ongoing transactions that m ay be curtailed at the utilities’ discretion. 
Increasable transactions take place when the transmission capacity becomes available 
in specific areas o f the systems at short notice, and so they are also called “as 
available” transactions. Non-firm wheeling transactions are derived from unbalanced 
power after the firm transactions. It is vital for the ISO to schedule non-firm 
transactions to secure the real-time electricity market.
2. Short-Run and Long-Run
Traditionally, a long-run or long-term transaction takes place over one or several 
years. The duration o f a long-run transaction is usually long enough to allow the 
building o f new transmission facilities. Long-run transmission transactions are the 
results o f contractual agreements between the wheeling customers. A short-run or 
short-term transaction may be from as short as a few hours to as long as one or two 
years, and are not generally associated with transmission reinforcements. Short-run
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transactions may be provided either under a bilateral contract or as part o f a 
transmission arrangement.
In the competitive market environment, the time interval is too indistinct to 
distinguish between long-run and short-run. Instead, it is clearer to classify by the 
different cost components involved, which are shown in Table 2.1.


















From the economic considerations, associated with the basic inputs o f labour and 
capital, are the notions o f fixed and variable cost, which can be summed together to 
make the total cost. Fixed cost is a common term brought in to define the short-run or 
long-run. Fixed costs are fixed during a specific period. Although a cost may be 
fixed during a short period, such as a month, it could vary for a longer period, such 
as a year. Dependent on the flexibility o f cost and technology, the short-run and 
long-run are shown in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Short-run or long-run [Rot 2003]
Time Cost Technology
Very short run All cost are fixed Fixed
Short run Some cost are fixed Fixed
Long run No cost are fixed Fixed
Very long run No cost are fixed N ot fixed
2.2.3 Long-Run Marginal Cost (LRMC)
M arginal cost (MC) is originally a basic principle o f economic regulation. The M IT 
Dictionary o f M odem Economic defines marginal cost as “the extra cost o f 
producing an extra unit o f  output.” Paul Samuelson defines marginal cost more 
cautiously as the “cost o f producing one extra unit more or less” [Sto 2002]. The “or 
less” is important. The assumption behind this definition is that producing one more 
unit o f output would cost exactly as much as producing one less unit would save. 
This is true for the continuous marginal cost curve o f textbook economics, as shown 
in Figure 2.5. To discuss the marginal cost o f a discontinuous supply curve, which is 
the case in the electricity industry, the definition must be extended to include the 
points o f discontinuity, where the cost to produce an extra unit is distinctly greater 
than the savings from producing one less. The Marginal costs are derived from the 
left-hand marginal cost (M C lh )  and right-hand marginal cost (M C rh ). M arginal cost 
range is defined as the range o f values between and including M C lh  and M C rh , as 
exemplified in Figure 2.6.















Figure 2.6: Discontinuous MC curve
Chapter 2 Network Pricing in the Market Environment 26
In an efficient market with competitive equilibrium, the market price is fixed. All 
price takers have shares o f the market, but they will not have the ability to change the 
market price and profit from doing so. In the short-run, a competitive producer sets 
the output to a level at which the marginal cost equals the market price, whether or 
not that is the competitive price. This maximizes profit. In the long-run, investment 
is involved and plays an important part. Following the definition from economics, 
profit equals revenue minus total cost, where total cost includes a normal, risk- 
adjusted, return on investment. The normal economic profit level is zero. However, 
business defines a normal return on equity to be profit.
To make the concept o f marginal cost more clear in electricity market, TRANSCOs 
and DISCOs are price takers from GENCOs and DISCOs, and are competitive 
producers o f transmission and distribution services. Their use o f system price is 
under control by the government regulator. For instance, the allowance for capital 
and operating expenditure o f TRANSCOs and DISCOs is set out by OFGEM in the 
price control period, which is five years in the U.K. [Ofg 2007a, Ofg 2007b]. 
Because the consumer wants a low price, the regulator has the role o f making the 
competition provide the lowest possible price. Competition does not guarantee the 
lowest possible price at any point in time. Nevertheless, it guarantees that price 
takers will just cover the long-run total costs, and no more. Together these mean that 
the long-run costs o f investment are minimized, and producers are paid only enough 
to cover their capital cost. So the long-run marginal cost is good for consumers.
There are many discussions about the details o f determining the electricity system 
marginal cost in an integrated market [Ber 1992, Sto 2002]. But this research is 
focused on the marginal cost in an electricity network. In the following sections o f 
this thesis, marginal cost only refers to the marginal cost o f an electricity network, 
not the whole electricity system. So long-run marginal cost pricing is based on the 
cost o f accommodating a marginal increase (of one unit, for instance) in the 
transacted power. It is also approximately the saving from producing one less unit. In
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this thesis, these are assumed to be so close together that no distinction is necessary, 
and this is typically the case.
2.3 Network Pricing Strategies
According to the four cost components o f providing the wheeling transaction, there 
are many network pricing mechanisms that were developed to cover the overall cost. 
In consideration o f the largest proportion o f existing system cost, the key issues o f 
the network pricing mechanism are who uses the existing network, and how the cost 
should be allocated among the wheeling transaction. An efficient network pricing 
mechanism should recover network costs by allocating the costs to electricity 
network users in a proper way. A network pricing paradigm is the overall process o f 
translating network cost into overall use o f system charges with a detailed network 
pricing mechanism. There are three paradigms introduced below [Kov 1994, Shi 
1996]:
2.3.1 Embedded Paradigm
In this paradigm, both the existing system costs and the new costs o f system 
operation and expansion, regardless o f their cause, are first summed up (“rolled-in”) 
into a single number [Hap 1994, Shi 1996]. This cost is then allocated among various 
users o f the system according to their “extent o f use” o f  the transmission system. 
Since this paradigm ignores the scarcity o f network resources caused by a new 
transmission transaction, the embedded transmission pricing paradigm cannot reflect 
the economical inefficiency.
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2.3.2 Incremental Paradigm
According to this paradigm, only the new transmission costs caused by new 
transmission customers are considered when evaluating transmission charges for 
these customers. The incremental transmission pricing paradigm requires one or 
more transmission transactions to be considered as a margin [Shi 1996]. Therefore, 
the paradigm can produce a completely irrelevant result. Since the ranking o f a 
transaction is normally based on historical or political reasons, many subjective 
arguments could arise.
Incremental cost can be defined as the revenue requirements needed to pay for any 
new facilities that are specifically attributed to the transmission service customer.
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Incremental cost o f a transaction is evaluated by comparing the transmission system 
costs with, and without, the entire transaction. However, the marginal approach 
would multiply the cost for a unit o f  an additional transaction by the size o f that 
transaction.
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Figure 2.8: Incremental pricing paradigm
2.3.3 Composite Embedded/Incremental Paradigm
This pricing paradigm includes both the existing system cost and the incremental 
cost o f a transmission transaction in evaluating overall transmission prices [Shi 1996]. 
In general, the price o f a transmission service is based on the sum total o f the 
embedded and incremental costs o f  providing the service. Figure 2.9 shows the basic 
concept o f this paradigm.
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Figure 2.9: Composite pricing paradigm
2.4 Objectives of Network Pricing 
Methodologies
The fundamental principle o f any network pricing methodologies is to allocate all or 
part o f the existing and new cost o f a network system to the network users. However, 
since the operation o f the electricity market are based on the policies and directives
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set by the respective government in each country, the network pricing methodologies 
should adopt similar objectives, including cost reflectivity, encouraging efficient use, 
transparency, simplicity, predictability, and encouraging investment.
Cost reflectivity: Network pricing should reflect the costs incurred by TRANSCOs or 
DISCOs in their transmission or distribution businesses [Edl 2007, Etl 2007]. Under 
the conditions o f the transmission or distribution licence, the pricing strategies 
should be driven by the network asset costs. Revenue obtained from the tariffs 
charged for the usage o f the network services should be adequate to recover all the 
expense incurred in investment, operation and maintenance, and a regulated level o f 
profit. It has the same meaning as “recover allowed revenue” .
Encouraging efficient use: The price should provide incentives to encourage efficient 
use o f the electricity network. Efficient usage o f the network can be attributed to 
technical efficiency which minimizes losses. Efficient use also means the price 
should give a locational indication for customers, such as embedded generators.
Transparency: The pricing schemes should be able to transmit the right economic 
signals to all network participants. It should be fair and justifiable.
Simplicity: The pricing schemes should be as simple as they can. Although the 
implementation o f pricing methodology may be not so easy, the pricing schemes 
should be easily understandable.
Predictability: The pricing schemes should produce a tariff following a correct 
economic prediction. It is very important for network participants to forecast the 
possible future cost.
Encouraging investment: The pricing scheme and the dividends paid to various 
network owners should provide an incentive for investment in new infrastructure as 
and when necessary.
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Cost reflectivity is an essential driver o f the pricing schemes. Encouraging efficient 
use, transparency, simplicity, and predictability are expected to benefit GENCOs and 
RETAILCOs. Encouraging investment will bring advantage to the TRANSCOs and 
DISCOs. Besides all o f  the above, there are more potential benefits, such as 
independence, facilitation o f competition, etc.
Chapter 3 Pricing Methodologies o f  Transmission Networks 33
Chapter 3 
Pricing Methodologies of Transmission 
Networks
This chapter reviews the existing pricing methodologies o f  transmission networks. 
The methodologies are divided into two categories o f embedded or 
incremental/marginal pricing paradigms. The embedded pricing paradigms are 
divided further into non-flow-based and flow-based pricing methods. The advantage 
and disadvantage o f each methodology follows after the explanation. Finally, in the 
UK, the use o f system charging methodology o f the National Gird Company (NGC) 
is explained as a typical example o f the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) pricing 
scheme.
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3.1 Chapter Introduction
TRANSCOs play an important role in maintaining the security o f the transmission 
network, supporting large quantity and long distance wheeling transactions crossing 
regions, states, or even nations. Simultaneously, the transmission network is where 
conventional GENCOs compete to supply RETAILCOs in a markets environment. 
Thus, transmission pricing should be a reasonable economic indicator when making 
decisions on system expansion, reinforcement, and resource allocation [Sha 2002]. 
Since wheeling is introduced as the first step towards the open access transmission 
network, many pricing methods are developed following each stage o f electricity 
market reform. Therefore, pricing methodologies o f transmission networks are more 
comprehensive than those o f distribution networks.
Essentially, the process o f transmission network pricing includes three major 
processes.
1. Cost evaluation: Because cost reflectivity is a main driver for network pricing 
schemes, the first process has to be evaluating the transmission network asset 
costs. According to the different cost allocation methods, the network asset 
cost may include both the existing network cost and network expansion cost, or 
both fixed cost and variable cost, or the direct and indirect oncost.
2. Cost allocation: Based on the evaluated network asset costs, the different 
methodologies are employed to allocate the cost to existing and new network 
customers. Generally, the embedded pricing methods refer to usage based cost 
allocation methods. The incremental/marginal pricing methods are related to 
the network investment and expansion costs.
3. Revenue reconciliation: Scaling or modifying the price to set up the final tariffs, 
which aim to meet the final company allowed revenue.
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Because the cost calculated from first two steps may under recover the capital cost, 
there is the need for a supplement o f revenue reconciliation. Economists offer 
different options for allocating this reconciliation among the network users. They 
may take the following forms for the power system [Rud 1995]:
1. Ramsey pricing scheme, which is based on custom er demand elasticity.
2. Uniform uplift, which is allocated as a lump sum to different users.
3. Proportional to allocated cost.
4. Base on independent measure, such as, installed capacity.
5. Base on other use o f  system pricing methodologies.
As indicated, the process o f revenue reconciliation is mainly an economic problem, 
normally not included in individual network pricing methodology. So the cost 
evaluation and cost allocation are the most distinguishing characteristics between 
different pricing methods.
Following the network pricing paradigms introduced in Section 2.3 o f Chapter 2, 
pricing methodologies o f transmission networks can be categorized into embedded 
cost pricing and incremental/marginal cost pricing paradigms. The embedded pricing 
methods include non-flow-based and flow-based pricing methods. The existing 
pricing methodologies o f transmission network are comprehensively reviewed in the 
rest o f this chapter. Note that there is no single best solution for the universal use o f 
transmission network charging. In practice, each country or each restructuring 
electricity market has chosen a method that is based on the particular characteristics 
o f its network.
3.2 Non-Flow-Based Pricing Methods
Non-flow-based pricing methods mean they do not need power flow calculation, and 
include the postage stamp method and contract path method. They are the most
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common and unsophisticated approaches. Regardless o f the influence o f power flow, 
they can hardly encourage the efficient use o f the system in electricity markets.
3.2.1 Postage Stamp Method
Postage stamp methodology is one o f the earliest transmission network pricing 
methodologies. This method assumes that the entire transmission system is used in 
wheeling transactions, irrespective o f the actual transmission facilities that carry the 
wheeling services [Hap 1994]. A simplified algorithm is listed as below [Lee 2001]:
1. Calculate the net plant (NPi) cost o f each line.
NPl = BC, -  DRl (3.1)
Where,
BCj: the book cost for each transmission line,
DRf. the depreciation reserve for each transmission line.
2. Calculate the annual fixed charge rate (AFCR) for each year o f the study
period, which is obtained from the company’s cost data and includes long term debt, 
preferred stock, common equity, weighted cost o f capital per year, operating and 
maintenance costs, taxes, administrative and general expenses, and insurance.
3. Calculate the annual average embedded costs (AAEC).
NP.
AAEC = AFCR - V -------------------------- -------------------------------  (3.2)
7^ PeakDemand + Wheelinglncrement
Where,
AAEC : the annual average embedded costs (£/MW ),
L\ the total number o f transmission lines.
4. Calculate the total annual wheeling costs (TAWC).
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TAWC = AAFC ■ Wheelinglncrement (3.3)
Where,
TAWCithe total annual wheeling costs (£/MW).
This method allocates charges to a transmission user based on an average embedded 
cost, and the magnitude o f the user’s transacted power. The cost o f wheeling as 
determined by postage stamp method is independent o f the transmission distance and 
network configuration [Sha 2002, Shi 1996], Traditionally, it is used by electrical 
utilities to allocate the fixed transmission cost amongst the users o f firm transmission 
services. It does not require power flow calculation, so it is very straightforward for 
all wheeling utilities to implement. However, if energy is transmitted across several 
transmission systems, it can suffer a pancaking problem, which means accumulating 
a high wheeling cost.
3.2.2 Contract Path Method
Overcoming the pancaking problem, Contract path methodology is based on the 
assumption that transmission transaction can flow along specified and artificial 
electrical paths [Hap 1994]. The contract path refers to the specified geographical 
distance between the generators and consumers, regardless o f the physical paths 
along electrons flow. After the artificial contract paths are defined, transmission 
prices will then be assigned using a postage-stamp rate, which are determined either 
individually for each o f the transmission systems, or on the average for the entire 
grid [Sha 2002]. A simplified algorithm is listed as below [Lee 2001]:
1. Calculate the net plant (.NP) cost and annual fixed charge rate {AFCR) as for 
the postage stamp methodology in Section 3.2.1, shown in Equation 3.1 and 
Equation 3.2.
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2. Determine the lowest MW capacity o f facilities along the specified path.
3. Calculate the annual average embedded costs (AAEC).
K NP
AAEC = AFCR - Y ------------- =*---------  (3.4)
/=1 lowestMWofPath
Where,
K : the total number o f transmission lines in path.
4. Calculate the total annual wheeling costs (TAWC).
TAWC = AAEC • Wheelinglncrement (3.5)
The contract path m ethodology ignores the facilities, which lie along this assumed 
path. With the additional consideration o f the distance between generators and 
consumers, the contract path method is otherwise ju st like the postage stamp 
methodology, and is also used by electrical utilities to allocate the fixed transmission 
cost among the users o f firm transmission service. However, the method does not 
reflect actual flows through the transmission network, that include loop and parallel 
path flows.
3.3 Flow-Based Pricing Methods
With power flow calculation, flow-based pricing methods are more sophisticated 
than non-flow-based pricing methods. The boundary flow method replaces the users’ 
transacted power in the postage stamp method by the real power flow cross the 
predefined boundary, which is the first flow-based method. MW -mile method 
evaluates the unit cost o f individual lines by the capacity and distance, making it a 
milestone in transmission pricing methodology. After the development o f various
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enhanced M W -m iles methods, the process o f cost evaluation in pricing 
methodologies reached a mature period. Distribution factors methods, AC power 
flow methods, and tracing methods focus on the allocation o f each network asset cost. 
Chronologically, they are described in detail below:
The boundary flow m ethod incorporates the impact o f a sale on the transmission 
system to the gross change in real power flow, either on a line basis or on a net 
interchange basis [Hap 1994]. Following the load level represented in the power 
flows at peak load or at other appropriate load levels, there are two power flows 
executed, with or without the transaction, for every year. So these two power flows 
correspond to either individual boundary lines or net interchange real power flow. 
Using all boundary line flow or net interchange flow to replace the magnitude o f the 
user’s transacted power in the postage stamp method, it is called boundary flow 
method or power allocation method [Kov 1994]. This methodology is very close to 
the postage stamp m ethodology in Section 3.3.1, and a simplified algorithm is listed 
as below [Lee 2001]:
1. Calculate the net plant (NP) cost o f each line, the annual fixed charge rate 
(AFCR) for each year o f the study period, and the annual average embedded costs 
(AAEC). They are as same as the postage stamp methodology in Section 3.2.1.
2. Calculate the total annual wheeling costs (TAWC).
3.3.1 Boundary Flow Method
(1 L




TA WC = AAEC  ■ [ — ■ ANe{Interchangek
*=i
(3.7)
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Where,
L : the total number o f boundary lines,
K\ the total number o f net interchanged lines.
Each interchange consists o f a group o f boundary lines that connect the wheeling 
company with one specific neighbouring company. All the boundary lines may 
contain circular components o f MW flows, which do not visible in the net 
interchanged lines. For example, there are two boundary lines connected to the area 
A. If  there is a circular flow within a wheeling transaction as shown in Figure 3.1, the 
M W  flows for boundary lines and net interchanged lines can be calculated 
respectively as below:
L
£ |A W , |  = 10 + 10 = 20
/=1
K
' y  ANetlnter changek = 1 0 - 1 0  = 0
*=i
So it is clear to see the difference between Equation 3.6 and Equation 3.7.
10 MW Area
Figure 3.1: Circular flow’s example
Again, this methodology is also used to allocate the fixed transmission cost amongst 
the users o f firm transmission service.
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3.3.2 MW-Mile Method
The M W -mile method is a milestone in transmission pricing methodology. In this 
methodology, the transmission network capacity used for a transaction is a function 
o f the magnitude, the path and the distance travelled by the transacted power. Hence, 
this m ethodology is called “M W -mile m ethodology” [Shi 1989], Because it 
considers the changes in M W  flows and transmission line length, it is also known as 
“Line-By-Line methodology” [Hap 1994, Sha 2002]. Given a transaction with an 
actual point and specified variations in generation and load, the MW -mile 
methodology calculates the maximum transaction related power flow on every 
transmission line, using DC pow er flow and linear program ming algorithms. The 
maximum transaction related flow on every line is multiplied by the line length and a 
factor reflecting the cost per unit capacity o f the line [Shi 1989]. The detailed 
algorithm is demonstrated as below:
1. Determine the unit cost per M W  capacity (IV/) o f  the transmission line /,
W. = —  (3.8)a
Where,
Hi: the unit cost o f the transmission line, which is a function o f numerous
factors including the line voltage class, location, date o f construction, the conductors 
used (£/KM),
Qi: the transmission line capacity, which is dependent on its voltage class
and other factors such as the size and the type o f conductors used (MW).
2. Calculate the transmission cost related to the transaction t,
MWMILE, 'M u • Li) (3-9)
l e K
Where,
MWMILEi". total transmission network cost related to transaction / (£),
MWtj : line flow over the transmission line / for transaction t (MW),
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Li: length o f transmission line / (KM),
K: set o f lines.
3. Repeat the process for every transaction by considering only the generation 
and loads associated with that transaction.
4. The share o f the total transmission network capacity cost allocated to the 
transaction t can be calculated according to the following formula:
V (wr MWi r L.)
A4WMJT F  i ‘J i /
TC =TC • = ------------ ' -  = T C - ^ = n ------------------. (3.10)
Y^MWMILE,
t e T  l e T  l e K
Where,
TCt\ cost allocated to transaction t (£),
TC: total transmission network capacity cost (£),
MWMILEi: total transmission network cost related to transaction t (£),
T: set o f transactions.
This methodology was firstly introduced by Dariush Shimohammadi in 1989, and 
applied to two categories o f transactions. The first category specifies the locations 
and fixed values for the generation and load, and there is a power balance for the 
transaction. The other category identifies by the locations o f generation and load and 
the range o f variation in the generation and load [Shi 1989]. The M W -M ile method is 
the first pricing method proposed for the recovery o f fixed transmission costs based 
on the actual use o f  the transmission network. Equation 3.10 also can be rewritten as:









C, = TC • / — I— r : is called embedded cost o f line /.
t eT
Chapter 3 Pricing Methodologies o f  Transmission Networks 43
The M W -mile methodology takes into account parallel power flow, and eliminates 
the problem o f  previous transmission pricing methods. It is intuitively logical and a 
conceptually straightforward approach to implement. Although it needs a 
recalculation o f power flows in all lines if  network configuration changes, this 
method is still favoured by TRANSCOs because it directly encourages the efficient 
use o f the transmission network.
3.3.3 Enhanced MW-Mile Methods
There are many other methodologies that have been investigated that are based on 
the M W -mile method, and modify the real power flow (MW ) by another format. So 
they are generally called enhanced MW -mile methods.
1. Modulus MW-Mile Method
It is also called the usage method, and assumes that all agents have to pay for the 
actual capacity use and for the additional reserve [Kov 1994]. A simple way to 
ensure the recovery o f all embedded costs, based on the M W -mile method while 
retaining its advantages, is to replace the circuit capacities by the sum o f absolute 
power flow and the additional reserve capacity [Sha 2002]. A simple formulation is 





£  1 ^ , - 1
t eT
(3.12)
The reserve capacity may be due to the need o f system meeting reliability, stability 
and security criteria, or due to inefficient system design. However, there is no 
incentive for the agent to alleviate the circuit load, improve the system performance 
and postpone transmission investment [Lim 1996].
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To compare with other M W -mile methods, an example is set to demonstrate the 
modulus M W -mile method. In Figure 3.2, it assumes that the transaction 2 is made 
by a counter flow.
A -------------------------------------------------  B
N et flow: A —► B 1OOMW
including:
Transaction 1: A —► B 110MW
Transaction 2: A <— B 10MW
Figure 3.2: Counter flow’s example
Using Equation 3.12,
l e K
Cr t w = Cr 10 + C ,. 10110 +  10 ' 110  +  10
V le T
So the final cost o f each transaction by the modulus M W -mile method is:
110
wheeling cost for transaction 1 : C,-
wheeling cost for transaction 2 : C,
110 + 10 
10
110 + 10
The counter flow is charged as same as net flow.
2. Zero Counter-Flow Method
Counter flow is the flow component contributed by a particular transaction that goes 
in the opposite direction o f the net flow. In the zero counter-flow method, only the 
agents that use the circuit in the same direction o f the net flow, pay in proportion to 
their contributions to the total positive flow [Lim 1996, Pan 2000].





TK: set o f transactions with positive flows on the circuit K.
Using Equation 3.13, the same example shown in Figure 3.2 is taken:
V iK eT K
So the final cost o f each transaction by the zero counter-flow method is:
wheeling cost for transaction 1: C ,-------
100
wheeling cost for transaction 2 : 0
The null cost for transaction 2 explains the name o f “zero counter-flow” method 
directly.
This method assumes that the net flow reduction is beneficial, but it is not true if 
there is already an “excess” installed capacity. M oreover, for a lightly loaded circuit, 
there is a discontinuity on the charges when the net flow changes the direction [Lim
3. Dominant Flow Method
The dominant flow method is a combination o f  the modulus method and zero 
counter-flow method [Lim 1995, Lim 1996]. The circuit capacity is divided into two 
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f
ClA = C, ■ — : embedded cost o f line / o f  base capacity,
Qi
Q -  f
Cjg = Cj • —— — : embedded cost o f line / o f  additional capacity,
Qi
f : total flow o f circuit 1,
Qf. capacity o f circuit 1,
Using Equation 3.14, the same example shown in Figure 3.2 is taken:
TC, = X
l e K
m w ,k , ^  K
V IKeTK l e T
100  ^  110  ^  10
100 110 + 10 110 + 10
So the final cost o f each transaction is:
r  ^  100 _ 110 W heeling cost lor transaction 1: CIA ■ + Cm ----------
100 110  +  10 
10W heeling cost for transaction 2 : Cm
“  110 + 10
Using dominant flow method, the participant who uses the system in the counter 
flow direction receives an incentive in the terms o f smaller costs. From the above 
example, when the circuit is near to fully loaded, the C/b is near to zero. It means that 
the incentive increases as the circuit gets more loaded. This can encourage reducing 
the circuit loading condition to postpone the expansion plan. Therefore, the dominant 
flow method can take the advantages from both the modulus MW -mile and the zero 
counter-flow methods, and represent counter flow in a practical way. But, it is not 
easy for transmission companies to arrange payments to users.
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3.3.4 Distribution Factors Methods
In general, generation distribution factors are calculated based on line load flow, and 
have been used in the domain o f power system security and contingency analysis [Ng 
1981, Rud 1995], because they can approximate the relationship between the 
generation and load values on transmission line flow. Distribution factors based on 
DC power flows can be used for the evaluation o f the transmission capacity usage 
under various open access structures. In recent years, the application o f distribution 
factors have been assigned to allocate the transmission cost amongst the different 
users, i.e., to transaction-related net power injections which are called Generation 
Shift Distribution Factors (GSDFs), to generators only which are called Generalized 
Generation Distribution Factors (GGDFs), or to loads only which are called 
Generalized Load Distribution Factors (GLDFs).
1. Generation Shift Distribution Factors (GSDFs)
GSDFs, or A factors, provide line flow changes due to a change in generation, which 
are used to identify the maximum transaction-related flow for bounded generation 
and load injections [Ng 1981, Rud 1995, Sha 2002].
Where,
AFt_k : change in flow in line 1-k which from bus 1 to bus k,
Ai-k/. a factor o f a line joining buses / and k, due to shift o f generation on 
generator
A G ,: change in generation o f generator /, excluding the reference generator
r,
AGr : change in generation o f  reference generator r,
(3.15)
AG, = -A G r (3.16)
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Ai-kS. is calculated using the definition o f a reactance matrix and the DC
load flow, which can be calculated as below:
AF, t AI, t
A, = (3.17)
' AG, AI,
A V  Y  — Y
&I,-k = — t L = ‘ fc-A7, (3.18)
l-k A  i_k
Where,
AI ,_k : change in current in line l-k, due to shift o f generation from AG, to
AG,,
A7/ : change in injection current into bus /,
NVt_k : change in voltage in line l-k, due to shift o f  generation from AG, to
A G ,,
Xn,Xki\ elements o f the reactance matrix, which is from the reverse o f  the 
admittance matrix without the reference bus,
Xj.y. reactance in line l-k.
Therefore,
A,.tj = X , i~ Xtl (3.19)
^  l-k
The values o f GSDFs are dependent on the network configuration and the selection 
o f reference bus, while they are independent o f the total generation o f the system and 
the distribution o f generation or load. Using GSDFs, the incremental cost o f 
transmission network by generators can be measured.
2. Generalized Generation Distribution Factors (GGDFs)
GGDFs, or D factors, determine the impact o f each generator to line flows [Ng 1981, 
Rud 1995, Sha 2002], Based on the A factors from GSDFs, GGDFs are defined as:
= (3-20)
1=1






N : numbers o f generator,
Fi.k'. total real power flow in line l-k after shift,
Di-kX- GGDF o f a line l-k corresponding to the generation at bus i,
Gt: total generation at bus i,
Dm / .  GGDF o f  a line l-k, due to the generation at reference bus r,
F/.k : original flow in line l-k before shift.
GGDFs depend on line parameters and system configuration, and not on the choice 
o f reference bus. GGDFs can measure the total use o f transmission network facilities 
produced by generator injections. Using GGDF, each network line cost can be 
allocated to individual generators.
3. Generalized Load Distribution Factors (GLDFs)
GLDFs, or C factors, are very sim ilar to GGDFs [Rud 1995, Sha 2002]. GGDFs 
determine the contribution o f each load to line flows.
(3.23)





F,.k: total real power flow in line l-k after shift,
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o.
GLDF o f a line l-k corresponding to the generation at bus r, 
Total demand at bus j ,
GLDF o f a line l-k, due to the generation at reference bus r, 
original flow in line l-k before shift.
GLDFs also depend on line parameters, system configuration and not on the choice 
o f reference bus. GLDFs can measure the total use o f transmission network facilities 
by loads which are treated as negative injection. Using GLDF, each network line cost 
can be allocated to individual loads.
The AC flow sensitivity indices method use the same logic as the distribution factors 
methods, but is based on AC power flow calculation instead o f DC power flow. Two 
indices are introduced below, including line utilisation factor for real power pricing, 
and reactive power adjustment factor for reactive power pricing.
Similar to the distribution factors, line utilisation factors were introduced to evaluate 
the sensitivity o f the flow on a line with respect to power generation at all buses [Par 
1998, Cha 2002], The relationship between the incremental line flow and the 
incremental power generation at any bus via line utilisation factors is given as 
follows:
The numerical values o f line utilisation factors can be calculated using standard AC 
power flow Jacobian m atrix with some m inor simplifications [Par 1998].
3.3.5 AC Flow Sensitivity Indices Methods
(3.26)
The concept o f a reactive power adjustment factor was introduced as a measure o f 
the impact o f unit M VA load change, or a transaction on the total generation reactive
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power output [Hao 1997], The author mentioned that reactive power losses are 
typically about ten times greater than active power losses due to the inductive nature 
o f transmission line. The formulation o f a reactive power adjustment factor (RPAF) 
is shown below, involving only the sensitivity indices o f network reactive power 
losses o f the active and reactive injections, together with appropriate scaling factors.
RPAF = Aq, + a  • ^ loss . g. . Aqt + f3 • ^ loss . <j.. Ap, (3.27)
dq, dp,
Where,
Qi0Ss’. the transmission network reactive power losses,
Aqf, Ajp.: the unit reactive and active power load at bus z,
a , [3: scaling factors that can be used to reconcile the difference
between the total reactive power losses and the total incremental reactive power 
losses,
, cr : scaling factors for ensuring that the load increments at bus i
are consistent with specified power factors.
Based on the line utilisation factor and the reactive power adjustment factor, the AC 
flow sensitivity indices methods can bring more detailed real and reactive cost 
information to study the impact o f wheeling transaction.
3.3.6 Transaction Assessment Methods
Transaction assessment methods are also based on the full AC power flow solution, 
including power flow decomposition methods and multi-transactions assessment 
methods.
Accurate decomposition o f power flow into flows contributed by individual 
transactions is essential for cost-based pricing o f transmission services. The power
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flow decomposition m ethod proposes an approach to decompose network flows into 
components associated with each particular transaction, and an interaction 
component, based on the superposition o f all transactions on the network [Zob 1997a, 
Zob 1997b]. It can then calculate the power flows and imbalance on the network 
subject to each given economic transaction using distributed slack bus. The power 
imbalance caused by a particular transaction can be compensated for by allocating 
the net system power imbalance amongst different embedded generating units 
according to the participation factors. The transmission system related fixed cost 
component is recovered from all transactions based on percentage utilisation o f the 
transmission system equipment. Then, the operating costs for a given transaction can 
be computed as the sum o f the costs incurred for compensating the power imbalance.
A power flow based on multi-transaction assessment methodology was introduced 
[Bar 1999], which is based on comparing the difference between power flow 
simulations, including the difference between base case (no transactions) and 
operating case (all transactions), and only transaction t case, and all transactions 
except t case. The methodology determines for each transaction the following: the 
flow path o f the transaction (both real and reactive power flow changes caused by a 
transaction); generator reactive power support from each area/utility; and real power 
loss support from each area/utility. It is then determined how much should be 
allocated to this transaction.
All transaction assessment methods are a very precise way to assign the cost to 
network users, but they require more detailed network cost information.
3.3.7 Tracing Methods
Tracing methodologies determine the contribution o f transmission users to 
transmission usage, and are generally based on the proportional sharing principle.
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Each transmission asset cost can then be shared between different users in different 
proportion. Unlike the distribution factors methods, tracing methods are not 
restricted by the network configuration.
1. Bialek’s Tracing Method
This method assesses the magnitude o f the real and reactive power output from a 
particular generator goes to a particular load. It also assesses the contributions o f 





















Figure 3.3: Proportional sharing principle
In B ialek’s tracing method, it is assumed that nodal inflows are shared proportionally 
among nodal outflows (Figure 3.1). Before executing Bialek’s tracing method, it is 
necessary to get the result o f the power flow which is a basic and vital calculation o f 
the power system analysis. The algorithm for tracing the flow o f electricity is derived 
into two versions. One is the upstream-looking algorithm, which looks at the nodal 
balance o f inflows; the other is the downstream-looking algorithm which finds the 
nodal balance o f outflow. The following shows how the upstream-looking algorithm 
works. The gross demand is defined as the sum o f a particular load and its allocated 
part o f the total transmission loss. The topological distribution factor refers to the kth 
generator’s contribution to line i-j flow.
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p* = i t ■p? = 3 "  Z  t a 1 L • = Z  ^  > j e <3 -28)f  f  *-=1 *=l
W here,
^  = £ | ^ / |  + ^ , i = . U . . . , n (3.29)
J££“
[A.L = fcl f r  
0
t = J 
je c d ;  
otherwise
(3.30)
p* • I A -11 P • I a _1 I
Q g  _  'J I u -I'* ^  v  L « (3 31)
And
Pjf: Unknown gross line flow in line i-j,
P f : Unknown gross nodal power flow through node i,
Au: Upstream distribution matrix,
Pgk• Generation in node K,
a dt : Set o f nodes supplied directly from node i,
a “ : Set o f buses supplying directly bus i,
DfJ k : Topological distribution factors.
Based on the proportional sharing principle, the reactive power can be also traced 
and priced. Using the topological distribution factors based on the upstream-looking 
algorithm, transmission usage charge is allocated to individual generators. 
Alternatively, using the topological distribution factors based on the downstream- 
looking algorithm, transmission usage charge is allocated to individual loads.
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2. Kirschen’s Tracing Method
Kitshchen’s tracing method is based on a set o f definitions for domains, commons, 
and links [Kir 1997, Kir 1999]. A domain is a set o f buses that obtain power from a 
particular generator. A common is a set o f contiguous buses supplied by the same set 
o f generators. Links are branches that interconnect commons. After the definitions, 
the state o f the system is represented by a directed graph that consists o f commons 
and links, with directed flows between commons and the corresponding data for 
generations/loads in commons and the flows on links. As for the B ialek’s tracing 
method, this method assumes that the proportion o f inflow traced to a particular 
generator is equal to the proportion o f outflow traced to the same particular generator 
for a given common.
Starting from a root common, the method finds recursively the contribution o f each 
com m on’s generator (load) to line flows and consumed loads. Here a proportionality 
assumption is used to contribute the outflow o f a common to the inflow o f a common. 
Finally, usage cost o f a transmission system can be allocated to generators or loads 
on the basis o f their contribution to each branch flow.
3.4 Comparison of Embedded Pricing Methods
Table 3.1 summarizes aforementioned embedded pricing paradigms include non- 
flow-based and flow-based pricing methods.
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3.5 Incremental/Marginal Pricing Methods
Incremental/marginal pricing methods assign part or all o f the incremental cost o f 
accommodating a transmission transaction directly to that transaction. There are two 
factors associated with these methods. One is for the concern o f tim e either short-run 
or long-run, which has been explained in Chapter 2. The other is the factor o f pricing 
based on either incremental or marginal cost. The major difference between 
incremental cost and marginal cost is how the additional transaction is estimated. 
Incremental cost is based on comparing the transmission costs with or without the 
entire additional transaction. The marginal cost approach calculates the cost o f a unit 
o f additional transaction, and multiplies the cost o f a unit by the size o f the additional 
transaction [Sha 2002, Shi 1996]. Incremental/marginal pricing methods are mainly 
used to determine the price o f a transmission transaction. They are also used in the 
composite pricing paradigm to determine the incremental component o f transmission 
prices.
3.5.1 Short-Run Incremental Cost (SRIC)
The short-run incremental cost pricing methodology evaluates and assigns the 
operating cost associated with an additional transmission transaction to the existing
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transactions. The transmission transaction operating costs can be estimated using an 
optimal power flow model that accounts for all operating constraints, including 
transmission system constraints and generation scheduling constraints [Shi 1996]. As 
introduced in chapter 2, the operating cost, opportunity cost and existing cost are the 
most significant factors in the SRIC pricing methodology. It should be noted that the 
SRIC o f a transmission transaction could be negative.
There are several concerns related to the SRIC pricing method. Firstly, in order to 
provide timely economic signals to transmission customers, there are serious 
technical challenges involved in accurately evaluating and forecasting the operating 
cost. Secondly, it is difficult to allocate the SRIC among several transactions that are 
collectively responsible for changes in operating cost. Thirdly, SRIC can not make 
efficient economic decisions for long-term transmission transaction. Therefore, the 
SRIC pricing method is a limited concept, difficult to execute in electricity markets.
3.5.2 Long-Run Incremental Cost (LRIC)
The long-run incremental cost pricing m ethodology entails all the costs including the 
reinforcement cost to accommodate a new transmission transaction. The standard 
LRIC pricing method uses a traditional system planning approach to determine 
reinforcements that are required, and corresponding investment schedules with and 
without each transaction [Hap 1994]. The basic steps include:
1. Preliminary calculation, with which all the cost and investment data are 
prepared.
2. Computations o f annual revenue requirement (ARR) and the present worth 
revenue requirement (PW RR) o f each reinforcement project.
3. Change in PW RR without all reinforcement projects, and with all 
reinforcement projects.
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4. Allocate the change in PW RR to each transaction. There are four separate 
methods: $/MW allocation, $/MW Mile allocation, interface flow allocation by 
regions, and one by one allocation [Hap 1994].
The reinforcement cost component can be evaluated based on the changes caused by 
long term transmission plans due to the transmission transaction. Although the 
concept o f LRIC is straightforward, the forecasting reinforcement cost scenarios 
become more and more inaccurate as time goes by. It should be noted that LRIC 
methodologies are difficult to numerically evaluate.
3.5.3 Short-Run Marginal Cost (SRMC)
The short-run marginal cost for any point in time associated with the operation o f  the 
electric power sector as a whole is the marginal cost o f supplying an additional unit 
o f  demand holding the capital stock constant [Tab 1994]. The marginal operating 
cost is the cost o f accommodating a marginal increase in the transacted power. The 
M arginal operating cost per M W  can be estimated as the difference in the optimal 
cost o f power at all points o f delivery and receipt o f that transaction, which can be 
calculated using OPF sensitivity methods [Mer 1989, Gri 1990]. The marginal 
operating cost is then multiplied by the magnitude o f the transacted power to get the 
SRMC. SRMC prices are normally higher than the actual operating cost, in order to 
provide the profit to fund future transmission expansion. But if  the magnitude o f the 
transacted power is large compared to the magnitude o f the native load in the 
transmission system, short run marginal costs will fall far short, discouraging the 
transmission reinforcement.
The earliest SRMC evolved from the theory o f an hourly spot price [Sch 1985, Car 
1986]. The spot wheeling rate are used for different types o f wheeling: utility-to- 
utility, customer-to-customer, customer-to-utility, and utility-to- customer. W heeling
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Rate Evaluation Simulator (WRATES) is the one o f earliest computer program for 
SRMC calculation, based on marginal operating cost and revenue reconciliation 
adjustments for capital recovery [Car 1989]. There are many SRMCs that have been 
developed, which include JUANAC/Transcost (ITT, M adrid) [Rub 2000], ESCORT 
(CEGB modified by NGC, UK) and PSS/OPF (PTI, Schenectady, NY). SRMC is 
usually used to correct and balance the transmission fixed cost [Jin 2003].
3.5.4 Long-Run Marginal Cost (LRMC)
The long-run marginal cost is defined as the marginal cost o f supplying an additional 
unit o f  energy, when the installed capacity o f the system is allowed to increase 
optimally in response to the marginal increase in demand. As such, it incorporates 
both capital and operating costs for the system as a whole.
In this pricing methodology, the marginal operating and reinforcement costs o f the 
power system are used to determine the final prices for a transmission transaction. 
The marginal operating cost is as the same as the short run marginal cost, and the 
reinforcement cost is determined with a similar approach using the long run 
incremental cost. The long run marginal cost prices will influence transmission 
expansions, hence avoid the disadvantage o f short run marginal cost prices. The main 
concern is the applicability and the allocation o f long run marginal cost prices.
Compared with SRMC, LRMC provides a simpler calculation process since the 
values are calculated based on long term plans. W hile they are stable within an 
annual time frame, they tend to be more volatile for calculation o f network values on 
a year to year basis, because they are affected by the timing o f individual investment 
decisions. There are two existing examples. Developed by the National Grid 
Company (NGC), UK, the first is called the Investment Cost-Related Pricing (ICRP) 
model. The other is called the DC load flow Investment Cost-Related Pricing (DCLF
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ICRP) model [Bak 2001], ICRP was introduced without load flow calculation in 
1993/94, and was replaced by DCLF ICRP in April, 2004. The details o f DCLF 
ICRP are described in the following section.
3.6 Investment Cost Related Pricing (ICRP) in 
the UK
In theory, it is desirable that generation is placed as close as possible to the demand 
centre. In practice, demand centres are physically located in urban areas, where 
generation capacity additions are difficult. Therefore, there are various transmission 
pricing methodologies employed in different countries to operate the transmission 
networks more effectively.
Background information o f the electrical power market in the UK has been 
introduced in the first chapter. Here follows the detailed application o f N G C ’s 
Investment Cost Related Pricing (ICRP), which can be treated as a long run marginal 
cost m ethodology [Ngc 2006b].
The NGC Transmission Network Use o f System (TNUoS) tariff comprises two 
separate elements. One is a locational varying element derived from the DCLF 
Investment Cost Related Pricing (ICRP) transport model, to reflect the costs 
including capital investment cost, maintenance and operation cost. The other is a 
non-locationally varying element related to the provision o f residual revenue 
recovery.
The process for calculating the TNUoS is divided into three steps:
1. The DCLF ICRP transport model.
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2. Calculation o f zonal marginal km.
3. Deriving the final £/KW  tariff.
3.6.1 The DCLF ICRP Transport Model
On 1st April 2004, National Grid implemented a new use o f system charging 
methodology, among other things, a DC load flow (DCLF) ICRP Transport Model 
that replaces the original ICPR Transport Model. The DCLF ICRP transport model 
calculates the marginal cost o f investment in the transmission system, which is 
required as a consequence o f an increase in demand or generation at each node based 
on a peak condition study. The DCLF ICRP transport model enable the 
differentiation o f the basic nodal costs to be determined, and also allows sensitivity 
analysis concerning alternative developments o f generation and demand to be 
undertaken [Ngc 2006b].
For the purposes o f the DCLF Transport algorithm, it has been assumed that the 
value o f circuit impedance is equal to the value o f circuit reactance (ignore the 
resisters). Consider the following 3 nodes network:
G en = 650N  
D em  = 100fi
3km  2 7 5 k V  O H L N ode \  G en  ■ 8 4 5 M W  
B ]  D em  = 5 0 M W
Im pedance = 2 X
/  2km  4 0 0 k V  cable  
/  Im pedance  = X
6km  4 0 0 k V  O H L
10km  4 0 0 k V  O H L  
Im pedance  = X
N ode
G en = OMW  
D em  = 1 0 0 0 M W
Total G en  = 1 4 9 5 M W  
Total D em  = 1 1 50 M W  
G en  Scaling Factor =  
0 .7 6 9 2 3 0 8
►----------- ^  D enotes cable
Figure 3.4: DCLF ICRP transport model (1) [Ngc 2006b]
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The first step is to match total demand and total generation by scaling uniformly the 
nodal generation down such that total system generation equals total system demand. 
Node A Generation = 1150 / 1495 • 650 MW = 500 MW 
Node B Generation = 1150 / 1495 ■ 845 MW = 650 MW
This gives the following balanced system:
cable circuit expansion factor is 10 and the 275kV overhead line circuit expansion 
factor is 2, the DCLF transport algorithm calculates the base case power flows as 
follows:
Gen = 500MW 
Dem = 100MW





 \   O Gen = 650MW
A /  Dem = 50MWy  
2km 400kV cable
Total Scaled Gen = 
1150MW 
Total Dem = 1150MW
Gen = 0MW 
Dem = 1000MW
Figure 3.5: DCLF IC R P tran sp o rt model (2) [Ngc 2006b]
Assuming Node A is the reference node, each circuit has impedance X. The 400kV
Gen = 500MW 
Dem = 100MW




6 + (2 x 10) = 26km & Imp =X10km & 
Imp =X
power flows from node A to node C 
inversely proportional to the sum of 
impedances for AC and ABC. The
Node
y  i pedances for AC and ABC. The
Gen = 0MW same PrinciP|e is true f ° r node B
Dem = 1000MW Super-position of these derives final 
net circuit flows for AB, AC & BC
Figure 3.6: DCLF ICRP transport  model (3) [Ngc 2006b]
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Nodes A and B export, whilst Node C imports. Hence the DCLF algorithm derives 
flows to deliver export power from Nodes A and B to meet import needs at Node C.
Step 1: Net export from Node A is 400MW; route AC has impedance X and
route AB-BC has impedance 3X; hence 300MW would flow down AC and 100MW 
along AB-BC
Step 2: Net export from Node B is 600MW; route BC has impedance X and
route BA-AC has impedance 3X; hence 450MW would flow down BC and 150MW 
along BA-AC
Step 3: Using super-position to add the flows derived in Steps 1 and 2 derive
the following;
Flow AC = 300 MW + 150 MW = 450 MW
Flow A B =  100 MW -  150 MW = -50 MW
Flow BC = 100 MW + 450 MW = 550 MW
Total cost = (450 * 10) + (50 * 6) + (550 * 26) = 19,100 MWkm
(Base case)
We then ‘inject’ 1 MW of generation at each node with a corresponding 1MW offtake 
(demand) at the reference node and recalculate the total MWkm cost. The difference
in cost from the base case is the marginal km or shadow cost. This is demonstrated as
follows:
Gen = 500MW / Node \ 6km; 2X f Node \  Gen = 650MW




Gen = 1 MW 
Dem = 1000MW
Figure 3.7: DCLF IC R P transport  model (4) [Ngc 2006b]
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To calculate the marginal km at node C:
Total Cost = (449.25 * 10) + (50.25 * 6) + (549.75 * 26) = 19,087.5 MW km 
Thus the overall cost has reduced by 12.5 (i.e. the marginal km = -12.5).
The nodal marginal km is amalgamated into zones by weighting them by their 
relevant generation or demand capacity. The criteria are used to determine the zonal 
boundaries [Ngc 2006b]:
1. Zones should contain relevant nodes whose marginal costs are all within +/- 
£1/KW  across.
2. The nodes within zones should be geographically and electrically proximate.
3. Relevant nodes are considered to be the only ones with generation connected to 
them, which contribute to the calculation o f the zonal generation tariff.
The zonal marginal km for generation is calculated as:
3.6.2 Calculation of Zonal Marginal KM
NM km , • Gen
(3.32)









Nodal generation from the transport model, 
Nodal marginal km form transport model, 
W eighted nodal marginal km,
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ZMkm : Zonal marginal km.
Similarly, the zonal marginal km for demand is calculated as:
- 1  • NM km , • Dem ,
WNMkm , = -------- ^ — J-------- J-  (3.34)
j e D i




Dem : Nodal demand from the transport model.
3.6.3 Deriving Final £/KW Tariff
The zonal marginal costs are converted into costs by multiplying the marginal costs 
by the expansion constant and locational security factor.
The expansion constant (£/M W km) represents the annual value o f the transmission 
infrastructure capital investment required to transport 1 MW over 1 km. Because the 
circuit expansion factors take nodal marginal cost into consideration, the expansion 
constant is determined from the m anufactures’ budgetary prices o f 400 KV overhead 
line. For 2006/2007 it is £10.07/M W km [Ngc 2006b].
The security factor is derived using a Secured DCLF (SECULF) program which 
calculates the marginal cost for each node, taking into account the requirem ent to 
secure against a set o f contingencies. The secure and intact marginal costs are 
compared on a nodal basis and a “least squares fit” employed to derive the GB 
security factor [Ngc 2006b].
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1. Correct T ransport T ariff
(ZMkma + C )-E C -L SF  = CTTa  (3.36)
(ZMkma  -C )-E C  ■ LSF  = CTTa  (3.37)
W here,
C: Generation/Demand split correction constant (km), which is to meet
CTTa /  CTTa = 27 /  73. This has been determined by the Authority for generation 
and demand respectively [Ngc 2006b],
EC: Expansion factor (£/M W km),
LSF : Locational security factor,
ZMkma: Zonal marginal km for each generation zone (km),
CTTa’. “Generation/Demand split” corrected transport tariff
for each generation zone (£/MW),
ZMkma'. Zonal marginal km for each demand zone (km),
CTTa’. “Generation/Demand split” corrected transport tariff
for each demand zone (£/MW).
21
Y j(CTTg, G 0)  = CTRR0 (3.38)
Gi=1
£  (C 7T„ •£>„) = CTRRd (3.39)
Di=1
CTRR: Generation / Demand split corrected transport revenue.
2. The Residual Tariff
R T i J p ; P T R R ) - C r R ^  (3 4Q)
2 X
Di=\
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RT : Residual tariff (£/MW),
p : Proportion o f revenue to be recovered from demand (27%),
PTRR : Total transport revenue (£),
CTRR: Generation / Demand split corrected transport revenue (£).
3. Final £/KW Tariff
C7T„ + RTnPi 
1000f t Di = (3-42)
FT = CTT°' + RT° (3 43)
G '  1000
Where,
FT: Final TNUoS tariff (£/KW).
To sum up, in order to calculate the generation tariffs, it is necessary to evaluate a 
generation weighted zonal marginal km cost, m odify by a re-referencing quantity to 
ensure that the revenue recovery split between generation and demand is correct, 
multiply by the security factor, then add a constant (termed the residual cost) to get 
the overall tariff. Example o f the zonal generation and demand tariff are shown in 
Appendix A -l and Appendix A-2.
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Chapter 4 
Pricing Methodologies of Distribution 
Networks
Besides the efficient pricing o f transmission networks, pricing methodology o f 
distribution networks has been another cornerstone o f the ongoing decentralized 
market. With the explanation o f distribution network pricing regulations, this chapter 
reviews pricing methodologies o f distribution networks. Finally, the use o f system 
charging methodology o f the UK’s distribution company demonstrates the bottom-up 
pricing scheme under price cap regulation.
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4.1 Chapter Introduction
As described in Chapter three, transmission pricing has reached a certain maturity in 
the last decade, during which many methods had been proposed. Contrarily, given 
the limited number o f distribution-connected generation in the past, the tariffs o f 
distribution networks are similar to postage stamp rate, which has been introduced as 
the earliest and simplest o f transmission pricing methodologies. The distribution 
prices are mainly set for suppliers and large customers according to their voltage 
levels and types, regardless o f locations, network configuration, power flow, and so 
on. The pricing structure also treats distribution-connected generation very 
differently from demand customers and transmission-connected generation.
Following the development o f generators’ technology and the aspiration o f a low 
carbon future, more new small-scale embedded generators are planning to connect to 
the distribution network. Thus, the non-discriminatory access to distribution network 
is the vehicle for promoting the necessary competition in generation and suppliers. 
Distribution tariffs that are too high or too low, or inappropriately structured, will 
hamper efforts to facilitate true competition. The existing distribution methodologies 
run out o f their ability to produce an economic price signal for generators.
Because the whole transmission network is firmly interconnected and operated co- 
ordinately, the characteristic o f the transmission network is commonly described as a 
“grid”. How to determine the extended use o f the system for network users is a key 
issue for all the transmission pricing methodologies. However, the distribution 
network is described as “radial” . Since all new connection assets, once installed and 
energised, become part o f the distribution system, there is an inevitably close 
association between connection charge and “use o f system” charging. M oreover, the 
way in which each user accesses the distribution system can be different at the same 
connection point. The direct application o f the transmission pricing methods to the
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distribution system seems difficult, especially when the voltages are lower than 
11KV. The reason being there is no metering and data below 11KV. The nature o f 
the network makes it very complex to keep a track on all the assets o f urban and rural 
areas, and identify the impact o f each distribution user on the expansion o f this 
system [Lim 2002]. So a long term distribution pricing methodology is still a 
challenge for government, industries, and researchers [Jam 2005, Str 2005, Tur 2005]. 
The existing pricing methodologies o f distribution networks will be reviewed 
following an explanation o f distribution network pricing regulations.
4.2 Regulation of Distribution Network Pricing
Since distribution business is still a monopoly, it cannot be presided from economic 
regulation. Although it is necessary to define an allocation rule for the allowed 
revenue, which is periodically established by the regulator, the regulation concerning 
price control plays a more important role than the price allocation in a traditional 
distribution business. There are two main approaches to preventing monopolistic 
infrastructure companies from charging excessively high prices: rate o f return 
regulation and incentive regulation [Lim 2002]. Incentive regulation includes price 
cap regulation and yardstick competition regulation.
4.2.1 Rate-of-return and Incentive
Rate o f return regulation means that the regulator will set the excepted rate o f return 
on the distribution network owners’ (DNOs) capital. The central idea is that 
monopoly companies should be required to charge the price that would prevail in a
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competitive market, which is equal to efficient costs o f  production plus a market 
determined rate o f return on capital. Rate o f return regulation has been criticised 
because it encourages more capital investment than it needs. Contrarily, incentive 
regulations have been applied in order to incentive the company to be more efficient. 
W hatsoever, the major task o f distribution regulation is to ensure that tariff settings 
allow the company to recover its costs plus a reasonable return on its capital, taking 
into account the risks faced by the company, while promoting incentives to achieve 
greater efficiency [Rud 2000].
In practice, the distinction between rate-of-retum regulation and incentive regulation 
may be lost, as regulators may end up making implicit decisions on the acceptable 
real rates o f return on capital employed, in order to arrive at price limit 
determinations.
4.2.2 Price Cap and Yardstick Competition
Price cap and yardstick competition are two main types o f incentive regulation.
Price cap regulation occurs when the regulator sets caps on service prices that the 
utility is allowed to charge. The prices are adjusted periodically to account for 
inflation, technological progress and exogenous changes. Revenue cap regulation is 
the same as price cap regulation except the com pany’s revenue is restricted by the 
inflation-productivity index [Jami 2005]. Compared with rate o f return regulation, 
price cap regulation has two advantages. Firstly, it provides incentives for 
distribution companies to improve efficiency, to minimize short-term costs. Since 
prices are fixed in short-term, any short-term cost reductions achieved by the utility 
are translated directly into increased profits. Secondly, it is relatively easy to 
implement a price cap on the regulator’s operational view [Sas 2006]. However, in 
the long run, the low price caps will defer the investment to keep the potential upside
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profits, and the high price caps will encourage distribution companies to invest in 
new capacity, in order to increase their production therefore leading to market 
surplus. Thus, price cap regulation can produce an inefficient signal for research and 
development. This problem can be ameliorated by a regulatory lag between the 
implementation o f a technological advancement and the resulting price cap change, 
giving the utility time to fully benefit from the technological advancement [Lim 
2002].
In the UK, price cap has been used to regulate the newly privatized utilities industry 
since the mid 1980s. It is very well known as the official Retail Price Index, minus X 
(RPI-X), a percentage reflecting the excess o f a target growth rate o f efficiency for 
the regulated industry over the average growth rate o f  efficiency for the whole 
country [Tur 1997]. Under the RPI-X form o f regulation, the regulator can control 
the change in average prices charged by a utility so that they do not exceed the 
increase in inflation.
Yardstick regulation approach aims to make private m onopoly companies compete 
with a reference efficient fictitious model company. So it is also called “benchmark 
regulation” . The scheme compares the real distribution company with a model 
company, established in specific geographical areas, reflecting the differences 
introduced by economics o f scope arising from population density and the size o f 
networks [Rec 2002]. The rewards or penalties are based on selected dimensions o f 
service performance. The regulator may adjust the measures o f  performance to 
account for differences among suppliers in operational conditions [Lim 2002]. 
Yardstick regulation brings an element o f competition into regulation, and also aids 
the regulator by making the distribution cost and operation information more reliable 
and easier to obtain. Although more complex to apply, yardstick regulation seems to 
be more suitable to the distribution activity, and the concepts are currently under 
development by several South American countries, such as Chile, Brazil [Rud 2000, 
Lim 2002].
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4.3 Distribution Pricing Methods
The approaches to calculate the distribution price are very basic and limited. The 
methods to calculate the base price include top-down and bottom-up, which come 
from two strategies o f information processing and knowledge ordering, and a 
proposed framework from the University o f M anchester Institute o f Science and 
Technology (UMIST) [Str 2005].
4.3.1 Top-down
Under the top-down approach, moving from general to specific, the distribution base 
price is derived by subtracting generation, transmission and commercialization costs 
from the traditional whole electricity price. The price can then be applied into 
various components o f the distribution network. Because the top-down approach 
begins with the big picture and wide-angle views, the top-down model has advantage 
o f staying focused on the goal. It facilitates the energy regulator to control the energy 
price. One o f the disadvantages is that it usually keeps distortions from the old 
regime. It may be used as an interim approach, so as not to impose a sudden impact 
on the balance o f the distribution companies, which is currently the case in Brazil.
4.3.2 Bottom-up
By contrast, under a bottom-up approach, the distribution base price is calculated by 
analyzing the cost o f distribution service components, regardless o f the full-service 
cost. It is necessary for each distribution company to identify each circuit and
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substation belonging to their system. Because the price is derived from the individual 
parts and detailed components, the bottom-up method makes more sense than the 
top-down method in distribution system. Another advantage is that it is more 
attractive and more consistent with transmission pricing methods. Although it is a 
m ajor challenge for energy regulator to decide how deep it should go in terms o f 
scanning all cost components. Form the bottom-up approach, it is possible to create a 
distribution model as a yardstick model, to serve as the basis for the yardstick 
regulation.
4.3.3 UMIST’s Model
The UMIST model is a symmetrical area-differentiated approach to the estimate o f 
the long-run unit distribution cost o f demand and o f distributed generation [Tur 
2005]. Figure 4.1 shows the steps in the derivation o f time o f use location network 
use o f system charges.
The advantages o f U M IST’s model include: it recognises the interaction o f 
generation and demand, it analyzes the power flow on each separate part o f the 
network in the identified periods, including maximum load and secure generation 
output (summer off-peak), minimum load and maximum generation (winter peak), it 
produces nodal price rather than aggregative results. There remains some weakness 
with this model. Although the size o f  the incremental demand is the appropriate 
dimension for ascertaining the need for additional distribution network capacity in 
demand dominated asset analysis, it is not always true for accommodating distributed 
generation in generator dominated asset analysis. Distributed generation requires 
extra assets for stability, voltage quality, and fault level limit. The prices for 
generation are probably much greater than for demand. Also this model is not based 
on marginal or any other economic concept, so it is difficult to give an efficient cost- 
benefit signal.
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Figure 4.1: U M IST’s model [Str 2005]
4.4 Distribution Reinforcement Model (DRM) 
in the UK
Although the total amount o f revenue is constrained by the energy regulator, the 
costs o f providing a distribution service need to be calculated, in order that they can 
be recovered from the system users through an appropriate tariff structure.
In the UK, the initial distribution pricing model for assessing the incremental 
capacity cost was introduced by the Electricity Council in 1984. Under the price cap 
regulation, which is o f RPI-X form, the distribution pricing methodology based on
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Distribution Reinforcement Model (DRM) is currently the major approach, which is 
one o f the bottom-up pricing methodologies.
In DRM, Network asset costs are based on the increment in the assets and 
equipments at each voltage level, to support a 500M W  increment in simultaneous 
maximum demand. The quantities in the model are consistent with engineering 
planning policy, including assets in proportion to the existing network, and are based 
on equipment available today [Wpd 2006a]. Because the DRM  model is a theoretical 
500M W  extension to the distribution system, it is also called 500MW  model. The 
final tariff is calculated by the yardstick, which means the benchmark o f cost in 
different voltage or transformation levels. The final tariff is designed for demand 
customers only.
DRM  calculation includes two steps. The first step is to determine yardstick tariffs 
for each class o f customer. The second step is scaling these yardstick tariffs to ensure 
that the revenues covered through use o f system charges match the allowed revenue.
4.4.1 Calculation of Yardstick Tariffs
The yardstick tariff consists o f the required transformer capacity at each system level, 
to meet demand and security to normal industry planning guidance, allowing for the 
use o f standard size equipment and typical utilisation factors. It also consists o f 
appropriate overhead lines and underground cables at each voltage level, to reflect 
the actual mix o f the existing network and typical utilisation factors.
In this, separate costs are identified for each normal level o f network and 
transformation, and leads to a model o f the network costs and yardsticks. For 
example, there are seven levels in Western Power Distribution (WPD) com pany’s 
charging methodology. They include 132KV network, 132/33KV transformation,
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33KV network, 33/11KV transformation, 11KV network, 11KV/LV network and LV 
network.
The steps to calculate the yardstick tariffs are as follows:
1. Estimate the scaling factor between the system Simultaneous M aximum 
Demand (SMD) and 500MW . SMD may be measured in the higher voltage level 
substations from transmission system.
„ „  SMDScalmgFactor = --------------------------------------- (4.1)
500
2. Investigate the quantities or lengths o f distribution system components at 
each voltage or transformation level.
"500MW"Unitasset = 0ri8 inalUmt (4.2)
ScalingFactor
asset: different types o f distribution asset, including overhead circuits, 
underground cables, transformers, switching gears etc.
3. Using the unit cost o f each asset and the quantities from Step 2, calculate the 
total asset reinforcement cost to meet 500 MW  demand.
"500M W "Costassel = UnitCostamr"500MW"Unitam, (4.3)
4. Calculate yardsticks for each voltage or transformation level with diversity 
factor. The diversity factor is defined as the ratio o f  the sum o f the individual 
maximum demand o f the various parts o f a distribution system to meet the system 
SMD, which is always greater than unity.
£"500WCa*f_
Yardstick = —^ ----------------------------------------------- (4.4)
500,000 • DiversityFactorv
v: different voltage or transformation levels,
N: the number o f total asset at level v.
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Yardstickv: cost benchmark at level v. (£/KW).
5. Taking losses into account, calculate the cumulated cost for each voltage or 
transformation level.
CumulatedCost D = ^  (YardStickv • (1 + Lossv %)) (4.5)
veD
CumulatedCostd\ final cost at level D (£/KW),
Lossv% : Percentage o f loss at peak hours at level v.
v: upstream voltage or transformation levels for
calculating the cumulated cost at level D,
Steps 1-5 are the general yardstick calculation process for different classes o f 
customers, and are also the fundamental principle o f the DRM pricing scheme. In 
Table 4.1 is a demonstration o f base steps 1-5 o f a DRM 500MW incremental 
example at 132KV and 33KV.
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Transmission exit charge 15
132 KV circuits (per KM)
Switch bay 
400 mm2 cable 
175 mm2 cable
175 mm2 overhead dual circuit 

















78.29 1.06 59.71 1.0% 60.31 74.60
132/32 KV substation 
2 • 90 MVA substation 







4,129 8.26 1.06 7.79 2.0% 7.95 82.55
33 KV circuits (per KM)
Urban 300 mm2 cable
Rural 175 mm2 overhead dual circuit










31,666 63.33 1.06 59.75 2.0% 60.94 143.49
Simultaneous Maximum Demand (SMD) = 500,000 “500MW” Cost -  Unit cost • “500MW” Quantities or lengths.
Cost per SMD = “500MW” cost / 500,000 Cost per Average Maximum Demand (AMD) = Cost per SMD / Diversity factor
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6. Using the cumulated costs, calculate the per KW H cost o f the different 
customers in the same voltage level, who have various energy consumptions and 
different coincidence factors according to the upstream use o f network.
PerKWHc = CumulatedCostv • (Units / K W )r ■ CFr (4.6)
C: customers class C,
PerKWHc• use o f network cumulated cost base on energy for customers
class C,
(Units/KW)c'. energy consumption for customers class C,
CFc'. coincidence factor for customer class C.
7. The yardstick tariffs o f different classes o f  customers are added to the 
operation & maintenance cost and other miscellaneous costs to the cost per KWH 
cost from Step 6.
Tariffc = PerKWHc + 0 & M C+ Otherc (4.7)
Step 6-7 are diverse between different distribution zones based on their own
characteristics in the UK.
4.4.2 Deriving Final Tariff Based on Yardstick Tariff
Yardsticks are used with forecasts o f consumption in the tariff charging periods for 
each class o f customer to produce a forecast o f total yardstick revenue. The 
individual yardsticks are then scaled by the same factor to meet the target revenue, 
taking into account regulatory entitlement.
FinalTariffcul,cmer = TariffcusKmr * S c a l i n g F a c t o r (4.8)
Based on the above equations, the following are two examples o f yardstick 
calculation from W estern Power Distribution Company (WPD). The first one is from
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South W est o f England distribution service zone, and the second one is from South 
Wales distribution service zone [Wpd 2006a].
Example of Yardstick Profile 1 WPD South West
kWh/kW 3662
£/kW/yr p/kWh Coincidence
132kV System 14.27 0.355 0.911
132kV System Losses @ 8.0% 0.028
132/33kV Substation 2.48 0.057 0.911
132/33kV Losses @ 7.3% 0.004
33kV System 4.99 0.115 0.911
33kV System Losses @ 6.6% 0.008
33/1 lkV Substation 6.26 0.145 0.911
33/1 lkV S/S Losses @ 5.9% 0.009
llkV  System 18.26 0.422 0.911
1 lkV System Losses @ 5.0% 0.021
1 lkV/LV Substation 4.60 0.121 0.950
1 lkV/LV S/S Losses @ 3.4% 0.004
LV System 6.97 0.168 0.950
LV System Losses @ 1.1% 0.002
Total 500MW Model Costs 1.459
Power Factor Deviation Cost -0.073
Service Cost 0.77 0.009 1.000
Subtotal 1.394
Miscellaneous Costs 0.000
Total Network Costs 1.394
Plus Working Capital @ 0.773% 0.011
Consumer Related Costs 0.156
Operational Rates 0.163




Note: An adjustment for customer contributions has been applied at the LV system level and 
has a value o f  50%.
Figure 4.2: DRM from WPD South West [W pd 2006a]
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Example of Yardstick Profile 1
kWli/kW 3662
132kV System




66&33kV System Losses @
132,66&33/1 lkV  Substation
132,66&33/1 lkV  S/S Losses @
1 lkV  System
1 lkV System Losses @
1 lkV/LV Substation
llkV /L V  S/S Losses @
LV System
LV System Losses @
Total 500MW Model Costs























Total Network Costs 1.385
Plus Working Capital @ 0.773% 0.011
Indirect Overheads 0.209
Operational Rates 0.202




Note: An adjustment for customer contributions has been applied at the LV system  level and 
has a value o f  50%.
Figure 4.3: DRM from WPD South Wales [Wpd 2006a]
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From the above description and examples, DRM can not produce generation pricing. 
Since 1st April 2005, in the UK, OFGEM - the energy regulator, have proposed a 
mechanism for distribution-connected generation [Wpd 2006a]. This mechanism 
allows DNOs to recover a percentage o f the reinforcement assets, either from the 
individual generator or the population o f generators. The distributed generators are 
charged based on DN O’s projected reinforcement costs associated with connecting to 
a certain voltage level. So it is a regulated and fixed price.
Overall, under the governm ent’s price cap regulation, DRM  is designed to meet 
D N O ’s allowed revenue by estimating the capacity cost o f  accommodating a 
postulated increment in the SMD met at each voltage level o f  500MW. It could not 
meet the objectives o f an efficient network pricing m ethodology in open access 
distribution networks.
Chapter 5 LRMC-DC and LRMC-AC 85
Chapter 5 
LRMC-DC and LRMC-AC
Firstly, the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) pricing methodology based on DC power 
flow calculation is formulated and explained in this chapter. Using two novel 
approaches that have been developed to set the price for reactive power, a new 
LRMC-AC pricing methodology is introduced and formulated. One IEEE standard 
test system, and one practical distribution test system are employed to demonstrate 
and compare LRMC-DC and LRMC-AC. W ith the advantage o f reactive power price, 
the results show that LRMC-AC outperforms LRMC-DC on system capital cost 
recovery.
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5.1 Chapter Introduction
A review o f transmission pricing methodologies in Chapter 3 reveals that they have 
been progressively developed over the years to become more sophisticated. Pricing 
methodologies based on marginal cost have the natural advantage o f giving efficient 
economic signals, and have achieved a dominant position in many countries’ 
transmission pricing schemes. In the previous chapter, the review o f existing pricing 
methodologies o f  distribution networks shows their weakness in following the trend 
o f distribution network open access. DRM used in the UK fails to produce a price for 
generation. Therefore, in this chapter, N G C ’s DCLF Investment Cost Related Pricing 
(ICRP) model is taken as the starting point. Initially a long-run marginal cost based 
on DC power flow (LRM C-DC) is formulated using the same concept. Besides the 
IEEE-30 bus test system, LRMC-DC is tested on a practical 110 bus distribution test 
system with 24 customer-connected nodes. This was chosen from the electrical 
network in South Wales, and serviced by the W estern Power Distribution (WPD) 
company. It is a demonstration o f an existing transmission pricing methodology on 
distribution network above 11KV. This is also an original research about the impact 
o f LRMC pricing m ethodology on distribution networks.
LRMC-DC pricing methodology ignores the price o f reactive power. It is therefore 
unfair to different customers and DNOs, as reactive power plays an important role in 
electricity network operation and security. Although a few transmission pricing 
methods can allocate reactive power costs, such as transaction assessment methods 
and tracing methods, there is no direct research about reactive power price based on 
LRMC. This chapter proposes two new reactive power pricing methodologies. They 
can extend LRMC-DC into LRMC based on AC power flow calculation (LRMC- 
AC), and form one o f the main contributions o f this research. The two reactive power 
pricing methodologies are explained and formulated. The LRMC-AC pricing method 
is also tested on the IEEE-30 bus test system and the distribution test system as
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mentioned above. In comparison with LRMC-DC, the results are presented and 
analyzed at the end.
5.2 LRMC-DC
5.2.1 Principle
The DCLF ICRP model as introduced in Chapter 3, is a practical example o f a long- 
run marginal cost pricing scheme. Based on the same principle, LRMC-DC is 
introduced as the basic marginal cost pricing methodology.
The definition o f LRMC has been explained in Chapter 2. LRMC-DC means that the 
marginal cost calculation is based on a DC power flow calculation. Therefore, there 
is no cost assigned to reactive power, being convenient to allocate all the cost to real 
power. The principle o f LRMC-DC is estimating the cost change based on the usage 
o f the electricity network increase or decrease, for a unit real power injection into, or 
withdrawal, from the system. The process o f LRMC pricing methodology can be 
summarized as:
1. Evaluate the network asset’s unit cost,
2. Calculate the power flow changes o f each network asset due to the marginal 
injection or withdrawal at a node,
3. Based on the unit cost o f  system and power flow changes, obtain the marginal 
cost for the node.
The power flow calculation is one o f the essential elements in the whole process. 
Power flow is a steady state o f a power system given the sets o f conditions, which
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has various solutions [Glo 2001, Gra 1994, Pan 2006, W oo 1996], Newton-Raphson 
power flow calculation has been selected as a typical approach, for use in this 
research.
5.2.2 Asset Unit Cost Evaluation
1. Estimation of the network asset costs
Transmission and distribution assets consist o f two main parts: circuit related assets, 
and substation related assets. The circuit related assets comprise different types and 
lengths o f overhead line and underground cable. There are various components in 
substations, including transformers, circuit breakers, isolators, busbars, structures, 
protection, control panels and so on. Because transformers are primary components 
o f a substation, which account for half o f the substation cost, it assumes that the total 
cost o f the substation can be shared by the numbers o f transformers.
Asset — ^ ol ^ 1,1 ^or c*rcu*t (5 1)
1 \  T, for transformer
Where,
Asset/: the cost o f asset I (£),
UCo, UCu: the unit cost o f overhead line and underground cable, which
represent the network infrastructure capital investment cost over unit length (£/KM),
Lot, Lui'- the length o f overhead line and underground cable belonging
to the circuit / (KM),
77: the unit cost o f transformer / (£).
2. Annuity Factor
The asset costs are expected to be covered during their lifespan, in which the annuity 
factor plays an important role in spreading the asset costs across their designed life.
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The definition o f annuity factor is the present value at a discount rate o f an annuity o f 
£1 paid at the end o f each o f ny periods.
AnnuityFactor =  -------- (5.2)
d  d-(l  + d)ny
To explain the annuity factor in the above equation, the concept o f discount factor is 
firstly introduced. Discount factor is how much £1 at a future date is worth today, 
also called the present worth factor and the present worth o f £1.
DiscountFactor = - — — (5.3)
(1 + d f  K }
Where,
d: the discount rate (expected rate o f  return),
ny: the number o f years.
Rate o f return is the remuneration to investment stated as a proportion or percentage. 
The financial rate o f return is the internal rate o f return based on market prices. The
economic rate o f  return is the internal rate o f return o f a cash flow, expressed in
economic prices. Here the expected rate o f return is the financial rate o f return 
proposed by network companies and approved by the energy regulatory.
Form the above equation,




If  a cash flow has already been defined as the difference between money received 
and m oney paid, each year’s future cash flow can be discounted to its present value 
by dividing it by the discount factor for that year.
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Where,
M: expected annual cash flow o f discount rate d.
In a power system, PV is the current investment and is a fixed cost. The expected 
annual cash flow is the annual future value to be covered.




+  . . .  +  ■
1 \
1 + d  (l + rf)2 (l + rf)3 (l + rf)
M
tv ■Md d(l + d )  
Using,
Annuity Factor -  - —  ^
(5.6)
d  d-(l  + d f  
Therefore,
PV  = AnnuityFactor • M  
The annual cashed flow is decided by the network com panies’ approved rate o f 
return. The annuity factor is used to find the annual worth o f the present value.
3. Defining the asset universal unit cost
Evaluate the universal unit cost (£/(year-MW) ) for real power o f both circuits and 
transformers,
AssetjU C ,= -------
AnnuityFactor • Capacity{
Capacity/: the capacity o f  asset / (MW).
(5.7)
5.2.3 LRMC-DC Formulation
The process and formulation o f  LRMC-DC are explained in the following six steps.
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1. Setting up the system model
Prepare network data to set up the system model. The data required includes system 
asset costs and network data for power flow calculation, such as, the data for busbars, 
circuits, transformers, generators and demands. The generators outputs and demands 
change from time to time. From the view o f the network planning and design, the 
network agreed capacities o f generators are taken. The simultaneous maximum 
demand (SMD) o f the system is taken as the demands data.
2. Base use of network cost
In the initial network, the power flow BasePi in each circuit and transformer can be 
defined from the power flow calculation. Then the base use o f network cost (£/year) 
can be calculated as below:
BaseCost, = BasePl - UC, (5.8)
L
TotalBaseCost = BaseCost t (5.9)
/= i
Where,
L: total number o f the network assets.
3. Injection for marginal cost calculation
In the LRMC-DC pricing method, a unit real power n (MW ) is injected into a certain 
node N  to demonstrate the base load profile with a marginal increase. To keep the 
balance between generators and demand, the unit injection needs to be withdrawn 
from a defined load centre, which is assumed as the slack bus in the transmission 
network, or the grid supply point in the distribution network.
4. New use of network cost
The power flow NewPi in each circuit and transform er is calculated according to the 
new load profile with the unit o f  real power injection. So,
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NewCost, = NewP, ■UCl (5.10)
L
TotalNewCost = ^  NewCost, (5.11)
i= \
5. Calculation of the marginal cost for node N
Define the marginal cost ( £ /(y ea rM W )) according to real power n (MW) injection 
at the node N.
, TotalNewCost-TotalBaseCostMCn = --------------------------------------------  (5.12)
6. Calculation of the marginal cost for each node
Inject a unit o f real power n (MW) into each node, and repeat steps 3-5 to get the 
marginal cost for demand at all nodes.
In Step 3, using unit o f real power n (MW) withdrawal instead o f injection, the 
marginal cost for the generator at the node N  can be calculated. Because generators 
can be treated as negative loads, and the unit o f real power n (MW) is selected as a 
marginally small value, generator cost is approximately opposite to the value o f 
demand cost at the same node.
5.3 Reactive Power Pricing Methodologies
In the above LRMC-DC pricing method, the final cost is only allocated on real 
power. Practically, reactive power plays an important role in providing the network 
security and maintaining voltages, especially for the lower voltage levels o f the 
distribution network. In addition to encouraging the use o f sustainable energy,
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embedded generators require numbers o f reactive power compensators or SVCs 
placed in various locations o f the network to support the voltage quality. It is 
unreasonable to ignore the reactive power price in network pricing methodology. 
W ithout reactive power prices, network owners cannot distinguish between good or 
poor power factors o f network users. So it is necessary to devise a network pricing 
m ethodology implementing reactive power charges. From the formulation o f the 
LRMC-DC, the unit cost is calculated from the assets cost, annuity factor and asset 
capacity. In this section, there are two approaches to split the unit cost into real and 
reactive parts. The perpendicular approach and arc approach derive their names 
from the triangular relationship between real, reactive and apparent power. The 
perpendicular approach is introduced in [Li 2005, Li 2006], and is a co-operative 
work done with the author. The arc approach is another novel solution, which is 
mainly employed in the studies o f this thesis. Both reactive power pricing methods 
are detailed explained in following subsections.
5.3.1 Perpendicular Approach
Based on the fundamental principles o f electrical circuit theory, the apparent power 
Si o f  the circuit I in vector formulation is defined as:
’s l =Pr i + Q , ’j  (5-13)
Where,
Pi: the real power o f circuit /,
Qi‘. the reactive power o f circuit /.
From Figure 5.1, the magnitude o f apparent power Si o f  the circuit / can be described 
as:
Sl = P, • co s0,+Qj-  sin 6j (5.14)
Where,
Chapter 5 LRMC-DC and LRMC-AC 94
co s# /: Power factor o f circuit /.
sin 6, = -^ /l -  cos2 6,
J
P c o s O
O P i
Figure 5.1: Perpendicular approach
In the LRMC-DC model, the unit cost o f each circuit was defined as
--------------Asset,--------------
AnnuityFactor • Capacity,
So the unit cost is based on the full capacity o f the line, rather than real power. 
M ultiplying both sides o f Equation 5.14 by UC\ gives:
S,-UC,  = P, - cos0, UC, + Q, sm0, UC, (5.15)
In the above equation, the cost o f used line capacity Sj is described into two parts, the 
costs which are related to Pi and Qi. So the unit costs for real power and reactive 
power can be defined as:
UCP,=cos6r UC, (5.16)
UCQ, =s\nOr UC, (5.17)
Where,
UCPf. unit cost o f line / for real power,
UCQf. unit cost o f line / for reactive power.
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Both UCPi and UCQi are defined based on the perpendicular relationship between 
apparent power and real/reactive power, so this method is called the “perpendicular 
approach”. In this approach, the power factor is used to separate the unit cost. Since 
the power factor will vary according to real and/or reactive power change, the unit 
costs for real power and reactive power are dependent on each other. As shown in 
Figure 5.2, because the reactive power increases from Q to Q \  the new unit cost will 
be:
UCP;= cosfl/ VC, (5.18)
UCQ,'= sin0,' UC, (5.19)
J
O P i
Figure 5.2: Perpend icu lar approach with various Q
To avoid the disturbance from reactive power and keep the independent unit cost o f 
real power, the arc approach is introduced later.
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5.3.2 LRMC-AC with Perpendicular Approach
With the perpendicular approach to allocate the reactive power cost, the LRMC-AC 
formulation is modified from LRMC-DC as below:
1. Setting up the system model
Prepare the system data as in the LRMC-DC pricing method.
2. Base use of network cost
In the base network, the power flow BasePi and BaseQ/ o f  each circuit and 
transformer can be defined from the power flow calculation. Using the unit costs o f 
real and reactive power defined in Equation 5.16 and 5.17, the base use o f network 
real and reactive cost (£/year) can be calculated as below:
L L
TotalBaseCostP = ^  Base Cos tP, = ^  (BaseP, • UCP,) (5.20)
i= i i= i
L L
TotalBaseCostQ = ^  BaseCostQ, = {BaseQ, • UCQ,) (5.21)
/= i  i= \
3. Injection for marginal cost calculation
In the LRMC-AC pricing method, a unit o f  power n (MW ) + n (MVAR) is injected
into a certain node N  to demonstrate the base load profile with a marginal increase.
4. New use of network cost
The power flow NewPj and NewQi o f each circuit and transformer is calculated 
according to the new load profile with the unit power injection. So,
L L
TotalNewCostP = '£NewCostP, = Y,(NewPi 'UCPi) (522'>
1=1 /=1
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L L
TotalNewCostQ = NewCostQj = £  (NewQ, ■ UCQl) (5.23)
/= i i= i
5. Calculation of the marginal cost for node N
Define the marginal cost ( £/(yearM W ) and £/(year-MVAR) ) according to unit o f 
power n (MW) + n (MVAR) at the node N.
. _ TotalNewCostP- TotalBaseCostPMCPn = ------------------------------------------------  (5.24)
n
_  TotalNewCostQ -  TotalBaseCostQ 0
n
6. Calculation of the marginal cost for each node
Inject a unit o f  power n (MW) + n (MVAR) into each node, and repeat steps 3-5 to 
get the marginal cost for demand o f all nodes.
In Step 3, using unit power n (MW) + n (MVAR) withdrawal instead o f injection, the 
marginal cost for generator at the node N  can be calculated. As suggested in Section 
5.2.3, generators can be treated as negative loads and the unit power is selected as a 
marginally small value, generator price is approximately opposite to the value o f 
demand price at the same node.
5.3.3 Arc Approach
Compared with the perpendicular approach, the “a rc  approach” makes an arc 
instead being perpendicular in the triangle relationship between apparent, real and 
reactive power, as shown below.




Figure 5.3: Arc approach
From the above diagram, the magnitude o f apparent power S  for the line / can be 
described as real power plus the contribution from reactive power.
s , = ^  + ( s , - i 5 ) = / ’, + (5.26)
Because,
P P  
cosO, p ft
p f , : Load power factor o f node /.
The contribution from reactive power can be formatted as:
Q , . ' ^  = S i - P i = L l . - P i A -Z £ [ l . p  (5.27)
Pfl Pf,
In the LRMC-DC model, the unit cost o f each circuit is defined as:
--------------Asset,--------------
AnnuityFactor • Capacity,
So multiplying both sides o f Equation 5.26 by UC, gives:
S r U C '-P r U C ' + Q ^ - U C ,  (5.28)
Compared with LRMC-DC, the LRMC-AC with arc approach calculates the 
contribution from reactive power based on the same unit cost. So the results o f the
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LRMC-AC with arc approach can maintain the same unit cost with Q change, as 




Figure 5.4: Arc approach with various Q
To clarify the difference between the perpendicular approach and the arc approach, 
an example is set to verify the cost change, due to the change o f reactive power. It 
assumes there is a transmission line A. The unit cost o f line A is £10/KW. Two 
loading conditions are proposed as shown in Figure 5.5. Under the loading condition 
1, the power flow on the line A is 10MW with 0.98 lagging power factor. Under the 
loading condition 2, the magnitude of real power keeps the same as the loading 
condition 1, but the power factor changes from 0.98 to 0.95. It also means that the 
reactive power flow increases from 2.03MVAr to 3.29MVAr. Based on the two 
loading conditions, the cost o f real and reactive power by the two different reactive 
power pricing methods can be calculated, respectively.
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PiO i O i
Loading condition 1:
10MW with power factor 0.98 
Px[ = 10 M W  Qx = 2.03 MVAR
cos 6X = 0.98 sin 6X = 0.20 
Sx = \Q2QMVA
Loading condition 2:
10MW with power factor 0.95 
I \  = 10 M W  Q2 = 3 2 9 MVAR
cos 02 = 0 .95  sin 02 =0.31 
S2 =\9.53MVA
Figure 5.5: Example with various Q
Using the perpendicular approach, the unit cost o f real power reduces when reactive 
power flow increases, as calculated in Table 5.1. With the increasing o f reactive 
power flow, the total recovered cost raises from £102, 000 to £105,000 according to 
more total power consumption. But the recovered cost from real power reduces from 
£98, 000 to £95,000, which is due to the unit cost o f real power decrease. The reason 
o f the unit cost o f real power change is the unit cost calculation depends on the 
power factor, as shown in Equation 5.18, Equation 5.19, and Figure 5.2.
Table 5.1: Perpendicular approach results
load Unit Cost Cost Recovered
P(MW) Q(MVAr) P(£/KW ) Q(£KVAr) P(£000) Q(£000) Total (£000)
Loading 1 10 2.03 9.8 2.0 98 4 102
Loading 2 10 3.29 9.5 3.1 95 10 105
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Using the arc approach, the unit cost o f  real power and reactive power keep the 
same under the both loading conditions, as shown in Table 5.2. Compared with the 
perpendicular approach, the change o f the final total recovered cost is same, which 
indicates both reactive power pricing methods can match the same financial goal. 
Furthermore, the arc approach can ensure that the total recovered cost from real 
power keeps the same, regardless o f the variation o f reactive power. The variation o f 
reactive power flow only causes the change o f the recovered cost from reactive 
component.
Table 5.2: Arc approach results
load Unit Cost Cost Recovered
P(MW ) Q(MVAr)
\ S \ ~ \ P \
(£/unit) P(£000) Q(£000) Total (£000)
Loading 1 10 2.03 0.20 10 100.0 2 102
Loading 2 10 3.29 0.53 10 100.0 5 105
Therefore, unlike the perpendicular approach, the unit cost o f real and reactive 
power by the arc approach is independent o f the power factor. As an objective o f 
desirable pricing method, it is more appropriate to keep the independence o f the real 
and reactive power cost. From the above demonstration, the arc approach is also 
simpler to interpret to network users than the perpendicular approach.
Overall, both the perpendicular approach and the arc approach are novel methods to 
evaluate the cost o f reactive component, which help recover more network cost. 
From the comparison, the advantage o f the arc approach is using a unique unit cost 
to reflecting the reactive cost, keeping the cost o f real power stable with the different 
power factor, more reasonable to explain the reactive power prices to network users 
due to their reactive power consumption. So, the arc approach, as a new reactive 
power pricing concept, is employed in the further studies o f this thesis. M ore analysis
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and implementation o f the perpendicular approach can refer to the attached authors’ 
papers [Li 2005a, Li 2006].
5.3.4 LRMC-AC with Arc Approach
W ith the arc approach to allocate the reactive power cost, the LRMC-AC 
formulation is modified from LRMC-DC as below:
1. Setting up the system model
Prepare the system data as in the LRMC-DC pricing method.
2. Base use of network cost
In the base network, the power flow BasePi and BaseSi o f  each circuit and 
transform er is be defined from the power flow calculation. Then the base use o f 
network real and reactive cost (£/year) can be calculated as below:
BaseQi,conir,h = BaseSt -  BaseP, (5.29)
L L
TotalBaseCostP = ^  BaseCostP, = ^  (BaseP, • UC, ) (5.30)
i=i i=i
TotalBaseCostQ = ^  BaseCostQ, = ^  (BaseQ, conmb • UC, ) (5.31)
i=i i=i
3. Injection for marginal cost calculation
In the LRMC-AC pricing method, a unit o f power n (MW ) + n (MVAR) is injected 
into a certain node N  to demonstrate the base load profile with a marginal increase.
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4. New use of network cost
The power flow NewP/ and NewS/ o f each circuit and transformer is calculated 
according to the new load profile with the unit o f power injection. So,
NewQi,con,nb = NewSi ~ NewPt (5.32)
L L
TotalNewCostP = Y , NewCostPi = H NewPi U ci) (5-33)
/ = 1 1=1
TotalNewCostQ = £  NewCostQl = £  (NewQIconlnh • UC,) (5.34)
i=i i=\
5. Calculate the marginal cost for node N
Define the marginal cost ( £/(year-MW) and £/(year-MVAR) ) according to unit
power n (MW) + n (MVAR) at the node N .
TotalNewCostP — TotalBaseCostPMCPn = ------------------------------------------------  (5.35)
n
j^ q q  _  TotalNewCostQ -  TotalBaseCostQ ^
N n
6. Calculate the marginal cost for each node
Inject a unit o f  power n (MW) + n (MVAR) into each node, and repeat steps 3-5 to 
get the marginal costs for demand at all nodes.
In Step 3, using unit pow er n (MW ) + n (MVAR) withdrawal instead o f injection, the 
marginal cost for a generator at the node N  can be calculated. As noted earlier, 
generators can be treated as negative loads and the unit power is selected as a 
marginally small value, generator cost is approximately opposite to the value o f 
demand cost at the same node.
Chapter 5 LRMC-DC and LRMC-AC 104
5.4 Results and Analysis
Based on the explanation and formulation for LRM C-DC and LRMC-AC detailed in 
Subsection 5.2.3 and 5.3.4, respectively, both methodologies are tested on the IEEE- 
30 bus test system, and a distribution test system which was chosen from the South 
W ale distribution network, in the UK. The results are presented and analyzed below.
5.4.1 IEEE-30 Bus Test system
The IEEE-30 bus test system represents a portion o f the American Electric Power 
System in Virginia as o f December, 1961 [Pow 2006]. The original test system does 
not have line thermal limits and costs. For the purpose o f  the network pricing, the 
costs o f lines were estimated based on the geographical constraints. The detailed 
system data is shown in Appendix B -l. Node 1 was chosen as the slack bus.
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Figure 5.6: IEEE-30 bus test system [Pow 2006]
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 show the results from LRMC-DC and LRMC-AC, 
respectively. The negative sign before the price means the demand will be paid for 
using the network, which is the case when the usage of network from these 
customers will reduce network congestion. It also means the network owner benefits 
from these customers, based on the current network loading condition. The price 
based on marginal cost is for demand, so the price for generation will be the negative 
equivalent of the values shown in the tables.
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Table 5.3: LRMC-DC results on IEEE-30 bus test system
M arginal C ost (£/unit/Yr) 
for D em and
C ost R ecovered  (£000/Y r)
N O . P (£/K W /Y  r) P(£000/Y  r) T otal(£000/Y r)
2 4.62 -84.55 -84.55
3 7.42 17.82 17.82
4 10.71 81.41 81.41
5 23.71 2,233.67 2,233.67
6 15.80 0.00 0.00
7 16.28 371.09 371.09
8 25.07 752.16 752.16
9 16.92 0.00 0.00
10 17.81 103.29 103.29
11 17.65 0.00 0.00
12 11.66 130.64 130.64
13 12.78 0.00 0.00
14 11.90 73.77 73.77
15 15.11 123.92 123.92
16 15.39 53.88 53.88
17 18.68 168.09 168.09
18 19.04 60.91 60.91
19 21.59 205.14 205.14
20 20.85 45.86 45.86
21 20.25 354.32 354.32
22 20.17 0.00 0.00
23 19.97 63.89 63.89
24 24.25 210.96 210.96
25 21.97 0.00 0.00
26 26.73 93.54 93.54
27 20.47 0.00 0.00
28 20.30 0.00 0.00
29 24.66 59.19 59.19
30 29.37 311.30 311.30
Total 5,430.31 5,430.31
W ithout the reactive power price, the total cost recovered is from real power pricing 
only. Zero cost recovered at certain nodes means that no customer connected to those 
nodes.
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Table 5.4: LRMC-AC results on IEEE-30 bus test system
Marginal Cost (£/unit/Yr) 
for Demand
Cost Recovered (£000/Yr)
NO. P(£/KW/Yr) Q(£/KVAr/Yr) P(£000/Y r) Q(£000/Yr) Total(£000/Yr)
2 4.76 -0.68 -87.14 25.40 -61.74
3 7.52 2.58 18.06 3.10 21.15
4 10.78 3.33 81.89 5.32 87.21
5 24.90 -6.24 2,345.20 112.25 2,457.45
6 15.86 3.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 16.62 4.84 378.84 52.72 431.57
8 25.17 -2.44 755.07 17.82 772.89
9 17.25 4.58 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 18.28 5.68 106.02 11.36 117.39
11 17.96 2.91 0.00 -47.11 -47.11
12 11.65 4.49 130.45 33.68 164.12
13 12.77 2.21 0.00 -23.37 -23.37
14 11.34 4.79 70.31 7.67 77.98
15 15.47 5.46 126.85 13.64 140.49
16 15.57 5.39 54.50 9.70 64.20
17 19.13 6.15 172.18 35.68 207.86
18 19.53 6.49 62.51 5.84 68.35
19 22.17 7.30 210.60 24.81 235.41
20 21.41 6.96 47.10 4.87 51.97
21 20.86 6.92 365.09 77.49 442.58
22 20.77 6.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 20.39 7.67 65.24 12.27 77.51
24 24.72 9.48 215.07 63.53 278.60
25 21.90 10.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
26 26.98 12.26 94.43 28.20 122.63
27 20.01 10.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
28 20.25 10.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
29 24.37 11.65 58.48 10.49 68.97
30 29.18 12.69 309.35 24.11 333.46
Total 5,580.07 509.47 6,089.54
The first advantage o f LRM C-AC is the allocation o f reactive power cost. As a result, 
it can recover more revenue than LRMC-DC, which can be seen from Figure 5.7.
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The total annual asset capital cost required to be covered is £ 13,384.76k. LRMC-AC 
can cover 45.5% of total capital cost, which is 5% more than LRMC-DC.
□  59.4%
|4 °.6% I 41.7%
□  54.5%
3.8%
■ LRMC-DC □  unrecovered □  LRMC-AC_P ■  LRMC-AC_Q □  unrecovered
Figure 5.7: LRM C-D C and LRM C-AC cost recovery on IEEE-30 bus test
system
In Figure 5.8, the nodal marginal cost o f LRMC-DC and LRMC-AC methods are 
presented together. The real power prices o f LRMC-DC and LRMC-AC are very 
similar, which means both methods are locational based methodologies. From the 
electrical network connection, nodes 1-8. and 28 are in the 132KV network. 
Considered with the geographical condition, nodes 5 and 8 are farther away from the 
slack bus than other 132KV nodes, so they have higher prices than their 
neighbouring nodes. The nodes in the 33KV and 11KV network are connected with 
shorter distances. Their prices tend to change gradually and smoothly with their 
neighbouring nodes.
Besides the locational signal, the reactive power price of LRMC-AC will be decided 
by the cost difference between the line’s apparent power and real power. For 
example, nodes 24-30 with loads having poor power factor in their area, are 
penalized (about 10 £/KVAr/Yr) by reactive power consumption. Loads at nodes 5 
and 8 are rewarded by using redundant reactive power from the existing synchronous 
condensers.
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Figure 5.8: LRM C-DC and LRM C-AC price com parison on IEEE-30 bus test
system
5.4.2 Distribution Test System
To demonstrate the results of the above two different LRMC pricing mechanisms, a 
practical network is chosen to be the test network. The criterion o f the test network 
should truly reflect the configuration of distribution networks. It should contain the 
various characteristics o f the typical demands, which include the urban, rural and 
average customers. A test network based on a South Wales distribution network 
supplied by the Western Power Distribution (WPD) company, UK, is modified to 
match the criterion of a typical network. It concentrates on the EHV networks 
(132KV, 33KV, 33/1 lKV transformation). The geographic map is shown below in 
Figure 5.9 [Wpd 2006b]. It includes 110 buses, 8 1 lines, 54 transformers, and 24 
customer-connected nodes. The total annual capital cost required to be covered is 
£l l ,080.32k. The detailed system data is shown in Appendix B-2.
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Figure 5.9: G eographic m ap of d istribution test system [Wpd 2006b]
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 show the results of applying LRMC-DC and LRMC-AC on 
the distribution test system, respectively. Considering the reality, only customer
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connected nodal prices are shown in the tables. As noted earlier, the negative sign 
before the price means the demand will be paid for using the network. It also means 
the network owner benefits from these customers, based on the current network 
loading condition. For instance, nodes 13, 14 and 15 have large generators connected, 
so the nodal prices are negative, which encourage the location demand to increase.
Table 5.5: LRMC-DC on distribution system
M arginal C ost (£/unit/Y r) 
for Dem and
C ost R ecovered (£000/Y r)
NO. P(£/K W /Y  r) Q (£/K V A r/Y r) P (£000/Y  r) Q (£000/Y  r) T otal(£000/Y r)
1 1.52 52.71 52.71
2 2.11 51.96 51.96
3 4.63 185.71 185.71
4 2.90 59.99 59.99
5 5.52 115.96 115.96
6 6.66 216.75 216.75
7 8.59 697.58 697.58
8 7.28 747.35 747.35
9 9.26 275.80 275.80
10 6.40 195.32 195.32
11 11.45 84.72 84.72
12 7.77 60.57 60.57
13 -2.65 85.72 85.72
14 -2.65 452.30 452.30
15 -2.65 151.28 151.28
16 20.45 661.40 661.40
17 22.61 590.09 590.09
18 14.19 217.14 217.14
19 9.94 238.63 238.63
20 8.34 133.44 133.44
21 18.71 312.47 312.47
22 7.57 174.00 174.00
23 13.25 154.64 154.64
24 11.04 126.94 126.94
T otal 6,042.47 6,042.47
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Table 5.6: LRMC-AC on distribution test system
Marginal Cost (£/unit/Yr) 
for Demand
Cost Recovered (£000/Yr)
NO. P(£/KW/Yr) Q(£/KVAr/Yr) P(£000/Y r) Q(£000/Y r) Total(£000/Yr)
1 1.55 -0.94 53.72 -3.25 50.46
2 1.81 3.31 44.56 57.57 102.13
4.67 -0.34 187.11 -2.23 184.88
4 2.89 0.37 59.76 3.07 62.83
5 5.56 0.70 116.80 4.26 121.07
6 6.73 0.31 219.19 0.93 220.12
7 8.69 1.84 705.62 49.89 755.51
8 7.38 1.63 757.72 59.25 816.97
9 9.36 2.13 279.05 18.51 297.56
10 6.48 1.03 197.67 10.26 207.93
11 11.53 1.83 85.35 2.74 88.10
12 7.84 0.84 61.12 1.34 62.46
13 -2.66 -1.03 85.95 10.95 96.90
14 -2.65 -0.83 453.32 46.54 499.86
15 -2.66 -1.01 151.68 18.85 170.52
16 20.62 7.37 666.99 88.97 755.96
17 22.82 9.13 595.68 59.37 655.05
18 14.24 2.82 217.81 16.91 234.72
19 9.99 3.16 239.76 30.02 269.78
20 8.37 2.79 133.98 14.80 148.79
21 18.77 4.40 313.41 29.06 342.47
22 7.59 1.26 174.59 0.00 174.59
23 13.36 5.88 155.88 81.64 237.52
24 11.07 2.61 127.32 12.00 139.32
Total 6,084.04 611.46 6,695.50
As for the IEEE-30 bus test system, the first advantage o f LRMC-AC is allocation o f 
reactive power cost. As a result, it can cover more revenue than LRMC-DC method, 
which can be seen from Figure 5.10. The total annual capital cost required to be 
covered is £ 1 1,080.32k. LRMC-AC can cover 60.4% o f total capital cost, which is 
6% more than LRMC-DC.
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Figure 5.10: LRM C-D C and LRM C-AC cost recovery on distribution test
system
In the current charging statement o f the WPD company, the final tariff is evaluated 
from the yardstick calculation, which is a fixed price for each voltage level [Wpd 
2006a]. In the LRMC results, either paying or rewarding by the distribution company 
is distinguished from the usage of the network, regardless of the customers' voltage 
level. Because demand at nodes 1, 2, and 4 have the shortest distance to generator- 
connected nodes 13-15, they have lower prices than other loads. Contrarily, demand 
at nodes 16 and 17 get the highest prices because they use more facilities than others, 
which also indicate that these sites will attract future embedded generators with most 
benefits. Therefore, the locational signal dominates the price signals, as seen in 
Figure 5.11. which emphasizes the observations from the previous IEEE test system.
From the reactive power prices of LRMC-AC in Figure 5.11, it also shows that the 
rural customers have higher reactive power prices, due to voltage drop considerations 
along the long-distance lines, such as for nodes 16, 17, 21, and 23. It truly reflects the 
natural characteristics of the distribution network. Overall, both the LRMC-DC and 
LRMC-AC pricing methods can produce reasonable results on the distribution 
network. Additionally, the LRMC-AC pricing method has the advantage of reactive 
power pricing.
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Figure 5.11: LRM C-D C and LRM C-A C Price com parison on the distribution
test system
5.5 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter, LRMC-DC are presented and tested on the IEEE standard test system 
and the practical distribution test system. With the locational signal, the results of 
distribution test system show a reasonable pattern which corresponds to the NGC 
official TNUoS tariffs, as shown in Appendix A-3. Additionally, the different 
reactive power pricing methods are introduced to extend LRMC-DC into LRMC-AC. 
Besides the perpendicular approach, the arc approach is another novel method to 
allocate the reactive power cost. They are named from the different lines made in the 
triangle relationship between apparent power and real/reactive power to define the 
reactive power cost. The perpendicular approach decides the unit cost o f real and 
reactive power according to the power factor. The arc approach keeps the same real 
power price as LRMC-DC and allocates the price difference between the apparent
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power and the real power to the reactive power, which is more straightforward to 
explain the reactive power price to network users. The allocation o f reactive power 
cost encourages the network users to operate at a better power factor as they attempt 
to minimise their network charges. For the network owner, the prices covered by 
reactive power can also bring locational signals to install future reactive power 
compensation devices. Overall, LRMC-AC demonstrates a more competitive result 
than LRMC-DC on capital cost recovery, and recognition o f the reactive power.
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Chapter 6 
LRMC with Network Utilisation 
Consideration (LRMC-Util%)
The LRMC-AC pricing methodology does not consider network utilisation. Hence it 
can not truly reflect the network investment. To overcome the deficiency o f LRMC- 
AC, LRMC with network utilisation consideration (LRM C-Util%) is introduced and 
formulated. LRM C-Util% is tested on the IEEE-30 bus test system and the 
distribution test system. Then three designed case studies are presented to analysis 
the difference between LRMC-AC and LRM C-Uitl% pricing methodologies. All 
three case studies are demonstrated on the IEEE-30 bus test system. Different 
scenarios testify that LRM C-Util%  can provide greater benefits for the network 
owner and network users with the efficient network investment price signal.
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6.1 Chapter Introduction
In Chapter 5, the LRMC-AC pricing m ethodology shows its applicability to 
distributions systems. It can provide clear locational signals and distinguish reactive 
power consumption o f different customers. Additionally, the marginal cost 
mechanism reflects the economic effect o f the network pricing scheme. However, 
neither LRMC-DC nor LRMC-AC considers the future network investment. In the 
asset evaluation process, the asset unit cost is based on its capital cost, capacity, and 
annuity factor, as described in Equation 5.7. The capital cost and capacity are fixed 
once the asset is installed. The annuity factor is based on the rate o f  return applicable 
for the price control period (currently 6.9%) over a 40-year asset life. So the asset 
unit cost is isolated from its physical constraints. It keeps the same value even if  
reinforcement is already needed.
Practically, in the asset management, the asset life is monitored and inspected, 
influenced by asset cost, risk, performance etc. Here some aspects o f the asset life 
and asset utilisation are discussed, as a way o f introducing the following network 
pricing method. M ost transmission and distribution assets can exceed their designed 
lifespan. For example, as shown in Figure 6.1 for a utility company in the United 
States [Bro 2005], thirty percent o f  this utility’s poles are older than their 40-year 
economic lifetime, and fifty percent o f this utility’s poles are more than 30 years old. 
It often seems wasteful to replace old equipment before it fails, but the possibility o f 
drastic increases in equipment failures is also unacceptable from both financial and 
system performance perspectives.




















Figure 6.1: Poles’ age [Bro 2005]
The asset utilisation o f this utility company is illustrated in Figure 6.2. On average, 
the distribution transformers o f this utility are loaded less than fifty percent of the 
nameplate rating at the peak loading time. Better asset utilisation could help this 
utility to reduce capital spending and increase returns on its asset base.
1.400
Maximum Loading
Figure 6.2: Distribution transform er loading condition [Bro 2005]
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Regardless o f the asset investment consideration, LRMC-AC pricing methodology 
has a fundamental problem. The following is an example o f how drawback occurs 

















There are two lines A and B, as shown in Figure 6.3 and 6.4, it assumes the load 
growth rate is 1.6%, and the discount rate is 6.9%. Figure 6.3 shows line A, which is
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75% loaded. With the assumed fixed load growth rate, the investment will be 
realized after 18 years. Using Equation 5.4, the present value o f £20/KW  after 18 
years is £6/KW . Figure 6.4 shows line B with 95% loading. The investment will be 
realized after 3 years. The present value o f £10/KW  after 3 years is £8/KW.
In LRMC-AC pricing methodology, the unit cost o f line A (£20/KW ) is higher than 
the unit cost o f  line B (£10/KW). But from the above analysis, line B does not have 
enough capacity, and the investment is needed in a short period with a higher cost 
(£8/KW ) than line A (£6/KW). With the utilisation consideration, the unit cost o f  line 
B should be modified, and proposed to be higher than the unit cost o f line A.
Network assets can operate for more than their designed lifetime, and can also be 
reinforced or replaced during their lifetime. Better network utilisation can delay the 
network investment. Taking these factors into account, the unit cost should reflect 
the future network investment, instead o f being a fixed value. Therefore, a novel 
concept o f LRMC with utilisation consideration (LRM C-util%) is proposed by the 
University o f Bath [Li 2005, Wpd 2006c], which is a jo in t work that the author is 
taking an important part in. LRMC-Util% pricing methodology aims to evaluate the 
costs o f network assets based on their utilisation, and bring the potential future 
investment into account. The investment occurs when the network facilities exhaust 
their lifespan, or the network facilities are close to being fully loaded, or both.
In LRM C-Util% methodology, asset utilisation is introduced to adjust the discount 
factor. It means that the network asset life can be extended or discounted by its 
loading condition according to whether its usage level is low or high. Based on the 
utilisation change, the cost o f closer reinforcement can be integrated into the higher 
annuity cost o f heavily loaded assets. Thus, the network asset cost is decided by the 
capacity (for circuits and transformers), distance (for circuits) and the portion o f 
future investment. In addition, combined with the arc approach o f  reactive power 
allocation, the LRM C-Util%  m ethodology demonstrates an allocation method with
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reactive power pricing. The customers with a poor power factor are charged by 
DNOs to maintain the network security.
6.2 LRMC with Network Utilisation 
Consideration (LRMC-Util%)
6.2.1 University of Bath Model
The University o f Bath model seeks to reflect the impact on the advancement or 
deferral o f future investment in network components, as a result o f  a unit injection or 
withdrawal o f generation or load at each study node. For a component, that is
affected there will be a cost associated with accelerating investment, or a benefit
associated with the deferral o f investment. Depending upon the discount rate that is 
employed, and the magnitude o f the expenditure, which could be a function o f 
transformer capacity or circuit length, the LRMC can be calculated [Li 2005b].
1. Determining When Investment Will Occur in the Future
Given a generic load growth rate, the number o f years it takes to grow from a 
network component / current loading condition to its capacity, can be determined as 
follows:
C ,= D r (\ + r ) ^  (6.1)
Where,
C/: the capacity o f the network component /,
Df. the power flow o f the network component /,
r: a given load growth rate o f a certain network,
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nyr: the number o f the years.
Because the utilisation o f the network component / can be described as
util, % = —
C




2. Present Value (PV) of Future Investment
Since the concept o f present value (PV) has been explained in the asset cost
evaluation section o f Chapter 5, the future investment can be discounted back to PV
according to after how many years the investment will occur.
P V  =  Asset> (6 3 )
' (1 + d T
Where,
d : the discount rate (expected rate o f return).
If the asset is a long circuit, then the future investment will be high; if  the circuit is 
short, then the investment will be low.
3. Cost Associated with Marginal Injection
A unit power n is injected into a certain node N  to demonstrate the base load profile 
with a marginal increase. W hen investment will occur in the future, the number o f 
years o f the network component / can be determined:
C ,= D , m . \ l  + i - r ’”  (6.4)
If
^ I ,n e wutil, % =l,new
C,





P V  =  — — -L 
LneW (l + d)m -
Asset, (6.6)
4. Calculating LRMC Cost
The final cost is the total difference between the PV and the new PV. A heavily
Where,
L : the total number o f network assets.
Repeating steps 3 and 4, the marginal costs o f all the study nodes can be calculated.
Based on the developed arc approach o f reactive power m ethodology in Chapter 5, 
the LRMC-Util% can formulated as below.
1. Mapping Utilisation of Asset into Years
Given a generic load growth rate in power sector [W w f 2006], which is 1.6% taken 
from private project meetings for this research, the number o f years it takes to grow 
from a network asset / current loading condition to its capacity can be determined.
loaded part o f network needs investment in a short period, which results in a big 
difference between the present value and new present value.
(6.7)
n
6.2.2 Formulation of LRMC-Util%
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C, =DPr (\ + r)"yr}) 




Ci: the capacity o f  the network component /,
DP/: the magnitude o f real power flow o f the network component /,
DSi: the magnitude o f apparent power flow o f the network component /,
nyrP: the number o f the years based on real power, 
nyrS: the number o f the years based on apparent power.
Because the utilisation o f the network component / can be described as
Taking the logarithm o f both sides o f above equation, the number o f years can be 
described as
2. Determining Present Value (PV) of Future Investment
The future investment can be discounted back to the present value (PV) according to 
after how many years the investment will occur.
DPutilP, % = —- 1
C ,
n c








PVQl = PVSI -P V P I (6.14)
Where,
PVPf. PV based on real power o f the network component /, 
d : the discount rate (expected rate o f return).
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PVSf. PV based on apparent power flow o f the network component /,
PVQf. PV based on reactive power o f the network component /.
3. Cost associated with marginal injection
A unit power n (MW) + n (MVAR) is injected into a certain node N  to demonstrate 
the base load profile with a marginal increase. W hen investment will occur in the 
future, the number o f  year o f the network component / can be determined:
4. Determining LRMC cost
The final cost is the total difference between the present value and new present value. 
A heavily loaded part o f network needs investment in a short period, which results in 
a big difference between the present value and new present value.
= Asset,




PVQl,neW = P VSi -PVP, (6.17)
Y X p v p ^ - p v p )
MCPn = (6.18)
n
f X p V Q i „ - p v Q )
m c q n = ^ (6.19)
n
Repeating steps 3 and 4, the marginal costs o f all the study nodes can be calculated.
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6.2.3 Utilisation with Security Factor
From the network planning point o f view, the 33KV and above network is generally 
designed to meet n-1 contingency, which is the network security standard [Wpd 
2006c], If  the security index is defined as the number o f the lines connected between 
two busbars, then the security factor is calculated as:
Security Factor = ------------------   Securitylndex (6.20)
Securitylndex -1
Based on the defined security index and security factor, the minimum and maximum 
utilisation can be calculated as:
CriticalUtilVo = . 96% (6.21)
Securitylndex — 1
MaxUtilVo = --------- ----------- (Securitylndex - 1) (6.22)
Securitylndex
For example in Figure 6.5, if  there are three lines connected between two nodes, the 
security index is 2. Using Equation 6.20, the security factor is 2. To meet the n-1 
contingency, each line’s maximum utilisation should be half o f the proposed power 
flow between bus 1 and bus 2. To explain the critical utilisation, the case o f security 
index 3 is presented. If  the security index is 3, security factor is 1.5 and line’s 
maximum utilisation is 66.7%. Because the range below 50% has been covered by 
index 2, the minimum or critical utilisation o f lines with security index 3 is 50% * 
96% ( * means multiply). 4% is an approximate overloaded percentage o f lines, 
which is consulted in the private project meetings with W estern Power Distribution 
(WPD) Company.
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Bus 1 Bus 3
Security index: 2 Security index: 3
Security factor: 2 Security factor: 1.5
MaxUtil%: 50.0% M axUtil%: 66.7%
Bus 2 Bus 4
Figure 6.5: Security index 2 and 3
In the LRM C-Util% calculation, there should be a way to use utilisation to estimate 
the security factor, then adjust the security index according to the looking up Table 
6 . 1 .
Table 6.1: Security index looking up table
Security index Security factor Critical Util% Maximum Util%
1 1.00 87.5% * 96% < < 100%
2 2.00 - < 50.0%
3 1.50 50.0% * 96% < < 66.7%
4 1.33 66.7% * 96% < < 75.0%
5 1.25 75.0% * 96% < < 80.0%
6 1.20 80.0% * 96% < < 83.3%
7 1.17 83.3% * 96% < < 85.7%
8 1.14 85.7%* 96% < < 87.5%
If  the utilisation o f a facility is in a certain range between critical util%  and 
maximum util%, the security index and security factor should be changed into the 
corresponding level.
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6.3 Results and Analysis
6.3.1 IEEE-30 Test system
The IEEE-30 bus test system has been introduced in Section 5.4.1 o f Chapter 5 and 
Appendix B -l.
Table 6.2 shows the results o f the LRMC-Util% method. The marginal cost is for 
demand, so the cost o f generation w ill be the negative equivalent o f the values in the 
table. In Figure 6.6, the nodal marginal costs o f LRM C-Util%  are plotted.
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Table 6.2: LRMC-Util% results on IEEE-30 bus test system
M arginal C ost (£/unit/Yr) 
for D em and
C ost R ecovered  (£000/Y r)
N O . P(£/KVV/Y r) Q (£/K V A r/Y r) P (£000/Y  r) Q (£000/Y  r) T otal(£000/Y r)
2 17.32 -0.93 -316.88 34.65 -282.23
13.48 0.80 32.34 0.96 33.31
4 17.56 1.01 133.49 1.62 135.10
5 28.80 -1.03 2,712.77 18.61 2,731.38
6 31.76 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 31.20 -0.23 711.38 -2.55 708.83
8 32.83 -0.10 984.99 0.74 985.73
9 32.28 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 32.80 1.55 190.23 3.10 193.33
11 32.28 0.65 0.00 -10.56 -10.56
12 15.71 -0.71 175.96 -5.34 170.62
13 15.78 -0.76 0.00 8.00 8.00
14 19.96 -0.16 123.72 -0.25 123.47
15 21.54 -0.15 176.61 -0.37 176.24
16 22.72 0.10 79.53 0.18 79.71
17 31.69 1.81 285.19 10.50 295.70
18 37.63 4.30 120.41 3.87 124.27
19 38.47 4.09 365.45 13.89 379.34
20 37.54 3.54 82.58 2.48 85.06
21 38.36 3.60 671.30 40.33 711.63
22 38.20 3.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 42.30 7.23 135.35 11.56 146.91
24 41.42 5.31 360.31 35.60 395.91
25 39.28 2.86 0.00 0.00 0.00
26 41.10 3.23 143.85 7.42 151.27
27 36.52 1.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
28 32.84 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
29 40.29 1.69 96.71 1.52 98.23
30 42.18 1.96 447.10 3.71 450.81
T otal 7,712.38 179.69 7,892.07
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Figure 6.6: LRM C-U tiI%  results on IEEE-30 bus test system
From the connection map in Figure 5.5 and load flow results in Appendix B -l, the 
nodes 2-4 and nodes 12-16 are strongly connected, and sited in the lightly loaded 
network, so the marginal costs are lower than for others. Node 28 is connected with 
other 132KV nodes 6 and 8, so they tend to have similar prices. Because o f the 
electrical connections, all the other 132KV nodes and 33KV nodes are split into two 
groups. Due to the extensive use of the network, 33KV nodes have higher prices than 
132KV nodes.
Since the results of LRMC-AC pricing methodologies are presented in Chapter 5, the 
results are reorganized and put together with LRMC-Util% to form a basic image 
regarding the price signals. Figure 6.7 shows the cost recovery from LRMC-AC and 
LRMC-Util% pricing methodologies on the IEEE-30 bus test system. Due to the 
existing network loading level, LRMC-Util% (58.9%) can recover more total capital 
cost than LRMC-AC (45.5%).
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□  54.5%
5  41.7% □  41.0%
B 57.6%
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Figure 6.7: LRM C-A C and LR M C -U til%  cost recovery on IEEE-30 bus test
system
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Figure 6.8: LRM C-AC and LR M C -U til%  price com parison on IEEE-30 bus
test system
Chapter 6 LRMC with Network Utilisation Consideration (LRMC-Util%) 132
Firstly, both LRMC-AC and LRMC-Util% distinguish the costs at different locations. 
The locational signal o f LRMC-AC is based on the network assets’ cost. So if the 
node is allocated far way from the slack bus and uses long-distance network facilities, 
it will be charged at a higher price, such as nodes 5 and 8. In the LRMC-Util% 
method, the locational signal is based on the network assets’ cost and their utilisation, 
so the prices tend to group into zones. For example, because the utilisation o f same 
voltage level is similar, most 132 KV nodes (nodes 5-8) have the similar prices, so 
do most 33KV nodes (nodes 18-30). Based on the concept o f zonal tariffs using by 
Nation Grid Company (NGC), as shown in Chapter 3, when the nodal prices are 
close to nearby nodes, it is more convenient to calculate zonal prices using LRMC- 
Util% than LRMC-AC.
Secondly, both methods set the prices for reactive power. Because the synchronous 
condensers inject reactive power at nodes 5, 8, 11, and 13, the LRM C-AC_Q at these 
nodes are notably less than at other nodes. In the LRM C-Util%  method, the reactive 
prices are generally less than in the LRMC-AC method. The reason for this is that 
real power dominates the netw ork’s utilisation. The capacity o f most network 
facilities is occupied by the real power. Thus, following Equation 6.12-6.19, LRMC- 
Util% tends to allocate more costs to real power, due to its major contribution o f line 
flow.
6.3.2 Distribution Test System
The Distribution test system has been introduced in Section 5.4.2 o f Chapter 5 and 
Appendix B-2.
Table 6.3 shows the results o f LRM C-Util% m ethod on the distribution test system. 
The marginal cost shown in the table is for demand. In Figure 6.9, the nodal marginal 
costs o f LRM C-Util% are plotted.
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Table 6.3: LRMC-Util% results on distribution test system
M arginal C ost (£/unit/Yr) 
for D em and
C ost R ecovered  (£000/Y r)
N O . P(£/K  W /Y  r) Q (£/K V A r/Y r) P(£000/Y  r) Q (£000/Y r) T otal(£000/Y r)
1 -3.17 -0.88 -110.15 -3.05 -113.20
2 -0.58 1.31 -14.36 22.79 8.42
3 9.61 2.04 385.46 13.46 398.92
4 -4.36 -0.33 -90.33 -2.67 -93.01
5 0.72 0.45 15.08 2.75 17.83
6 8.68 1.73 282.53 5.20 287.74
7 9.56 2.64 775.67 71.41 847.09
8 8.59 2.49 881.28 90.32 971.60
9 8.67 2.35 258.49 20.46 278.95
10 7.43 2.26 226.46 22.57 249.03
11 5.17 1.02 38.28 1.53 39.81
12 3.53 0.70 27.53 1.12 28.64
13 -9.03 -1.29 291.57 13.74 305.31
14 -8.99 -1.04 1,537.63 58.62 1,596.25
15 -9.03 -1.26 514.60 23.64 538.24
16 17.08 6.36 552.44 76.72 629.16
17 21.28 8.46 555.41 54.96 610.37
18 6.45 1.72 98.61 10.30 108.90
19 10.44 3.98 250.66 37.82 288.48
20 4.64 1.67 74.18 8.82 83.00
21 7.36 2.06 122.96 13.62 136.58
22 7.31 1.30 168.06 0.00 168.06
23 16.80 7.33 196.07 101.73 297.79
24 3.62 1.31 41.63 6.04 47.67
T otal 7,079.75 651.89 7,731.64
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Figure 6.9: LR M C -U til%  results on the d istribu tion  test system
From the load flow results in Appendix B-2, nodes 13 -15 are generator connected 
and dominated. The generators are charged for their use o f network, by the negative 
equivalent of the values in Table 6.3. Nodes I and 4 are close to nodes 13-15, which 
means they can consume the network generators' output, and encourage the local 
generation to meet local demand, so they are rewarded for their usages.
Further comparisons with previous results of LRMC-AC pricing methodology in 
Chapter 5 are presented below. Figure 6.10 shows the cost recovery from the LRMC- 
AC and LRMC-Util% pricing methodologies on the distribution test system. Due to 
the network loading level, LRMC-Util% (69.8%) can recover more total capital cost 
than LRMC-AC (60.4%).
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Figure 6.10: LRM C-A C and LRM C-U til%  cost recovery on distribution test
system
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Figure 6.11: LRM C-AC and LRM C-U tiI%  price com parison on distribution
test system
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Firstly, both LRMC-AC and LRMC-Util% reflect the locational signal. Because 
nodes 13-15 are highly utilized due to their connection to a large generator plant, 
they are charged at a lower price for demand by LRMC-Util% than LRMC-AC. It 
encourages an increase in local demand. Secondly, both methods can set a similar 
price for reactive power.
Summarizing, from the above two test systems, both LRMC-AC and LRM C-Util% 
can distinguish the siting and reactive power consumption o f customers. The 
distribution results presented here are in a similar price range when compared with 
the NGC official TNUoS tariffs (-8£/KW ~23£/KW ), as shown in Appendix A-3. 
Additionally, the LRM C_Util% pricing methodology can reflect the use o f network 
more practically than LRMC-AC, so it can recover more capital cost, due to the 
current loading conditions in both test systems.
6.4 LRMC-AC vs. LRMC-Util%
The concept and application o f the LRMC-Util% pricing methodology has 
highlighted in the above sections. Theoretically, it is an innovative concept in the 
area o f use o f network charges. Can LRMC-Util% gain more advantage over the 
previous LRMC methods for network owners and network users practically? There 
are a few case studies further comparing LRMC-AC and LRMC-Util%. Case 1 
investigates the response o f embedded generators’ location following the sequential 
marginal cost price signal. Case 2 investigates the price change according to 
dem and’s increment. Case 3 investigates the price change with the network 
reinforcement.
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6.4.1 Case 1: Embedded Generator Response
The case study aims to discover how the different price signals can influence the 
potential location o f embedded generators. It assumes that there are five individual 
embedded “pseudo” generators planning to connect to the network, one after the 
other. Each “pseudo” generator assumes operating at 10MW real power injection 
with 0.95 lagging power factor, which also means it withdraws 3.29M VAR reactive 
power from the network. Each pseudo generator demonstrates a worst case o f 
operating condition o f embedded generators.
Each one o f them is trying to locate at the ideal position, where it can obtain the 
highest possible payment from the network owner. Once the first pseudo embedded 
generator is connected to the network, the network flow will change, and the nodal 
marginal cost prices will change. Based on the new set o f  nodal prices, the following 
second generator will choose the most profitable location again, and so on. In order 
to investigate directly the response o f the embedded generator with price signals 
change, the demand change and the network constraints are ignored in this case study.
After each pseudo generator is connected to the network, the nodal price for 
generator, based on the LRMC-AC pricing method, will change due to the power 
flow change as shown on the left hand graphs o f Figures 6.13-6.16. The negative 
price means that the generators are rewarded for their injection. The next pseudo 
generator can then choose the location based on the nodal price. The right hand 
graphs in Figures 6.12-6.16 show the expected payment from the network owner, if 
the pseudo generator connects to a certain node, based on the price shown on the left. 
In the following figures, G1 to G5 represent the first to the fifth pseudo generator.
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Figure 6.14: G3 a t node 5 (LRM C-AC)







Figure 6.15: G4 a t node 5 (LRM C-AC)
Location
LocationLRMC-AC_Q
Figure 6.16: G5 a t node 8 (LRM C-AC)
Repeat the same process for the LRMC-Util% pricing methodology. Figures 6.17- 
6.21 show the embedded generator response with the LRMC-Util% method.
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Figure 6.18: G2 a t node 24 (LR M C -U til% )
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Figure 6.19: G3 a t node 23 (LR M C -U til% )
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Figure 6.20: G4 a t node 19 (LR M C -U til% )
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Figure 6.21: G5 a t node 18 (LR M C -U til% )
Summarizing the above results into Table 6.4. The suggested location o f the pseudo 
embedded generator using LRMC-AC settles at node 5 from G1 to G4, finally 
jumping to node 8 due to the power flow direction change in the line 5-7. Using 
LRMC-Util%, the pseudo embedded generator tends to find the place where the 
network utilisation can be reduced mostly. The potential location for the next 
generator is diverted every time, following the nodal prices’ change. The advantage 
can be clearly seen from Figure 6.23, the nodal prices are gradually reduced by the 
increase of the number of embedded generators. On the contrary, the nodal prices 
using LRMC-AC, as shown in Figure 6.22, can not provide effective indications to 
embedded generators.
Table 6.4: Em bedded generator response
Suggested location using 
LRM C-AC
Suggested location using 
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Figure 6.22: Price com parison with G1-G5 (LRM C-AC)
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Figure 6.23: Price com parison with G1-G5 (LRM C-U til% )
Figure 6.24 shows the price change at node 30 according to the embedded generator 
increase. It is clear to see the real power cost change dramatically using LRMC-
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Util% than LRMC method. LRMC-Util% can incentivizes generation connection in 
the areas with highly loaded circuits, and provide a proper price signal for siting 
embedded generation hence releasing the capacity o f highly utilized areas of the 
network. With more generation connected, the nodal cost for demand reduces, which 
is the negative equivalent o f the values in the figure. Without consideration of 
utilisation, using LRMC-AC, network price hardly change due to only distance and 









Node 30 price variation G1-G5 
- LRMC-AC P LRMC-Util% P
Figure 6.24: Price a t node 30 com parison with G1-G5
6.4.2 Case 2: Price Response with Demand Increase
In Case 2, it assumes that the rational average demand growth is 1.6% annually 
[W wf 2006]. Without generation change, the case study traces the price response 
with general demand increase between LRMC-AC and LRMC-Util% pricing 
methodologies. D1 is the original load profile, and D2 is 1.6% bigger than D I, which 
means demand at each connected node will rise by 1.6%. The price comparisons of 
D1-D4, which assume the next three years' demand increase, including the original
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load profile D l, are shown in Figures 6.25 and 6.26. Figure 6.27 compares the price 
variation of node 30 with D1-D4.
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Figure 6.26: Price com parison with D1-D4 (LRM C-U til% )
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Figure 6.27: Price at node 30 com parison with D1-D4
From Figure 6.25, using LRMC-AC, both real and reactive power prices are hardly 
changed. This is because the asset unit costs are kept the same. With LRMC-Util%, 
shown in Figure 6.26, the nodal prices increase following the demand growth, due to 
the growth in utilisation of the network. By truly reflecting the extended use of 
network with the utilisation consideration, the cost variation using LRMC-Util% is 
more sensitive in response to demand change than that using LRMC-AC, as shown 
in Figure 6.27. The benefit of the LRMC-Util% pricing method is demonstrated in 
the cost recovery shown in Figures 6.28-6.31. LRMC-Util% can reflect the increase 
o f the nodal prices with demand growth, but LRMC-AC can not.
■ 3.8%
H LRMC-AC_P ■  LRMC-AC_Q □  unrecovered a  LRMC-Util%_P ■  LRMC-Util%_Q □  unrecovered 
Figure 6.28: D1 cost recovery pa tte rn
□  41
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Figure 6.30: D3 cost recovery pattern
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Figure 6.31: D4 cost recovery7 pattern
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6.4.3 Case 3: Price Response with Network
Reinforcement
On the IEEE-30 bus test system, there are two lines connected to slack bus 1. 
Compared with the utilisation (29%) of the line between node 1 and node 3, the other 
line between node 1 and node 2 is highly loaded (utilisation=42.9%) with the 
security consideration, as shown in Appendix B - l . In Case 4, a line, the same as the 
original one, is added between node 1 and node 2. Case 4 is proposed to test the price 
response with network line reinforcement. The price results o f LRMC-AC and 
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Figure 6.32: LRM C-A C and LR M C -U til%  cost recovery on reinforcem ent
IEEE-30 bus test system
Compared with the original case in Figure 6.7, the cost recovery by LRMC-Util% is 
significantly reduced from 58.9% to 32.8%, due to the utilisation decrease under the 
line reinforcement. Because the reinforcement line is the same as the existing one, 
the asset unit cost does not change after the investment in the LRMC-AC pricing 
method. The cost recovery by LRMC-AC is almost keeping the same around 45%.
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Figure 6.33: LRM C-AC and LRM C-U tiI%  price com parison on reinforcem ent
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Figure 6.34: LRM C-A C and LR M C -U til%  price com parison on original IEEE-
30 bus test system
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Compared with the original case in Figure 6.34, the change o f nodal prices using 
LRM C-Util%  is much higher than that using LRMC-AC. Because the reinforced line 
is connected to the slack bus, the nodal prices o f all nodes reduce due to the releasing 
o f the highly utilized capacity o f the network.
Therefore, the LRM C-Util%  pricing methodology indicates that better investment 
can bring greater benefits to network users. This can provide an incentive for proper 
investment in new network infrastructure. LRMC-AC pricing methodology can not 
offer such a price signal for network investment.
6.5 Chapter summary
Compared with the proposed LRM C-DC and LRMC-AC model in Chapter 5, the 
LRMC-Util% pricing m ethodology can truly reflect the network long-run costs, and 
ensure that the costs are properly taken into account in the overall costs incurred in 
the choice o f site. As shown in Figure 6.35, the final cost at a node is set in the 
marginal cost ranging between MCbase and MCfutUre5 which is a competitive price 
following the discontinuous marginal cost curve, as described in Chapter 2 Section 
2.2.3. If  a node sits at a highly utilized part o f the network, the present value o f future 
investment will be higher. So the marginal cost will be closer to the MCfature- 
M oreover, the proposed LRM C-Util%  methodology distinguishes successfully the 
costs at different locations, recognizes the reactive power, and provides the economic 
signals for network users to locate new loads and generation.









Figure 6.35: Discontinuous future investment MC curve
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Work
Conclusions are drawn from discussions in the previous chapters and the findings 
from the case studies presented. Finally, a number o f  works outside the scope o f this 
thesis, but nevertheless considered to be important extensions to the work presented 
in this thesis, are mentioned. These would enable the developed methodologies to be 
transformed into suitable forms for adoption in real world network charging 
methodologies.
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7.1 Conclusions
Countries all over the world have committed to or currently in the process o f 
introducing more competition into their power industries. M oving from monopolies 
to competitive electricity markets, open access to transmission and distribution 
networks is the vehicle used to promote effective competition in the electricity 
supply industry. Therefore, the use o f network prices set by network companies play 
a more and more crucial role in providing economic efficient signals for siting and 
sizing o f oncoming generators and demands, and incentivizing the efficient use o f 
networks.
In the U.K., the increasing penetration o f embedded generators (EGs) in current and 
future electricity distribution networks leads to the changing in transmission network 
development. This would question the appropriateness o f the existing transmission 
pricing arrangement, which does not have the scope to deal with EGs [Pos 2001]. A t 
the same time, because the current distribution pricing m ethod using distribution 
reinforcement model (DRM) is based on postage stamp pricing method, essentially, 
has the same use o f system charge regardless o f the locations at each voltage level 
[Tur 2005, Wpd 2006a]. W ithout economic efficient price signals, EGs could 
potentially locate at areas which cause great network investment. This research is 
therefore proposing and exploring alternative efficient network pricing 
methodologies to incentivize appropriate sitting o f  EGs and demands.
The DCLF Investment Cost Related Pricing (ICRP) model adopted by the National 
Grid Company (NGC), UK, is a practical example o f long-run marginal cost with DC 
load flow (LRMC-DC) [Ngc 2006b]. It can reflect the asset costs, and provide the 
locational signals for both generators and demands. It is one o f advanced pricing 
methodologies so far. In this thesis, LRMC-DC pricing method was extended to a 
practical distribution network in the first time, to test its suitability in distribution
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networks. The results indicate that it is capable o f generating locational nodal prices 
on distribution networks, reflecting the distance power travelled from points o f 
generators to points o f consumers, overcoming the shortage o f the current DRM  
pricing, which has the average price at the same voltage level.
However, LRMC-DC based methodologies are not capable o f pricing reactive power, 
yet reactive power is very important in network investment and operation. N ew  
reactive power price allocation methodologies are proposed and demonstrated as the 
perpendicular approach and the arc approach. They are named from the different 
lines made in the triangle relationship between apparent power and real/reactive 
power to define the reactive power cost. The perpendicular approach decides the 
unit cost o f real and reactive power according to the power factor [Li 2005a, Li 
2006]. The arc approach keeps the same real power price as LRMC-DC and 
allocates the price difference between the apparent power and the real power to the 
reactive power, which is more straightforward to explain the reactive power price to 
network users.
In the development o f  the two novel methodologies above, the existing LRMC-DC 
method was modified into the LRMC-AC method to reflect the effects o f reactive 
power on network performance and capacity requirement. LRMC-AC will produce 
high reactive power prices for customers with poor power factors, and low reactive 
power prices for customers with good power factors. For the network users, the 
allocation o f reactive power cost encourages the consumers to operate at a better 
power factor as they attempt to minimise their network charges. However, the 
reactive power price would have to be sufficiently high to make a business case in 
investing in power factor correction equipment or changing operating regimes to 
minimise reactive power charges. This applies equally to demand and generation 
network users. For the network owner, the prices covered by reactive power can also 
bring locational signals to install local reactive power compensation devices.
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The advantage in cost reflectivity o f the LRMC-AC pricing methodology over 
LRMC-DC demonstrated on the IEEE-30 bus test system and the practical 110 bus 
distribution test system. On both test systems, LRMC-AC can cover around 5% more 
o f the capital cost than LRMC-DC due to the reactive power price. Compared with 
the highest real power price £22 KW/Yr, the highest reactive power price is £12 
KVAr/Yr on the IEEE-30 bus test system, and £9 KVAr/Yr on the distribution test 
system, which the reactive power price is sufficiently high to influence the customers 
to correct their power factors.
Because LRMC-AC only gears for reflecting the distances and paths to support nodal 
customers, it however does not reflect the degree o f utilisation, the LRMC-AC 
prcing m ethodology was further improved into the LRMC-Util% pricing 
methodology, capable o f  dealing with network utilisation. As one o f the m ajor 
contribution in this research, LRMC-Util% is a new proposed pricing methodology. 
In this method, the headroom o f network asset is related with future reinforcement 
cost. That is, if the reinforcement incurred earlier, the present value o f the future 
investment will be higher; otherwise, if the reinforcement happened later, the present 
value will be lower.
Compared to LRMC-AC, the LRMC-Util% encourages more efficient use o f  the 
existing network. It incentivizes generation connection in areas with highly loaded 
circuits, and incentivizes demand connections in areas with lightly loaded circuits. 
LRMC-Util% can therefore provide a proper price signal for siting embedded 
generation hence releasing the capacity o f highly utilized areas o f the network. 
Consequently, the network prices can be reduced with decreased network utilisation. 
Additionally, LRM C-Util% reflects both increases in the nodal prices with demand 
growth and reduction in the nodal prices with network reinforcements. W ithout 
consideration o f utilisation, using LRMC-AC, network prices hardly change due to 
only distances and power travel paths being considered.
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Overall, LRMC-Util% is aimed at allocating network asset costs based on the usage 
o f the network facilities from study nodes. It involves evaluating the future network 
investment requirements and fairly allocating the future network costs to users. The 
advantages o f LRM C-Util% include the ability to reflect the forward looking costs, 
to distinguish the costs at different locations, to recognize the reactive power, and to 
derive charges for both generation and demand users.
Thus, the benefits derived from LRMC-Util% methodology appeal to network 
owners, network generation and demand users alike. For network owners, it can 
reduce the future investment costs and release the network capacity. For generation 
and demands, it can produce the lower use o f network charges. Ultimately, the end 
consumers will benefit from reduced electricity prices.
7.2 Future Work
A number o f areas, outside the scope o f this thesis, that require further research and 
evaluation were identified. The issues briefly described here were considered to be 
important extensions to the work presented in this thesis to enable the developed 
methodologies to be useable in real world network charging methodologies.
1. Network benefits analysis
The embedded generator response and demand increase case studies o f Chapter 7 do 
not consider the network physical limitations. If  a generator connected to the network, 
the network facilities may not have sufficient capacity to adequately deal with 
possible increases in power flows. On the other hand the generator could ‘free u p ’ 
network capacity if  it is largely supplying local load. Network benefit analysis is to 
determine whether there are potential benefits that could arise from using different 
pricing regimes, and thus help inform the consideration o f any new network pricing
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framework. The study carried out by the University o f Bath [Li 2005b], in which the 
author was involved, is a good example, which indicates that the Bath University 
M odel, related to the LRMC-Util% pricing method, can bring more benefits by 
deferring network investment when compared with other pricing models.
2. Different time o f use o f network
In LRMC pricing methodologies, demand profile is one o f the m ost important input 
system data. The simultaneous maximum demand o f the system is taken as the 
demands data. In the existing network pricing regimes, such as ICRP, DRM, there 
are a few ways to define the system maximum demand. But realistically certain 
customers reach their maximum load condition during the system off-peak time. It is 
possible to calculate another set o f LRMC price based on off-peak time. The 
question is how to split the system asset cost amongst the different time periods, and 
how to allocate the cost to the customers who have their maximum load condition at 
the system off-peak time.
3. Various characteristic o f different distribution network
The distribution test network is a practical network based on the distribution system 
in the South Wales. The configuration o f network in other distribution zones can be 
very different from the distribution test network here. For example, the distribution 
network in Central London is fully built by underground cable. The asset cost will be 
much higher than other areas and the characteristics will be very different from the 
test network. LRM C-Uitl% should be tested on a diverse range o f practical 
distribution networks to verify its robustness.
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A Derivation of NGC TNUoS Tariff
A-l Calculation of Zonal Generation Tariff [Ngc 
2006b]
Let us consider all nodes in generation zone 4:W estem Highland.
The table below shows a sample output o f the transport model comprising the node, 
the marginal km o f an injection at the node with a consequent withdrawal at the 
reference node, the generation sited at the node, scaled to ensure total national
generation equals total national demand.







Gen W eighted Nodal 
M arginal km
1 4 LAGG1Q 1113.41 0.00
2 4 CEAN1Q 1133.18 54.41 366.48
3 4 FASN10 1143.82 38.50 261.75
4 4 FAUG10 1100.10 0.00
5 4 FWIL1Q 1009.79 0.00
6 4 FW IL1R 1009.79 0.00
7 4 GLEN 1Q 1123.82 43.52 290.71
8 4 INGA1Q 1087.40 16.74 108.20
9 4 M ILL1Q 1101.55 0.00
10 4 MILL IS 1106.76 0.00
11 4 QUOIIO 1123.82 15.07 100.67
12 4 QUOI1Q 1120.49 0.00
13 4 LOCL1Q 1082.41 0.00
14 4 LOCL1R 1082.41 0.00
Totals 168.24 1127.81
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In order to calculate the generation tariff we would carry out the following steps:
1. Calculate the generation weighted nodal shadow cost.
^  _ T , ,» „  . , ,  N odalM arg inalKm ■ ScaledGeneration
Gen W eighted Nodal Marginal km = --------------- 5--------------------------------------
TotalScaledGeneraion
2. Sum the generation weighted nodal shadow cost to give a zonal figure.
For zone 4 this would be:
(366.48 + 261.75 + 290.71 + 108.20 + 100.67) km = 1127.81 km
3. M odify the zonal figure in Step 2 above by the generation/demand split
correction factor. This ensures that the 27:73 (approx) split o f  revenue recovery 
between generation and demand is retained.
For zone 4 this would be say: 1127.81 km + (-239.60 km) = 888.21 km
-239.60 km is the generation/demand split correction factor. It is calculated by
simultaneous equation to give the correct split o f total revenue.
4. Calculate the transport tariff by multiplying the figure in Step 3 above by the
expansion constant (& dividing by 1000 to put into units o f  £/kW).
For zone 4 and assuming an expansion constant o f £9.80/M W km and a locational 
security factor o f 1.8:
(888.21 km * £9.80/MW km * 1.8) / 1000 = £15.67 / kW
5. Calculate the residual tariff.
Assuming the total revenue to be recovered from TNUoS is £ 1067m, the total 
recovery from generation would be (27% * £ 1067m) = £288m.
Assuming the total recovery from generation transport tariffs is £70m and total 
forecast chargeable generation capacity is 67000MW 
The Generation residual tariff would be as follows:
(£288m-£70m)/65000M W  =£3.35 / KW
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6. To get to the final tariff, add the generation residual tariff to zonal generation 
transport ta riff
For zone 4: £15.67/kW  + £3.35/kW  = £19.02 / kW
To summarise, in order to calculate the generation tariffs, it needs evaluate a 
generation weighted zonal marginal km cost, m odify by a re-referencing quantity to 
ensure that our revenue recovery split between generation and demand is correct, 
multiply by the security factor, then add a constant (termed the residual cost) to give 
the overall tariff.
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A-2 Calculation of Zonal Demand Tariff [Ngc 2006b]
Let us consider all nodes in demand zone 14: South W estern.
The table below shows a sample output o f the transport model comprising the node, 
the marginal km o f an injection at the node with a consequent withdrawal at the 
reference node, the generation sited at the node, scaled to ensure total national








Demand W eighted 
Nodal Marginal km
1 14 ABHA4B -381.25 148.5 -18.39
2 14 ABHA4A -381.72 148.5 -18.42
3 14 ALVE4A -328.31 113 -12.05
4 14 ALVE4B -328.31 113 -12.05
5 14 AXM I40 SWEB -337.53 117 -12.83
6 14 BRW A2A -281.64 92.5 -8.46
7 14 BRW A2B -281.72 92.5 -8.47
8 14 EXET40 -320.12 357 -37.13
9 14 HINP20 -247.67 4 -0.32
10 14 HINP40 -247.67 0
11 14 INDQ40 -401.28 450 -58.67
12 14 IROA20 SWEB -194.88 594 -37.61
13 14 LAND40 -438.65 297 -42.33
14 14 M ELK40 SWEB -162.96 102 -5.40
15 14 SEAB40 -63.21 352 -7.23
16 14 TAUN4A -273.79 0
17 14 TAUN4B -273.79 97 -8.63
Totals 3078 287.99
In order to calculate the demand tariff we would carry out the following steps:
1. Calculate the demand weighted nodal shadow costs.
^  , „ .  . , , _ T . , - , . , ,  NodalM  arg inalKm ■ Demand
Demand W eighted Nodal M arginal km = --------------- 2-------------------------
TotalDemand
2 . Sum the demand weighted nodal shadow cost to give a zonal figure.
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For zone 14 this is shown in the above table and is 287.99km.
3. M odify the zonal figure in Step 2 above by the generation/demand split 
correction factor.
For zone 14 this would be say: 287.99km - (-239.60km) = 527.59 km
-239.60 km is the generation/demand split correction factor. It is calculated by
simultaneous equation to give the correct split o f  total revenue.
4. Calculate the transport tariff by multiplying the figure in Step 3 above by the 
expansion constant (& dividing by 1000 to put into units o f £/kW).
For zone 14, assuming an expansion constant o f £9.80/M W km and a locational 
security factor o f 1.80:
(527.59km * £9.80/MW km * 1.8) / 1000= £9.31/kW
5. Calculate the residual tariff.
Assuming the total revenue to be recovered from TNUoS is £ 1067m, the total 
recovery from generation would be (73% * £1067m) = £779m.
Assuming the total recovery from generation transport tariffs is £130m and total 
forecast chargeable generation capacity is 50000MW  
The demand residual tariff would be as follows:
(£779m-£l 30m)/50000M W  = £12.98/KW
6. To get to the final tariff, add the demand residual tariff to demand zonal
transport tariff.
For zone 14: £9.31 / kW  + £12.98 / kW = £22.29 / kW
7. The final demand tariff is subject to further adjustment to allow for the
minimum £0/kw demand charge and the small generators recovery.
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A-3 NGC Official TNUoS Tariffs
2004/05 Final Tariffs:
Zone No. Zone Name. HH Zonal Tariff (£/kW) NHH Zonal Tariff (p/kWh)
1 Northern 4.940866 0.656585
2 North West 8.325173 1.100254
3 Yorkshire 8.455923 1.171611
4 N Wales & Mersey 8.709914 1.107068
5 East Midlands 10.771600 1.479424
6 Midlands 12.600874 1.733413
7 Eastern 11.007104 1.394934
8 South Wales 16.130442 2.228075
9 South East 14.321101 1.773924
10 London 16.761568 2.430277
11 Southern 15.679987 2.076489
12 South Western 17.798154 2.198679
Zone No. Zone Name Zonal Tariff (£/kW)
1 Northern 9 009237
2 Humberside 5.767201
3 North West 6 222266
4 Pennines & North Wales 4.121912
5 Dinorwig 10.715347
6 Anglesey 7.011370
7 East Anglia 2.889748
8 West Midlands 2.032089
9 South Wales & Gloucs -2.150590
10 Oxon & Bucks 0.004330
11 Estuary 1.733641
12 Central & SW London -6.604821
13 South Coast -1.507146
14 Wessex -3.829097
15 Peninsula -6 836065
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2005/06 Final Tariffs:
Zone No. Zone Name. HH Zonal Tariff (£/kW) NHH Zonal Tariff (p/kWh)
1 Northern Scotland 0.041110 0.005610
2 Southern Scotland 4.114438 0.561693
3 Northern 7.393664 0.970234
4 North West 11.137060 1.461966
5 Yorkshire 11.182059 1.487585
6 N Wales & Mersey 11.210216 1.512416
7 East Midlands 13.465848 1.804975
8 Midlands 15.026957 2.062601
9 Eastern 14.028455 1.909865
10 South Wales 18.315906 2.368863
11 South East 15.989410 2.167559
12 London 18.516693 2.454909
13 Southern 17.833397 2.446575
14 South Western 20.489868 2.728435
Residual Charge for Demand (£/kW) 11.190000
Zone No. Zone Name Zonal Tariff (£/kW)
1 Peterhead 18.162236
2 North Scotland 20.929759
3 Skye 23.095483
4 Western Highland 18.920247




9 South Scotland 11.820471
10 North East England 8.090616
11 Humber, Lancashire & SW Scotland 4.906290
12 Anglesey 6.122706
13 Dinorwig 8.705520
14 South Yorks & North Wales 3.120190
15 Midlands & South East 1.322966
16 Central London -5.712196
17 North London -0.220327
18 Oxon & South Coast -0.698936
19 South Wales & Gloucester -2.552479
20 Wessex -4.951295
21 Peninsula -8.044943
Residual Charge for Generation (£/kW) 3.257
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B Test System Data
B-l IEEE 30 Bus Test System
Figure B.l is shown the standard IEEE-30 bus test system. The bus data, line data, 
and transformer data are given in Table B .l, B.2, and B.3, respectively. And the base 
MVA is 100 [Pow 2006].
THREE WINDING TRANSFORMER EQUIVALENTS
HANCOCK
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6  I f i l l  132 KV
ROANOKE132 KV. REUSENS
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Figure B .l: IEEE 30-bus test system
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Table B .l: Bus data
Bus
No.
Bus Name Base KV Type
Demand Generator/Condenser
P(MW) Q(MVar) P(MW) Q(MVar)
1 Bus 1 132 Slack - - - -
2 Bus 2 132 Generator 21.7 0.0 40.0 50.0
3 Bus 3 132 Load 2.4 1.2 - -
4 Bus 4 132 Load 7.6 1.6 - -
5 Bus 5 132 Condenser 94.2 0.0 0.0 37.0
6 Bus 6 132 Load - - - -
7 Bus 7 132 Load 22.8 10.9 - -
8 Bus 8 132 Condenser 30.0 0.0 0.0 37.3
9 Bus 9 1.0 Load - - - -
10 Bus 10 33 Load 5.8 2.0 - -
11 Bus 11 11 Condenser - - 0.0 16.2
12 Bus 12 33 Load 11.2 7.5 - -
13 Bus 13 11 Condenser - - 0.0 10.6
14 Bus 14 33 Load 6.2 1.6 . .
15 Bus 15 33 Load 8.2 2.5 - -
16 Bus 16 33 Load 3.5 1.8 - -
17 Bus 17 33 Load 9.0 5.8 - -
18 Bus 18 33 Load 3.2 0.9 - -
19 Bus 19 33 Load 9.5 3.4 - -
20 Bus 20 33 Load 2.2 0.7 - -
21 Bus 21 33 Load 17.5 11.2 - -
22 Bus 22 33 Load - - - -
23 Bus 23 33 Load 3.2 1.6 - -
24 Bus 24 33 Load 8.7 6.7 - -
25 Bus 25 33 Load - - - -
26 Bus 26 33 Load 3.5 2.3 - -
27 Bus 27 33 Load - - - -
28 Bus 28 33 Load - - - -
29 Bus 29 33 Load 2.4 0.9 - -
30 Bus 30 33 Load 10.6 1.9 - -
Table B.2: Line data
From To Base
KV








1 2 132 0.0192 0.0575 0.0528 11,505,736 1,375,000 400
1 3 132 0.0452 0.1652 0.0408 1 1,505,736 825,000 300
2 4 132 0.057 0.1737 0.0368 17,258,604 550,000 200
3 4 132 0.0132 0.0379 0.0084 5,752,868 0 300
2 5 132 0.0472 0.1983 0.0418 20,135,038 825,000 400
2 6 132 0.0581 0.1763 0.0374 17,258,604 550,000 200
4 6 132 0.0119 0.0414 0.009 8,629,302 0 200
5 7 132 0.046 0.116 0.0204 17,258,604 550,000 200
6 7 132 0.0267 0.082 0.017 5,752,868 275,000 200
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6 8 132 0.012 0.042 0.009 8,629,302 0 200
12 14 33 0.1231 0.2559 0 577,318 164,080 32
12 15 33 0.0662 0.1304 0 288,659 164,080 32
12 16 33 0.0945 0.1987 0 346,391 164,080 32
14 15 33 0.221 0.1997 0 721,648 0 16
16 17 33 0.0524 0.1923 0 230,927 0 16
15 18 33 0.1073 0.2185 0 432,989 0 16
18 19 33 0.0639 0.1292 0 288,659 0 16
19 20 33 0.034 0.068 0 115,464 0 32
10 20 33 0.0936 0.209 0 346,391 164,080 32
10 17 33 0.0324 0.0845 0 115,464 164,080 32
10 21 33 0.0348 0.0749 0 144,330 164,080 30
10 22 33 0.0727 0.1499 0 288,659 164,080 30
21 22 33 0.0116 0.0236 0 57,732 0 30
15 23 33 0.1 0.202 0 432,989 164,080 16
22 24 33 0.115 0.179 0 432,989 0 30
23 24 33 0.132 0.27 0 577,318 0 16
24 25 33 0.1885 0.3292 0 721,648 0 30
25 26 33 0.2544 0.38 0 865,977 0 30
25 27 33 0.1093 0.2087 0 432,989 0 30
27 29 33 0.2198 0.4153 0 721,648 164,080 30
27 30 33 0.3202 0.6027 0 1,154,636 164,080 30
29 30 33 0.2399 0.4533 0 865,977 164,080 30
8 28 132 0.0636 0.2 0.0428 23,011,472 1,100,000 200
6 28 132 0.0169 0.0599 0.013 11,505,736 0 200
Table B.3: Transformer data






6 132 9 1 0 0.208 0 568,402 100
6 132 10 33 0 0.556 0 568,402 100
11 11 9 1 0 0.208 0 490,695 100
10 33 9 1 0 0.11 0 490,695 100
4 132 12 33 0 0.256 0 568,402 100
12 33 13 11 0 0.14 0 490,695 65
28 132 27 33 0 0.396 0 1,136,805 100
The power flow result o f IEEE-30 bus test system is following:
Bus Data
Bus V(pu) V(kV) V(theta) Pg(MW) Qg(MVAr) Pd(MW) Qd(MVAr) LoadPf
1 1.06 139.92 0.00 261.71 13.25 0 0 —
2 1.03 136.29 -5.24 0 0 -18.3 -37.3 -0.44
3 1.00 132.39 -7.38 0 0 2.4 1.2 0.89
4 0.99 130.65 -9.12 0 0 7.6 1.6 0.98
5 0.99 130.87 -14.26 0 0 94.2 -18 0.98
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6 0.99 129.98 -10.91 0 0 0 0 —
7 0.98 129.28 -12.84 0 0 22.8 10.9 0.90
8 0.98 129.91 -11.70 0 0 30 -7.3 0.97
9 1.00 1.00 -14.09 0 0 0 0 —
10 0.99 32.55 -15.80 0 0 5.8 2 0.95
11 1.04 11.40 -14.09 0 0 0 -16.2 —
12 1.01 33.47 -15.25 0 0 11.2 7.5 0.83
13 1.03 11.31 -15.25 0 0 0 -10.6 —
14 1.00 32.88 -16.20 0 0 6.2 1.6 0.97
15 0.99 32.66 -16.23 0 0 8.2 2.5 0.96
16 0.99 32.82 -15.74 0 0 3.5 1.8 0.89
17 0.98 32.46 -16.04 0 0 9 5.8 0.84
18 0.98 32.20 -16.85 0 0 3.2 0.9 0.96
19 0.97 32.04 -17.01 0 0 9.5 3.4 0.94
20 0.97 32.14 -16.77 0 0 2.2 0.7 0.95
21 0.97 32.13 -16.29 0 0 17.5 11.2 0.84
22 0.97 32.15 -16.26 0 0 0 0 —
23 0.98 32.16 -16.56 0 0 3.2 1.6 0.89
24 0.96 31.78 -16.61 0 0 8.7 6.7 0.79
25 0.97 31.99 -16.32 0 0 0 0 —
26 0.95 31.38 -16.79 0 0 3.5 2.3 0.84
27 0.98 32.42 -15.85 0 0 0 0 —
28 0.98 129.28 -11.56 0 0 0 0 —
29 0.96 31.73 -17.19 0 0 2.4 0.9 0.94
30 0.95 31.33 -18.15 0 0 10.6 1.9 0.98
Line Data 
FromBus ToBus V(kV) Pij(MW) Qij(MVAr) Pji(MW) Qji(MVAr) PLoss(MW) Util%
1 2 132 174.09 -2.45 -168.91 12.18 5.18 42.90
1 3 132 87.62 15.70 -84.40 -8.28 3.22 29.00
2 4 132 43.85 10.41 -42.74 -10.79 1.11 22.30
3 4 132 82.00 7.08 -81.11 -5.36 0.89 27.30
2 5 132 82.85 5.83 -79.78 2.78 3.07 20.40
2 6 132 60.51 8.88 -58.45 -6.44 2.06 30.00
4 6 132 71.33 -7.71 -70.70 9.01 0.62 35.80
5 7 132 -14.42 15.22 14.64 -16.65 0.22 10.80
6 7 132 37.84 -6.15 -37.44 5.75 0.40 19.10
6 8 132 29.74 -7.40 -29.62 6.93 0.12 15.30
12 14 33 8.08 3.16 -7.99 -2.97 0.09 26.90
12 15 33 18.20 9.82 -17.92 -9.28 0.28 63.80
12 16 33 7.45 6.53 -7.36 -6.34 0.09 30.60
14 15 33 1.79 1.37 -1.78 -1.36 0.01 14.00
16 17 33 3.86 4.54 -3.84 -4.47 0.02 37.00
15 18 33 6.36 3.23 -6.31 -3.12 0.06 44.30
18 19 33 3.11 2.22 -3.10 -2.20 0.01 23.80
19 20 33 -6.40 -1.20 6.42 1.23 0.02 20.40
10 20 33 8.70 2.11 -8.62 -1.93 0.08 27.80
10 17 33 5.17 1.36 -5.16 -1.33 0.01 16.70
10 21 33 15.35 9.89 -15.23 -9.63 0.12 60.50
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10 22 33 7.33 4.52 -7.28 -4.41 0.06 28.50
21 22 33 -2.27 -1.57 2.27 1.57 0.00 9.20
15 23 33 5.14 4.91 -5.09 -4.80 0.05 44.10
22 24 33 5.01 2.84 -4.97 -2.78 0.04 19.10
23 24 33 1.89 3.20 -1.87 -3.17 0.02 23.10
24 25 33 -1.86 -0.76 1.87 0.77 0.01 6.70
25 26 33 3.55 2.37 -3.50 -2.30 0.05 14.10
25 27 33 -5.42 -3.15 5.47 3.23 0.05 21.00
27 29 33 6.20 1.69 -6.11 -1.51 0.09 21.20
27 30 33 7.11 1.69 -6.93 -1.36 0.18 23.90
29 30 33 3.71 0.61 -3.67 -0.54 0.04 12.40
8 28 132 -0.38 0.37 0.38 -4.49 0.00 1.30
6 28 132 19.23 2.74 -19.16 -3.75 0.07 9.70
Transformer Data 
FromBus ToBus Pij(MW) Qij(MVAr) Pji(MW) Qji(MVAr) PLoss(MW) Util% TapRatio
6 9 26.96 2.15 -26.96 -0.65 0 27.00 0.98
6 10 15.39 6.09 -15.39 -4.62 0 16.30 0.97
11 9 0.00 16.20 0.00 -15.69 0 15.90 1.00
10 9 -26.96 -15.26 26.96 16.34 0 31.30 1.00
4 12 44.92 22.26 -44.92 -16.55 0 49.00 0.93
12 13 0.00 -10.45 0.00 10.60 0 16.20 1.00
28 27 18.78 8.24 -18.78 -6.61 0 20.20 0.97
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B-2 Distribution Test System
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Figure B.2: Geographic map of distribution test system
Appendices 171
The bus data, line data, and transformer data are given in Table B.4, B.5, and B.6, 
respectively. And the base M VA is 100.
Table B.4: Bus data
Bus
No.
Bus Name Base KV Type
Demand Generator/Condenser
P(MW) Q(MVar) P(MW) Q(MVar)
5001 Bus 5001 275 - - - - -
5043 Bus 5043 275 - - - -
5080 Bus 5080 275 Slack - - - -
5081 Bus 5081 275 - - - -
5242 Bus 5242 275 - - - -
2270 Bus 2270 132 - - - -
2271 Bus 2271 132 - - - -
1 Bus 1 33 Load 34.77 3.47 - -
2280 Bus 2280 132 - - - -
2281 Bus 2281 132 - - - -
2 Bus 2 33 Load 24.59 17.42 - -
2290 Bus 2290 132 - - - -
3 Bus 3 33 Load 40.11 6.61 - -
2300 Bus 2300 132 - - . -
2301 Bus 2301 132 - - - -
2302 Bus 2302 132 - - - -
4 Bus 4 11 Load 20.70 8.20 - -
2310 Bus 2310 132 - - - -
5 Bus 5 11 Load 21.00 6.10 - -
2320 Bus 2320 132 - - - -
6 Bus 6 33 Load 32.55 3.01
2330 Bus 2330 132 - - - -
7 Bus 7 33 Load 81.18 27.07 - -
8 Bus 8 33 Load 102.63 36.33 - -
9 Bus 9 11 Load 29.80 8.70 - -
2350 Bus 2350 132 - - - -
10 Bus 10 11 Load 30.50 10.00 - -
2360 Bus 2360 132 - - - -
2361 Bus 2361 132 - . - -
11 Bus 11 11 Load 7.40 1.50 - -
2660 Bus 2660 132 - - - -
12 Bus 12 11 Load 7.80 1.60 - -
2724 Bus 2724 11 - - - -
2725 Bus 2725 11 - - - -
2726 Bus 2726 11 - - - -
2727 Bus 2727 11 - - - -
2730 Bus 2730 132 - - - -
2731 Bus 2731 132 - - - -
2735 Bus 2735 11 - - - -
13 Bus 13 11 Generator - - 32.30 10.61
14 Bus 14 11 Generator - - 171.00 56.20
15 Bus 15 11 Generator - - 57.00 18.73
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2739 Bus 2739 6.6 - - - -
2740 Bus 2740 132 - - - -
2741 Bus 2741 132 - - - -
2742 Bus 2742 132 - - - -
2745 Bus 2745 11 - - - -
2746 Bus 2746 11 - - - -
2747 Bus 2747 11 - - - -
2748 Bus 2748 11 - - - -
2749 Bus 2749 6.6 - - - -
2750 Bus 2750 132 - - - -
2751 Bus 2751 132 - - - -
2755 Bus 2755 11 - - - -
2756 Bus 2756 11 - - - -
2757 Bus 2757 11 - - - -
2812 Bus 2812 11 - - - -
3834 Bus 3834 132 - - - -
5000 Bus 5000 275 - - - -
5008 Bus 5008 132 - - - -
5009 Bus 5009 132 - - - -
5010 Bus 5010 132 - - - .
5011 Bus 5011 132 - - - -
5040 Bus 5040 275 - - - -
5050 Bus 5050 132 - - - -
5051 Bus 5051 132 - - - -
5052 Bus 5052 132 - - - -
2092 Bus 2092 132 - - - -
2093 Bus 2093 132 - - - -
2370 Bus 2370 132 - - - -
2371 Bus 2371 132 - - - -
16 Bus 16 33 Load 32.35 12.07 - -
2381 Bus 2381 132 - - - -
2382 Bus 2382 132 - - - -
2390 Bus 2390 132 - - - -
2391 Bus 2391 132 - - - -
17 Bus 17 11 Load 26.10 6.50 - -
2400 Bus 2400 132 - - - -
2401 Bus 2401 132 - - - -
18 Bus 18 11 Load 15.30 6.00
2403 Bus 2403 132 - - - -
2404 Bus 2404 132 - - - -
19 Bus 19 11 Load 24.00 9.50 - -
2406 Bus 2406 11 - - - -
2410 Bus 2410 132 - - - -
2411 Bus 2411 132 - - - -
20 Bus 20 11 Load 16.00 5.30 - -
2416 Bus 2416 132 - - - -
2418 Bus 2418 132 - - - -
2419 Bus 2419 132 - - - -
2420 Bus 2420 132 - - - -
2421 Bus 2421 132 - - - -
21 Bus 21 11 Load 16.70 6.60 - -
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22 Bus 22 11 Load 23.00 0.00 - -
2800 Bus 2800 132 - - - -
2801 Bus 2801 132 - - - -
2802 Bus 2802 132 - - - -
2803 Bus 2803 132 - - - -
2804 Bus 2804 132 - - - -
2805 Bus 2805 132 - - - -
2808 Bus 2808 132 - - - -
2809 Bus 2809 132 - - - -
23 Bus 23 33 Load 11.67 13.88 - -
24 Bus 24 11 Load 11.50 4.60 - -
4446 Bus 4446 11 - - - -
4449 Bus 4449 11 - - - -
5240 Bus 5240 275 - - - -
5250 Bus 5250 132 - - - -
5251 Bus 5251 132 - - - -
5252 Bus 5252 132 - - - -













5080 5081 275 0.00051 0.00475 0.0216433 0 0 1134
5080 5001 275 0.00054 0.00488 0.0333 0 0 1180
5080 5000 275 0.00054 0.00488 0.0333 0 0 1180
5081 5043 275 0.00051 0.00475 0.0216433 0 0 1134
5043 5040 275 0.00051 0.00475 0.0216433 0 0 1134
5001 5242 275 0.00062 0.005645 0.067725 0 0 1596
5242 5240 275 0.00062 0.005645 0.067725 0 0 1249
5008 5010 132 0.000745 0.04027 0 0 0 787.3
5009 5011 132 0.00049 0.040995 0 0 0 787.3
5010 2280 132 0.000849 0.002998 0.01542894 416,508 297,000 875
5010 2301 132 0.006153 0.029926 0.0192307 3,900,732 247,500 875
5011 2302 132 0.006153 0.029926 0.0192307 3,900,732 247,500 875
5011 2281 132 0.000812 0.002852 0.01039887 416,508 194,150 875
2724 2725 11 0 0.164 0 0 0 2361.9
2727 2726 11 0 0.229 0 0 0 2361.9
2281 2270 132 0.003478 0.016965 0.004087826 2,237,578 0 950
2300 2731 132 0.000574 0.000895 0.0328434 0 0 550
2300 2740 132 0.000113 0.000352 0.000550508 0 0 1610
2300 2271 132 0.003227 0.010002 0.005766788 1,300,148 121,000 705
2300 2730 132 0.000574 0.000895 0.0328434 0 0 550
2300 2301 132 0.002906 0.009017 0.003525637 1,193,720 0 805
2301 3834 132 0.002058 0.010041 0.002419379 1,324,310 0 950
2302 2330 132 0.002058 0.010041 0.002419379 1,324,310 0 950
13 2735 11 0 0.0001 0 0 0 2000
2740 2742 132 0 0.00011 0 0 0 2000
2740 2741 132 0 0.00011 0 0 0 2000
2747 2748 11 0 0.6637 0 0 0 2000
14 2745 11 0 0.0001 0 0 0 20000
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15 2746 11 0 0.0001 0 0 0 20000
2739 2749 6.6 0 0.0001 0 0 0 2000
2812 2747 11 0.00925 0.02021 0 0 0 1259.7
2271 2270 132 0 0.0001 0 0 0 787
2290 2271 132 0.005925 0.032708 0.09481407 4,152,420 2,132,350 787
5050 2660 132 0.000929 0.004228 0.003962346 0 2,341,900 840
5050 2290 132 0.001947 0.006534 0.1549899 0 3,822,500 787
5051 5050 132 0.00046 0.04377 0 0 0 1049.73
5052 5050 132 0.00046 0.04377 0 0 0 1049.73
2360 5050 132 0.004105 0.009309 0.002005953 1,158,340 0 590
2361 5050 132 0.004105 0.009309 0.002005953 1,158,340 0 590
2320 5050 132 0.000702 0.002401 0.06880654 0 1,610,400 787
2320 2751 132 0 0.0001 0.000806696 0 0 623.2
2320 2750 132 0 0.0001 0.001656998 0 0 623.2
2755 2757 11 0.013157 0.01697 0.00096724 0 0 1800
2756 2757 11 0.013157 0.01697 0.00096724 0 0 1800
2350 2660 132 0.000405 0.001951 0.0210707 0 1,008,150 978.5
2350 2320 132 0.000399 0.001565 0.04808288 0 1,006,500 672
2330 2320 132 0.001031 0.003523 0.1009539 0 2,362,800 787
3834 2310 132 0.000346 0.001355 0.04164556 0 871,750 760
2310 2350 132 0.000876 0.003433 0.1054933 0 2,208,250 760
5250 2805 132 0.001291 0.005492 0.002025074 704,726 0 840
5250 2804 132 0.001291 0.005492 0.002025074 704,726 0 840
5250 2803 132 0.003474 0.015439 0.005692526 1,981,000 0 840
5250 2802 132 0.00369 0.015933 0.007142009 2,034,502 35,200 569
5250 2401 132 0.003996 0.016861 0.01790029 2,131,438 260,150 770
5250 2400 132 0.004 0.016871 0.0183733 2,131,438 270,600 770
5251 5250 132 0.000485 0.04229 0 0 0 971
5252 5250 132 0.00005 0.04221 0 0 0 1049.73
2802 2382 132 0.009552 0.021663 0.004667939 2,695,506 0 590
2382 2093 132 0.01293 0.029325 0.006318728 3,648,757 0 590
2093 2370 132 0.015055 0.034145 0.007357321 4,248,493 0 590
2803 2381 132 0.010463 0.02373 0.005113263 2,952,660 0 590
2381 2092 132 0.01293 0.029325 0.006318728 3,648,757 0 590
2370 2390 132 0.002948 0.006686 0.00144058 831,865 0 590
2371 2391 132 0.002948 0.006686 0.00144058 831,865 0 590
2092 2371 132 0.015055 0.034145 0.007357321 4,248,493 0 590
17 4449 11 0.628 0.2792 0 0 0 378
17 4446 11 0.557 0.2655 0 0 0 360
2804 2410 132 0.001019 0.002312 0.000498126 287,643 0 590
2804 2800 132 0.000366 0.001558 0.00057446 199,912 0 520
2805 2411 132 0.001019 0.002312 0.000498126 287,643 0 590
2805 2801 132 0.000366 0.001558 0.00057446 199,912 0 520
2800 2808 132 0.002021 0.003622 0.02626545 0 2,030,050 450
2801 2809 132 0.002021 0.003622 0.02626545 0 2,030,050 450
2400 2403 132 0.00068 0.003648 0.1048135 0 2,171,400 366
2401 2404 132 0.000675 0.00362 0.104017 0 2,154,900 366
2406 19 11 0 0.0001 0 0 0 2000
2403 2418 132 0.005801 0.016713 0.01853552 2,046,295 289,300 366
2404 2419 132 0.005806 0.016737 0.01922578 2,046,295 303,600 366
2420 2416 132 0 0.0001 0 0 0 65535
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2418 2420 132 0 0.0001 0 0 0 65535
2419 2421 132 0 0.0001 0 0 0 65535
Table B.6: Transformer data






5000 275 5008 132 0.000745 0.04027 0 1,452,000 180
5000 275 5009 132 0.00049 0.040995 0 1,452,000 180
2280 132 2 33 0.01127 0.2898 0 1,391,069 45
5010 132 2724 11 0 0.164 0 0 45
5011 132 2727 11 0 0.229 0 0 45
2300 132 4 11 0.0225 0.8583 0 1,125,908 30
2300 132 4 11 0.0229 0.8613 0 1,125,908 30
2730 132 2735 11 0.0135 0.486 0 0 35
2731 132 2735 11 0.0135 0.486 0 0 35
2740 132 2812 11 0.00925 0.02021 0 0 24
2741 132 2745 11 0.00189 0.0767 0 0 180
2742 132 2746 11 0.00319 0.1382 0 0 92
2747 11 2749 6.6 0 0.6613 0 0 1
2270 132 1 33 0.0094 0.257 0 1,330,159 60
2270 132 1 33 0.01 0.213 0 1,330,159 60
2290 132 3 33 0.0065 0.2507 0 1,818,699 90
5050 132 9 11 0.0302 0.741 0 967,751 30
5050 132 8 33 0.0047 0.2033 0 1,724,111 90
5050 132 9 11 0.0304 0.745 0 967,751 30
5050 132 8 33 0.0048 0.2023 0 1,724,111 90
5040 275 5051 132 0.00046 0.04377 0 2,010,538 240
5040 275 5052 132 0.00046 0.04377 0 2,010,538 240
2360 132 11 11 0.024 0.86 0 1,164,556 30
2361 132 11 11 0.0265 0.8327 0 1,164,556 30
2320 132 6 33 0.0052 0.2712 0 2,190,551 90
2750 132 2755 11 0.0293 0.4167 0 0 30
2751 132 2756 11 0.0293 0.4167 0 0 30
2660 132 12 11 0.0192 0.851 0 1,029,211 30
2660 132 12 11 0.0192 0.851 0 1,029,211 30
2350 132 10 11 0.019 0.699 0 1,169,285 40
2350 132 10 11 0.019 0.6965 0 1,169,285 40
2330 132 7 33 0.0107 0.212 0 1,453,321 60
2330 132 7 33 0.0107 0.21 0 1,453,321 60
2310 132 5 11 0.0192 0.851 0 1,077,633 30
2310 132 5 11 0.0192 0.851 0 1,077,633 30
5250 132 22 11 0.0254 0.8607 0 951,610 30
5250 132 22 11 0.0231 0.8567 0 951,610 30
5240 275 5251 132 0.000485 0.04229 0 4,230,232 222
5240 275 5252 132 0.00005 0.04221 0 4,573,224 240
2370 132 16 33 0.0106 0.2738 0 1,072,604 45
2371 132 16 33 0.0117 0.2778 0 1,072,604 45
2390 132 17 11 0.03 0.893 0 943,540 30
2391 132 17 11 0.03 0.888 0 943,540 30
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2381 132 23 33 0.0128 0.2733 0 1,671,673 45
2410 132 20 11 0.0254 0.8607 0 935,469 30
2411 132 20 11 0.0231 0.8567 0 935,469 30
2808 132 24 11 0.02125 0.8597 0 903,188 30
2809 132 24 11 0.02082 0.85905 0 903,188 30
2400 132 19 11 0.0297 0.89217 0 1,019,531 30
2401 132 19 11 0.0211 0.86244 0 1,019,531 30
2403 132 18 11 0.02614 0.86761 0 1,103,593 30
2404 132 18 11 0.0261 0.8423 0 1,103,593 30
2420 132 21 11 0.0234 0.83567 0 1,172,626 30
2421 132 21 11 0.0234 0.844 0 1,172,626 30
The power flow result o f  distribution test system is following:
Bus Data 
Bus V(pu) V(kV) V(theta) Pg(MW) Qg(MVAr) Pd(MW) Qd(MVAr) LoadPf
5001 1.03 282.42 -0.46 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5043 1.03 282.47 -0.49 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5080 1.03 283.25 0.00 355.88 79.32 0.00 0.00 —
5081 1.03 282.87 -0.25 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5242 1.02 281.40 -0.99 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2270 1.04 137.70 -1.91 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2271 1.04 137.70 -1.91 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
1 1.02 33.65 -4.12 0 0 34.77 3.47 1.00
2280 1.04 137.27 -1.76 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2281 1.04 137.59 -2.00 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2 1.03 34.08 -5.30 0 0 24.59 17.42 0.82
2290 1.04 136.61 -2.96 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
3 1.03 33.97 -8.26 0 0 40.11 6.61 0.99
2300 1.05 138.37 -1.37 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2301 1.04 137.53 -1.94 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2302 1.04 136.64 -2.80 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
4 1.05 11.50 -5.83 0 0 20.70 8.20 0.93
2310 1.04 136.74 -2.76 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5 1.04 11.46 -7.32 0 0 21.00 6.10 0.96
2320 1.03 136.43 -3.02 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
6 1.02 33.67 -7.81 0 0 32.55 3.01 1.00
2330 1.03 136.33 -3.07 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
7 1.03 34.11 -7.44 0 0 81.18 27.07 0.95
8 1.03 33.86 -8.42 0 0 102.63 36.33 0.94
9 1.05 11.53 -8.53 0 0 29.80 8.70 0.96
2350 1.03 136.50 -2.97 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
10 1.05 11.53 -8.27 0 0 30.50 10.00 0.95
2360 1.03 136.38 -3.04 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2361 1.03 136.38 -3.04 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
11 1.04 11.48 -4.67 0 0 7.40 1.50 0.98
2660 1.03 136.47 -2.99 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
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12 1.04 11.48 -4.71 0 0 7.80 1.60 0.98
2724 1.04 11.45 -1.73 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2725 1.04 11.45 -1.73 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2726 1.04 11.46 -2.01 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2727 1.04 11.46 -2.01 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2730 1.05 138.39 -1.37 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2731 1.05 138.39 -1.37 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2735 1.06 11.61 2 73 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
13 1.06 11.61 2.73 0 0 -32.30 -10.62 -0.95
14 1.01 11.14 6.25 0 0 -171.00 -56.21 -0.95
15 1.01 11.13 3.17 0 0 -57.00 -18.74 -0.95
2739 1.05 6.92 -1.33 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2740 1.05 138.42 -1.33 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2741 1.05 138.43 -1.32 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2742 1.05 138.43 -1.33 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2745 1.01 11.14 6.24 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2746 1.01 11.13 3.16 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2747 1.05 11.54 -1.33 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2748 1.05 11.54 -1.33 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2749 1.05 6.92 -1.33 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2750 1.03 136.43 -3.02 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2751 1.03 136.43 -3.02 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2755 1.05 11.57 -3.02 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2756 1.05 11.57 -3.02 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2757 1.05 11.57 -3.02 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2812 1.05 11.54 -1.33 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
3834 1.04 136.85 -2.66 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5000 1.03 282.88 -0.20 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5008 1.05 137.95 -0.96 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5009 1.05 138.04 -1.10 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5010 1.04 137.37 -1.73 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5011 1.04 137.56 -2.01 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5040 1.03 282.04 -0.74 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5050 1.03 136.41 -3.02 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5051 1.04 137.02 -1.88 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
5052 1.04 137.02 -1.88 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2092 0.99 130.34 -6.81 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2093 0.99 131.08 -6.66 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2370 0.98 129.90 -7.16 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2371 0.98 129.30 -7.30 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
16 1.03 34.10 -9.54 0 0 32.35 12.07 0.94
2381 0.99 131.20 -6.39 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2382 1.00 132.08 -6.24 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2390 0.98 129.80 -7.20 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2391 0.98 129.21 -7.35 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
17 1.03 11.36 -13.26 0 0 26.10 6.50 0.97
2400 1.01 133.05 -5.94 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
2401 1.01 133.04 -5.95 0 0 0.00 0.00 —
18 1.05 11.57 -9.24 0 0 15.30 6.00 0.93
2403 1.01 133.03 -5.98 0 0 0.00 0.00 ____
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2404 1.01 133.02 -5.98
19 1.05 11.58 -11.10
2406 1.05 11.58 -11.10
2410 1.01 133.13 -5.73
2411 1.01 133.13 -5.73
20 1.06 11.61 -9.15
2416 1.01 132.90 -6.05
2418 1.01 132.90 -6.05
2419 1.01 132.89 -6.05
2420 1.01 132.90 -6.05
2421 1.01 132.89 -6.05
21 1.05 11.53 -9.56
22 1.06 11.61 -10.73
2800 1.01 133.15 -5.72
2801 1.01 133.15 -5.72
2802 1.01 132.80 -5.93
2803 1.00 132.52 -5.99
2804 1.01 133.15 -5.72
2805 1.01 133.15 -5.72
2808 1.01 133.13 -5.73
2809 1.01 133.13 -5.73
23 1.03 33.87 -7.97
24 1.06 11.66 -8.18
4446 1.03 11.36 -13.26
4449 1.03 11.36 -13.26
5240 1.02 280.30 -1.53
5250 1.01 133.19 -5.68
5251 1.02 134.46 -3.58
5252 1.02 134.46 -3.58
Line Data
FromBus ToBus V(kV) Pij(MW)
5080 5081 275 98.35
5080 5001 275 178.85
5080 5000 275 78.69
5081 5043 275 98.30
5043 5040 275 98.25
5001 5242 275 178.68
5242 5240 275 178.48
5008 5010 132 36.39
5009 5011 132 42.24
5010 2280 132 24.69
5010 2301 132 11.69
5011 2302 132 52.45
5011 2281 132 -10.22
2724 2725 11 0.00
2727 2726 11 0.00
2281 2270 132 -10.22
2300 2731 132 -16.11
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 24.00 9.50 0.93
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 16.00 5.30 0.95
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 16.70 6.60 0.93
0 23.00 0.00 1.00
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 11.67 13.88 0.64
0 11.50 4.60 0.93
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00 —
0 0.00 0.00
Pji(MW) Qji(MVAr) PLoss(MW) Util%
-98.30 -20.16 0.05 18.50
-178.68 -44.89 0.17 32.80
-78.65 -21.29 0.03 14.40
-98.25 -21.99 0.05 18.60
-98.20 -23.82 0.05 18.70
-178.48 -50.17 0.20 24.30
-178.27 -55.36 0.21 31.30
-36.38 -10.46 0.01 21.10
-42.24 -8.36 0.01 24.00
-24.69 -19.89 0.01 15.60
-11.68 5.75 0.01 6.80
-52.29 -14.03 0.17 27.00
10.22 3.28 0.00 5.50
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10.22 2.85 0.00 4.90

















































2300 2740 132 -227.24 -45.67 227.29 45.78 0.06 63.00
2300 2271 132 108.66 18.43 -108.30 -17.95 0.36 68.20
2300 2730 132 -16.11 -7.65 16.12 4.05 0.00 13.70
2300 2301 132 130.05 32.40 -129.57 -31.31 0.48 72.60
2301 3834 132 141.25 25.56 -140.86 -23.92 0.39 65.90
2302 2330 132 52.29 14.03 -52.23 -14.01 0.06 24.90
13 2735 11 32.30 10.61 -32.30 -10.61 0.00 89.20
2740 2742 132 -56 89 -13.86 56.89 13.87 0.00 12.80
2740 2741 132 -170.40 -31.92 170.40 31.95 0.00 37.90
2747 2748 11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 2745 11 171.00 56.21 -171.00 -56.17 0.00 47.24
15 2746 11 57.00 18.74 -57.00 -18.73 0.00 15.75
2739 2749 6.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2812 2747 11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2271 2270 132 45.05 7.69 -45.05 -7.69 0.00 25.40
2290 2271 132 -63.02 -19.22 63.25 10.26 0.23 36.10
5050 2660 132 -15.51 -6.70 15.51 6.29 0.00 8.80
5050 2290 132 -22.80 -25.23 22.81 8.70 0.01 16.20
5051 5050 132 49.09 10.88 -49.08 -9.85 0.01 20.90
5052 5050 132 49.09 10.88 -49.08 -9.85 0.01 20.90
2360 5050 132 -3.64 -0.85 3.64 0.64 0.00 2.80
2361 5050 132 -3.76 -0.87 3.76 0.65 0.00 2.80
2320 5050 132 3.78 2.02 -3.78 -9.36 0.00 4.00
2320 2751 132 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.10
2320 2750 132 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.10
2755 2757 11 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20
2756 2757 11 0.00 -0.11 0 00 0.00 0.00 0.20
2350 2660 132 23.32 5.90 -23.31 -8.14 0.00 10.90
2350 2320 132 65.73 11.81 -65.71 -16.88 0.02 43.80
2330 2320 132 -29.32 -20.29 29.33 9.55 0.01 18.50
3834 2310 132 140.86 23.92 -140.80 -28.13 0.07 82.40
2310 2350 132 119.75 20.16 -119.63 -30.98 0.12 70.50
5250 2805 132 13.79 2.84 -13.79 -3.03 0.00 7.30
5250 2804 132 13.76 2.80 -13.76 -2.99 0.00 7.30
5250 2803 132 40.76 23.91 -40.68 -24.14 0.08 24.60
5250 2802 132 30.60 11.31 -30.56 -11.87 0.04 25.10
5250 2401 132 28.35 -0.50 -28.32 -1.18 0.03 16.10
5250 2400 132 27.87 -0.91 -27.84 -0.83 0.03 15.80
5251 5250 132 89.15 23.73 -89.11 -20.26 0.04 41.40
5252 5250 132 89.08 24.69 -89.07 -21.22 0.00 38.30
2802 2382 132 30.56 11.87 -30.46 -12.10 0.10 24.30
2382 2093 132 30.46 12.10 -30.32 -12.42 0.14 24.30
2093 2370 132 30.32 12.42 -30.15 -12.76 0.17 24.30
2803 2381 132 40.68 24.14 -40.45 -24.12 0.23 35.00
2381 2092 132 28.74 9.39 -28.62 -9.74 0.12 22.40
2370 2390 132 13.27 4.94 -13.26 -5.06 0.01 10.50
2371 2391 132 12.95 4.33 -12.94 -4.46 0.01 10.10
2092 2371 132 28.62 9.74 -28.47 -10.13 0.14 22.40
17 4449 11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 4446 11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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2804 2410 132 8.00 3.13 -8.00 -3.18 0.00
2804 2800 132 5.76 -0.14 -5.76 0.08 0.00
2805 2411 132 8.03 3.17 -8.03 -3.22 0.00
2805 2801 132 5.76 -0.13 -5.76 0.08 0.00
2800 2808 132 5.76 -0.08 -5.76 -2.59 0.00
2801 2809 132 5.76 -0.08 -5.76 -2.60 0.00
2400 2403 132 15.98 -5.09 -15.97 -5.55 0.00
2401 2404 132 16.10 -5.04 -16.10 -5.52 0.00
2406 19 11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2403 2418 132 8.42 2.07 -8.41 -3.94 0.00
2404 2419 132 8.33 1.96 -8.32 -3.89 0.00
2420 2416 132 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2418 2420 132 8.41 3.94 -8.41 -3.94 0.00
2419 2421 132 8.32 3.89 -8.32 -3.89 0.00
Transformer Data
FromBus ToBus Pij(MW) Qij(MVAr) Pji(MW) Qji(MVAr) PLoss(MW) Util%
5000 5008 36.40 11.53 -36.39 -11.00 0.01 21.20
5000 5009 42.25 9.76 -42.24 -9.06 0.01 24.00
2280 2 24.69 19.89 -24.59 -17.42 0.10 68.70
5010 2724 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5011 2727 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2300 4 10.39 5.09 -10.37 -4.11 0.03 37.90
2300 4 10.36 5.06 -10.33 -4.09 0.03 37.70
2730 2735 -16.12 -4.05 16.15 5.31 0.04 48.00
2731 2735 -16.12 -4.05 16.15 531 0.04 48.00
2740 2812 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2741 2745 -170.40 -31.95 171.00 56.17 0.60 98.20
2742 2746 -56.89 -13.87 57.00 18.73 0.11 64.40
2747 2749 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2270 1 15.77 2.28 -15.75 -1.66 0.02 26.50
2270 1 19.05 2.56 -19.02 -1 81 0.04 31.90
2290 3 40.21 10.52 -40.11 -6.61 0.10 45.70
5050 9 15.01 6.00 -14.94 -4.36 0.07 52.90
5050 8 51.31 23.83 -51.18 -18.14 0.13 61.60
5050 9 14.93 5.96 -14.86 -4.34 0.07 52.60
5050 8 51.58 23.92 -51.45 -18.19 0.14 61.90
5040 5051 49.10 11.91 -49.09 -10.88 0.01 21.00
5040 5052 49.10 11.91 -49.09 -10.88 0.01 21.00
2360 11 3.64 0.85 -3.64 -0.75 0.00 12.40
2361 11 3.76 0.87 -3.76 -0.75 0.00 12.80
2320 6 32.60 5.79 -32.55 -3.01 0.05 36.60
2750 2755 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.40
2751 2756 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.40
2660 12 3.90 0.92 -3.90 -0.80 0.00 13.30
2660 12 3.90 0.92 -3.90 -0.80 0.00 13.30
2350 10 15.27 6.63 -15.22 -4.99 0.04 40.80
2350 10 15.32 6.65 -15.28 -5.01 0.04 41.00

















































2330 7 40.97 17.22 -40.79 -13.59 0.19 72.90 0.97
2310 5 10.52 3.99 -10.50 -3.05 0.02 37.00 0.97
2310 5 10.52 3.99 -10.50 -3.05 0.02 37.00 0.97
5250 22 11.50 1.00 -11.47 0.01 0.03 38.40 0.95
5250 22 11.55 1.04 -11.53 -0.01 0.03 38.50 0.95
5240 5251 89.19 27.20 -89.15 -23.73 0.04 41.80 0.99
5240 5252 89.08 28.17 -89.08 -24.69 0.00 38.70 0.99
2370 16 16.89 7 82 -16.85 -6.97 0.03 40.90 0.93
2371 16 15.53 5.79 -15.50 -5.10 0.03 36.50 0.93
2390 17 13.26 5.06 -13.21 -3.50 0.05 46.40 0.92
2391 17 12.94 4.46 -12.89 -3.00 0.05 44.90 0.92
2381 23 11.71 14.73 -11.67 -13.88 0.04 41.10 0.93
2410 20 8.00 3.18 -7.98 -2.63 0.02 28.40 0.93
2411 20 8.03 3.22 -8.02 -2.67 0.01 28.50 0.93
2808 24 5.76 2.59 -5.75 -2.30 0.01 20.80 0.93
2809 24 5.76 2.60 -5.75 -2.30 0.01 20.90 0.93
2400 19 11.86 5.92 -11.82 -4.62 0.04 43.20 0.92
2401 19 12.21 6.22 -12.18 -4.88 0.03 44.70 0.92
2403 18 7.56 3.48 -7.54 -2.96 0.02 27.40 0.93
2404 18 7.78 3.56 -7.76 -3.04 0.02 28.10 0.93
2420 21 8.41 3.94 -8.40 -3.32 0.02 30.50 0.93
2421 21 8.32 3.89 -8.30 -3.28 0.02 30.20 0.93
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents the application of genetic algorithms (GA) to the economic environmental dispatch problem, 
considering transmission (or wheeling) charges. Traditional approach to economic dispatch is purely based on fuel 
costs. With increasing emphasis on environmental protection and system security, it is economically efficient for a 
generation company to consider the level of emissions and cost of wheeling when dispatching power. Fuel cost and 
emissions produced from a unit are generally related only to the amount of power to be produced. Wheeling charges, 
however are not only dependent on the amount of power to be transferred, but also closely linked to the network 
configuration and network traffic at the time, hence highly non-linear. This paper proposes a genetic algorithm based 
optimisation technique to take into account these non-linearities, providing a useful tool for generation companies to 
dispatch power at the least possible cost and the minimum levels of pollution, where the cost to be minimised includes 
both fuel and wheeling cost.
Keywords:
Genetic algorithms (GA), wheeling charges, economic and environmental dispatch
INTRODUCTION
The problem of Economic Dispatch (ED) is to schedule 
the power outputs for the on-line generators so that the 
total fuel cost is minimised and customer load demand 
is matched. Traditional approach to economic dispatch 
is purely based on the cost of power production [1]. 
This has to change in the deregulated environment, for 
that the users of the transmission system, i.e. generator 
companies and suppliers, have to pay for the use of the 
transmission system when wheeling electricity from 
one point of the network to another. This implies that 
under the deregulated environment the economic 
dispatch problem has to be extended to take into 
account of the additional wheeling charges. Coupled 
with increasing emphasis on environmental protection 
and system security, it is economically efficient for a 
generation company to consider level of emissions and 
cost of wheeling when dispatching power.
Economic Environmental Dispatch (EED) considering 
wheeling costs adds significant complication to the 
power dispatch problem. Fuel cost and emissions 
produced from a unit are generally related only to the 
amount of power to be produced. Wheeling charges, 
however are not only dependent on the amount of 
power to be transferred, but also closely linked to the 
network configuration and network traffic at the time, 
hence highly non-linear. This paper therefore proposes 
a genetic algorithm based optimisation technique to 
take into account these non-linearities, providing a 
useful tool for generation companies to dispatch power 
at the least possible cost and the minimum level of 
pollution, where the cost to be minimised includes both 
fuel and wheeling cost.
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC DISPATCH 
(EED) PROBLEM FORMULATION
EED Problem Definition
The aim of the EED problem is to supply the load 
demand while minimising the environmental impact at 
the minimum possible operating cost, including both 
fuel cost and wheeling cost [2].
The EED problem formulation considered in this paper 
can be mathematically stated as follows:
Problem objectives
1) Minimisation offiiel cost
Minimise ^  ='jr^Fa  (1)
/ - I
Where
Pa = (aa ~ ba • $a )’ (a a  + P a  ' Pa + "fa ’Pa )  
a , ba are the cost per kcal coefficients;
a a '  P a ' Ya 316 C011sumP ti° n  coefficients;
Sa is the sulphur contents in fuels for the i th 
generator;
C is the total fuel cost from all generators.
2) Minimisation o f  wheeling cost
Minimise c„ = CtLk ■ (2)
Where
p i  is the loading at the ij th line caused by generator g; 
C i  is the cost of k  th transmission line, S/MW;
C \ is the total wheeling cost.
The detail of the calculation methodology of wheeling 




1) Generation limit constraints
For the safety operation o f a generation, power outputs 
from each generator must be within a limit:
PZTsPo,sPr
Where pa is the real power output o f the / th generator.
is the lowest power output level where />“  is the 
highest output level.
2) Power balance constraints
The total power generation must be equal to the total 




The total pollutiou generated in an area must be below 




Q<h =  e <» ' S  a t ' (a a  +  P o , ' P q i +  ^ &  ' P < *) 
ea  is the coefficients o f the i th generator emission 
m s  is the maximum air pollution allowance for a 
particular area.
Calculation Method of Wheeling Charges
The term o f wheeling is defined as “The use o f 
transmission or distribution facilities o f a system to 
transmit power o f and for another entity or entities." [3] 
Wheeling costs when applied to a transmission 
network, also called transmission costs, are the costs 
charged against generator companies and suppliers for 
their use o f the transmission services. The simplest 
approach to the transmission pricing is the postage- 
stamp method [4], in which the wheeling customers 
will pay a fixed rate per unit o f the energy transmitted 
regardless o f then distance and location. This simple 
allocation method does not provide economic signals 
for market participants o f congestion and constraint 
problems and needs for future network development. 
The MW-Mile methodology based on power flow is a 
more realistic measure o f the actual use o f  a 
transmission network [3]. This paper adopts the 
Bialek’s power tracing method to find individual 
generator’s contribution to line power flow, based on 
which, the cost o f  transmission charges are allocated to 
each generator companies [5],
In Bialek's tracing method, it is assumed that nodal 
inflows are shared proportionally among nodal 
outflows, as shown in Figure 1.
1 40 70
Figure 1: Proportional sharing principle
The wheeling charges are determined by topological 
distribution factor, which refers to the k"' generator's 
contribution to line /'-/’s power flow, and defined by the 
following equations:
q  =5 - z k U r  = i^P ox ■ l ea‘ (6)”, t-1 *-1
Where
P,s PQ' i = l -2   "

















an unknown gross line flow in line i - j  
an unknown gross nodal power flow through
topological distribution matrix 
generation in node k
set o f nodes supplied directly from node / 
set o f buses supplying bus / 
topological distribution factors
Figure 2 is the flow diagram for the wheeling charge 
calculation based on the Bialek’s power tracing method:
The in i t i a l  data 
o f  the network
j E
Form the Jacobian matrix
Newton Raphson load flow
Power flow r e su lts
C alcu late the to p o lo g ic a l d is tr ib u tio n  factor  
using equations 6 9
| C a lcu la te  the wheeling cost using equation 2




IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED 
DISPATCH ALGORITHM
A number o f optimisation techniques can be used for 
solving the EED problem: linear programming, genetic 
programming, dynamic programming, and simulated 
annealing. The variability and imprecise nature o f this 
problem requires a robust optimisation technique that 
can handle complex problem formulations. Hence. 
Genetic algorithms have been chosen as the dispatch 
algorithm for the EED problem considering the 
wheeling cost.
The Mechanics of Genetic Algorithms
Genetic Algorithms (GA) are search algorithms based 
on the mechanics o f  natural selection and natural 
genetics. The original concept o f GA is from the 
evolutionary' behaviour o f  biological systems. The 
initial candidates are generated at random with little 
knowledge o f correctness. Parameters o f each solution 
guess are represented as bit strings instead o f actual 
parameters, so that they can be improved repeatedly 
with a series o f genetic operators, namely reproduction, 
crossover and mutation [6].
Genetic algorithms are general purposed techniques for 
optimisation and learning, and they are especially 
useful for multi-modal, multi-objective, highly non­
linear. discontinuous search space.
Application Procedure of Genetic .Algorithms for 
the EED Problem
The followings are the procedure o f the proposed 
dispatch algorithm:
1. Setting up the test system:
2. Initialising the population. All generator outputs 
except the slack bus generator, are represented as 
bit strings to be optimised;
3. The bit strings are mapped into the range specified 
by the power limit constraints, generation costs, 
emission production, constraint violations can then 
be calculated;
4. Applying the Bialek’s tracing methodology to 
calculate the wheeling cost for each population 
member, using the power outputs from the GA:
5. Calculating the fitness value according to the 
equation stated below:
FN= 5 ----- +r}------£ -----+A------f ------u ----- 6—
S^min V^®*x— ft... ~
Where.
/r is the fuel cost objective;
Fv is the wheeling cost objective:
9 is the power balance constraint;
0 is the area emission constraint;
ff. a .// are corresponding weight coefficients:
max, min are corresponding maximum and 
minimum limits.
6. According to the fitness value, the power output 
variables will be manipulated under the GA 
operators: reproduction, crossover and mutation
[7]-
7. Repeat the steps 3 -  5, until the convergent criteria 
is met.
8. The final result is the best among the whole 
population members.
TEST SYSTEM AND RESULTS
Figure 3 shows the test system with two generators and 
five buses [4], The line data are given in Table 1. Bus 1 





Figure 3: 5-bus test system
Table 1: System data of the 5-Bus Example
Line From To R X B 2 CkLv
1 1 2 0.02 0.06 0.030 1.5
2 1 3 0.08 0.24 0.025 6
3 2 4 0.06 0.18 0.020 7
4 2 5 0.04 0.12 0.015 3
5 3 4 0.01 0.03 0.010 0.75
6 4 5 0.08 0.24 0.025 6
The cost and emission characteristics o f G1 and G4 are 
summarised as below.
Fuel cost functions are:
F e, =  (3.21 -  0.36 • S 0i ) - ( l4 8 .4 + 2.21 • P0l + 0.25 • P& ) 
FCi =  (3.219 -  0 .355- SG4 )■ (l37 .2  +  0.89 • PC4 + 0 .2 5  - / & )
Generation limit constraints are:
100ADT< PGl <150A/TT 
50A/W’ <PM <. 80MW
.Area emission fimctions are:
Qgv =  0.673 • S0I • (148.4 +  2.21 • PGl +  0.25 • P0:, )
Qo* =  0-67 • S04 • (137.2 -0 .8 9 •  PQi + 0 .25  • J & )
The range o f  sulphur content o f  fuels are:
0.3 s  S01 < 0.8 
0.3 < SC4 <; 0.8
Q  l.t=60lt*+j20Ml
~ T










Table 2 shows the simulation results under different 
emission limits. The results are the best from the five 
GA runs under each emission limit. As shown from the 
table, the more relaxed emission limits lead to the 
decreased fuel cost. Since generator 4 is the cheaper 
one of the two generators, it tends to operate at its 
maximum capacity, while the sulphur contents 
progressive increases with increases in the emission 
limit.





Output(MW) 103.36 103.36 103.36
Sulphur (%) 0.54 0.74 0.75
Fuel cost ($) 1140.18 1126.96 1125.86
Emission 145.83 170.54 172.6
G4
Output(MW) 80 80 80
Sulphur (%) 0.49 0.48 0.72
Fuel cost ($) 635.19 635.8 626.77





Fuel cost ($) 1775 1762 1752
Cost ($) 2417.23 2404.23 2394.23
For the resultant power outputs from the GA search, 
the network’s voltages, angles, generation and load at 
each busbars are shown in Table 3. The load flow 
result for each line is shown in Table 4. Table 5 gives 
the line loadings from each generator unit using 
Bialek’s power tracing algorithm. Finally, table 6 
shows the final transmission cost allocated to each 
generator.
Table 3: Voltage, Angle and Load at Each Bus
Bus Voltage Angle Pl Ql Pg Qg
1 1.060 0.000 0 0 103.36 14.52
2 1.035 -2.452 50 10 0.00 0.00
3 1.042 -2.283 60 20 0.00 0.00
4 1.050 -1.712 0 0 80.00 28.57
5 0.999 -4.912 70 30 0.00 0.00
Total 180 60 183.36 43.09
Table 4: Line Flow Results
Line From To P„(MV) Q.i (MVA)
1 1 2 84.34 15.22
2 1 3 19.02 -0.70
3 2 4 -9.66 -7.77
4 2 5 42.68 15.59
5 3 4 -41.24 -15.96
6 4 5 28.85 10.63
Table 5: Transmission Usage Allocation




1 1 2 84.343 0
2 1 3 19.017 0
3 2 4 0 9.929
4 2 5 38.292 4.388
5 3 4 0 41.331
6 4 5 0 28.846
Table 6: Transmission Charge Allocation
Line From To CkLk($/MW) Gl($) G4($)
1 1 2 1.5 126.51 0
2 1 3 6 114.10 0
3 2 4 7 0 69.50
4 2 5 3 114.88 13.16
5 3 4 0.75 0 31.00
6 4 5 6 0 173.08
Total 355.49 286.74642.23
CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses genetic algorithms as the dispatch 
algorithm for the economic environmental dispatch 
problem, considering the wheeling charges. The 
wheeling charges are calculated with a power flow 
based MW-Mile approach, where the power tracing 
from each generator is carried out using the Bialek’s 
tracing method. The proposed dispatch algorithm is 
tested on a small test system, showing that the GA is 
capable of dealing with non-linear and multi-objective 
problems. The dispatch algorithm can be scaled up as a 
useful tool for generation companies to dispatch power 
at the least possible cost and the minimtun levels of 
pollution, where die cost to be minimised includes both 
fuel and wheeling cost.
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Abstract
The paper presents a multi-objective genetic algorithm 
(MOGA) to determine optimal power flow (OPF) with 
extended objectives. TTie extended OPF problem is 
formulated to more closely reflect the actual system operation 
that respects the environmental restrictions, the cost of use of 
transmission network and the desire for a reliable system. 
The more realistic modelling of the reliability constraints 
optimal power flow (RCOPF) assigns generation cost, 
transmission cost, generation reliability indices, security 
objective and emission as five independent. The paper then 
develops a MOGA that is able to simultaneously optimise the 
aforementioned five objectives. This is contrary to the more 
popular approach of optimising a single performance index 
made of a linear combination of various objectives. The 
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is tested on the IEEE 
30-bus system.
1 Introduction
The classical optimal power flow (OPF) is to obtain the least 
cost generation pattern that can respect the security 
constraints of the transmission network while meeting system 
demands [4,5,9], These calculations often ignore the cost of 
the use of the transmission network, and fail to take into 
account of the emission constraints and system reliability. 
This paper firstly aims to develop a more realistic modelling 
of the reliability constraints optimal power flow (RCOPF), 
assigning generation cost, transmission cost, security, 
emission, and reliability indices as five independent 
objectives to be optimised. The paper then develops a MOGA 
that is able to simultaneously optimise the aforementioned 
five objectives, attaining a set of non-inferior solutions. 
Compared with the more popular approach of optimising a 
single performance index made of a linear combination of 
various objectives. MOGA can offer a wide range of options 
to choose from [1,8]. Especially, over the planning process, 
MOGA allows more options to be examined in order to strike 
a right balance between cost, security and reliability.
Reliability refers to the probability of its satisfactory 
operation under uncertainties conditions [6], Generator 
outages, which are one of the most important indices of 
system reliability, refer to the possible loss of a certain
generator during a period. This paper introduces a reliability 
index based on generator outage that is incorporated into th< 
OPF calculation to improve system reliability in addition t( 
minimising generation cost, transmission cost am 
environmental impact.
The effectiveness of the proposed MOGA and implication o 
the new OPF modelling are demonstrated on the IEEE 30-bu: 
6-generator system [11]. The MOGA is able to generate a se 
of non-inferior solutions and their respective strength 
providing a valuable assessment for the planner or systen 
operator to choose from.
2 Formulation o f RCOPF
The propos of the RCOPF calculation is to supply the loa< 
demand while minimising the environmental impact 
maximising system reliability at the minimum possibh 
operating cost, including both fiiel cost and wheeling cost.
2.1 Introduce the reliability index
Reliability is “the degree to which the performance of th< 
elements of that system results in power being delivered t< 
consumers witliin accepted standards and in the amount o 
desired” [6]. In general, reliability include adequacy whicl 
means the ability of the generator supply the custome
without scheduled and unscheduled outage, and security
which means the ability of the system withstand suddei 
disturbances.
According to the preference index, which introduced in th< 
reference paper [16], reliability index indicated the systen 
reliability based on the generator outage, which is showed ii 
equation (1).
I  =  Z R , i . I t ( P , )  (1)>-1 *-1
R, =(l-7-1)(l-r,)..r(. . . ( l - 0  (2)
W )  = (3)
/(*,)=kl x<e  ^ (4)
Where,
rt ; Forced outage rates of generator i:
Pk : Power flow of transmission line k  before an outage;
Pa : Permissible value of transmission line k;
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<f>: A series of transmission lines that power flow
exceed their permissible values.
The reliability index will be a small value, which is not a real 
indicator from the practice system. But it take into account of 
not only the outage rates of generator to avoid the system 
emergency and show the adequacy ability, but also the power 
system line load profiles to meet the system security. The 
minimum preference means the higher reliability of the 
system. Compared with the reliability indices of different 
system status, the system operator can defect the risk of a 
particular power dispatch.
2.2 RCOPF objectives
2.2.1 Minimisation o f  fitel cost
Minimize Cf = (5)
Where
Pa = a a ■ P ‘ + Pu + y a :
Fuel cost of die /th generator, $/h: 
a u ■ P a .Ya '■ Fuel consumption coefficients;
C : Total fuel cost from all generators.
2.2.2 Minimization o f  transmission cost
After RCOPF calculation for a set of generator outputs, it is 
possible to calculate the reliability index from the equation
( 1).
2.3 RCOPF constraints
2.3.1 Power balance constraints
As a basic obligation of traditional OPF, the total power 
generation must be equal to the total power demand and 
power losses in the transmission system:
(7)
i-l
2.3.2 Generation limit constraints
For the safety operation of a generator, power output from 
each generator must be within a limit:
P ™  < (8)
2.3.3 Line capacity' constraints
The every line flow should be below the permissible value to 
ensure the system secmity:
(9)
Alk : Permissible line Ik overloaded percentage.
Transmission cost, also called wheeling cost, means the usage 
cost of transmission and distribution facility charged against 
suppliers and consmners. The MW-Mile methodology based 
on power flow associated with each wheeling transaction is a 
more realistic measure of the actual use of transmission 
network [13], so it was widely used into the wheeling cost 
calculation.
Minimize c , =S^Ctt-vpi; j  (6)
Where
C„: Total wheeling cost;
Cu : Unit cost of A"th transmission line:
PJ: Load at the Alh line caused by generator /;
P't can be calculated using the Bialek’s tracing method [2.14]. 
wliich is assumed that nodal inflows are shar ed proportionally 
among nodal outflows. In the tracing method, it uses a 
topological distribution factor to determine the contribution of 
individual generators or loads to every line flow. Assumed the 
net power flow as positive direction, a particular transaction 
can flows in the opposite direction of the net flow, which 
called counter flow. The topological distribution factors 
calculated in the tracing method are always positive, that 
means the line power traced to each generator are positive, 
therefore this method can eliminates counter flow problem 
easily.
2.2.3 Maximization reliability
2.3.4 Emission limits constraint
The total pollution generated in an area must be below the 
specified limit MS:
|  Q0I<M S  (10)
Where
Qo, = n + b- Pa + c  ■ P l + d -exp(e-P J :
Emission of the /th generator, Ton/h; 
a . b . c . d . e : Coefficients of the r th generator emission:
MS: Maximum air pollution allowance for a
particular area.
3 Implementation o f MOGA
Genetic algorithms are general purposed techniques for 
optimisation and learning, and especially suitable for this 
multi-modal, multi-objective. highly non-linear, 
discontinuous problem [3,7], The implementation of MOGA 
is realised using the concept of Pareto Optimality. This uses 
the idea that a solution x  is “better” than a solution v if x  
dominates v . In natural language, x  dominates v if x  is 
better than v for at least one objective function, and is no 
worse for any of the others. A solution is Pareto-optimal if it 
is not dominated by any other solution. This concept is veiy 
powerful for a small number of objectives, however, when the 
number of objectives grows large, it can be very inefficient. 
In order to improve the efficiency of MOGA this paper 
modifies the original concept slightly so that x  is “better”
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than a solution V if more objectives in x  are better than that 
of y .
Pareto optimality lias been implemented by using Tournament 
Selection. During the reproduction stage the population is 
randomly divided up into pair s of candidate solutions. Each 
pair of candidate solutions is a tournament. If one candidate 
solution betters its competitor it is declared the winner and is 
copied. Its copy then replaces the loser in the post- 
reproduction population.
The implementation procedure of MOGA is shown in figure 1. 
Due to the nauire of Pareto optimality, more than one 
candidate solution may be optimal. For example, one 
candidate solution may have a low cost but high emission and 
another may have a high cost but low emission. It is coimnon 
to find many “lion-dominated” and hence Pareto optimal 
solutions in the course of optimisation.
|rhe initial random population"] 











Newton Raphson Load flow 
(constraint: power balance)
Fitness value calculation 
(constraint: slack bus capacity: 
objectives: fuel cost, wheeling cost, 
reliability index, transmission hue 
capacity, emission)
Figure 1: RCOPF using MOGA
4 Case study
4.1 Test system
The proposed algorithm is tested on the standard IEEE-30-bus 
test system, which is showed in Figure 2 [11]. The bus data, 
branch data, generator fuel cost and emission coefficients are 
given in references [11.12.16], respectively.




Total generation time: 100
Figure 2: IEEE 30-bus test system 
4.2 Simulation result
Figure 3 shows 50 non-dominant solutions from MOGA in 
the 3D coordinates, the three axes are emission, reliability 
preference index, and cost made up of fuel and wheeling cost. 
All 50 solutions have their own strength and weakness. Table 
1 and 2 show the results taken from the point (0.025. 0.209. 
640.73) marked by O. where table 1 gives the generation data 
and table 2 presents line flow data.
8
♦ -(0 025(0215.640)001 
O - (0 029.0 209 640 73)
022
0 2  001emission (Totvn)








G1 51.12 138.37 3.5681 0.03
G2 38.23 84.87 2.6152 0.01
G5 66.13 156.52 0.0 0.03
G8 76.45 121.52 1.8699 0.06
G il 25.00 67.50 0.4826 0.03
G13 29.52 62.99 0.4232 0.05
Total 286.45 631.77 8.959 0.21
Table 1: Generators data
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.Vo. Kfrom) ittoi Pi) (MW) pi) (MVA)
1 1 2 32.0421 17.8373
2 1 3 19.0763 14.1283
3 2 4 1 1.5559 9.1552
4 3 4 16.4216 16.4388
5 2 s 24.6138 9.6711
6 2 6 12.1488 11.7409
7 4 6 2.8709 11.3973
8 5 7 -3.7820 5.7974
9 6 7 26.7984 1.9548
10 6 8 -36.6081 17.6636
l l 6 9 8.0768 -14.1232
12 6 10 9.5655 -1.8988
13 9 11 -25.0000 -19.6942
14 9 10 33.0768 16.7779
15 4 12 17.3020 -14.9299
16 12 13 -29.5161 -12.2919
17 12 14 8.3470 3.1973
18 12 15 19.2010 10.1657
19 12 16 8.0701 6.9559
20 14 15 2.0585 1.4133
21 16 17 4.4735 4.9528
2*> 15 18 606277 3.4147
23 18 19 3.3714 2.4002
24 19 20 -6.1393 -1.0213
2J 10 20 8.4186 1.8954
26 10 17 4.550 0.9448
27 10 21 16.0677 9.7547
28 10 22 7.8007 4.4281
29 21 22 -1.5497 -1.6976
30 15 23 6.1376 5.0984
1 22 24 6.1949 2.6144
2 23 24 2.8775 3.3771
3 24 25 0.2964 -0.8394
4 25 26 3.5460 2.368"
5 25 27 -3.2511 -3.210’
6 28 27 16.5619 -0.9341
7 *>7 29 6.1927 1.6740
8 27 30 7.0955 1.6692
9 29 30 3.7045 0.6075
10 8 28 9.6484 -3.9890
11 6 28 6.9898 6.3752
Table 2: Line flow results
Figures 4 -6  demonstrate emission, reliability index, cost of 
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Figure 6: Fuel and wheeling cost profile 
5 Conclusion
This paper presents an improved OPF framework. Firstly, 
this paper presents a more realistic OPF problem formulation 
by incorporating the reliability index, transmission cost and 
environmental lunits into the traditional OPF. Secondly, the 
paper developed a multi-objective genetic algorithm to 
effectively handle the multi-objective, multi-constraints 
model with very high performance. The concept o f  Pareto 
Optimality is adopted to handle the multiple objectives. The 
results are a set o f non-dominate solutions that have different 
qualities against the five objectives. These assessments 
provide useful information for power engineers to make 
sensible compromising decisions
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Charging Methodology
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Abstract—This paper describes the principle and 
implementation of a new MM+MVAr-Miles based charging 
methodology to allocate the existing distribution network’s 
annuity cost. The proposed charging methodology separates 
network facilities’ cost dne to the respective real and reactive 
power flows. The costs are then allocated to network users 
according to their nature (demand or generation) and their 
power factors. The charging methodology is developed with an 
aim of reflecting the true cost and benefit of network customers, 
especially of embedded generators (DGs). The charging method 
is demonstrated on a subset of a practical distribution network, 
its effectiveness Is shown through the comparison with MW-Mlle 
and MVA-Mlle charging methodologies. This paper results 
from work undertaken in a project on distribution charging 
methodologies for Western Power Distribution. The views in the 
paper expressed are not those of Western Power Distribution.
Index Terms—Distribution network, network charging 
methodologies, embedded generators.
I. In t r o d u c t io n  
—  xisting network charging or embedded charging can be 
redefined as the revenue that has to be allocated among all 
the connected demand/generation customers to meet the 
annual cost of all the existing facilities, due to their 
contribution to network depreciation [1]. Typically, their 
charges are driven by their demand over peak periods.
All demand/generation customers of a distribution network 
are required to contribute a percentage from the existing 
network charging and the rest from the long-run cost. 
Traditionally, the embedded cost of a distribution network is 
very small when compared with incremental cost, based on 
the planning procedure that the new customers who caused 
additional system reinforcement have to pay for the network 
incremental cost. This leads to distribution network charging 
mainly based on long run cost. However, in the UK, this so 
called Deep Different methods have been used for allocating 
existing network charging like postage stamp and contract 
path [2-3], both are not considering the effect of actual
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loading on multiple circuits due to a transaction. The 
Boundary Flow method [1] and the MW-Mile method [4] 
have improved upon the limitations of the first two methods 
by respecting power flows on multiple paths due to a customer. 
However, these methods do not consider the extent of the use 
of network from reactive power flows. This use of network 
due to a customer’s poor power factor can be significant in a 
distribution network. As a result, MVA-Mile method [4-5] is 
proposed to take into account of the true extent of the use of 
the network by considering both active and reactive power. 
The MVA-Mile method however treats both real and reactive 
power the same, fails to differentiate reactive power injection 
and dawn within a facility. This leads to the new MW+MVAr- 
Mile charging methodology that is able to accurately account 
for the extent of the use of network for a customer, taking into 
account of their respective MW and MVAr power flow from 
the source to the customer. By separating the MW and MVAr 
power flows, the proposed charging methodology 
acknowledges the full cost-benefit of network users, 
especially embedded generators. The principle of the proposed 
method is demonstrated on a subset of 132kv distribution 
network, its effectiveness is clearly shown through the 
comparison with MW-mile and MVA-mile methodologies.
II. M a t h e m a t ic a l  F o r m u l a t io n
This section gives mathematical formulation for all three use 
of system charging methodologies, namely MW-Mile, MVA- 
Mile and the newly proposed MW+MVAr-Mile 
methodologies.
For a given distribution network, facility f s  cost is assumed 
to be DFCy the annual fixed rate of return is assumed to be 
AFRRf for the year under study, then the annual revenue 
requirement {ARE) for each facility can be determined with 
the following equations:
ARRf  = AFRRf  X DFCf  (1)
A) MW-Mile Method
For the MW-Mile (MWM) method, existing network costs of 
distribution system are allocated proportionally to the MW 
flows caused by a customer in a network. If the MW flows in 
each distribution facility/ caused by customer T is (.MWf)T, the 
network charges CcT for customer T is given by the following 
equation.
0-7803-9114-4/05/J20. 00 <>2005 IEEE. 1
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£ C MWf )TL}
CcT = •xC (2)
r /  
where
C= Total annual revenue requirement per hour £/h
C = X C/ ^
/
(M W jr = MW flow in facility /  due to customer J.
£/ = Length of facility /
B) MVA —M ile M ethod 
It has been recognized that the use of distribution network 
has been best measured by monitoring both real and reactive 
power flow. This is because of a circuit rating based on its 
MVA ratings, its reactive power components can be as 
significant as real power when power factor is poor. This 
leads to the development of MVA-Mile charging methodology, 
which requires ac power flows to allocate network charges 
when considering both active and reactive power flow. In this 
charging regime, the MVA flows due to customer T  is first 
established, the cost allocation to custom T  is subsequently 
given by the following equation:
Y { M V A ,) t L ,
CcT -




(MVAj) t = MVA flow in facility f  due to 
customer T.
From the above diagram, the magnitude of apparent power 5 
for the circuit/ can be described as:
Sf  =  Pf • cos df + Q f - sin 6f  (4)
Hence, if the annualized circuit cost associated with S/ is Q, 
then the extent of the use of the circuit due to real power can 
be determined by:
_ P c o s d  _ 
Cpf = —  xC, (5)
where C #  is the extent of the network cost due to the circuit 
real power flow.
This leads to the contribution due to real power as:
Cpt = c o sd 2 x.Cf  (6)
Therefore, the total cost due to network’s real power flows is:
cr =Y.crj m
/
While the extent of the use of network due to reactive power 
is formulated as:
CQf = ( l-co s^ : )xC/  (8)
This leads to the total cost due to network’s reactive powers:
<9 >/
C) M W+M VAr -M ile  M ethod
Even though die MVA-Mile method has provided better 
measurement for the extent of the use of the network by 
monitoring both real and reactive power flow within the 
facilities, it cannot distinguish if a custom drawing or injecting 
reactive power, hence, customers helping the system can be 
unfairly treated. This leads to the formulation of 
MW+MV AR-Mile method.
D) Economic Principle o f  M W +M VAr -M ile  M ethod
For a circuit f  the relationship between the apparent power 
flow 5 and its real and reactive power contribution is shown in 
Figure 1.
Q s i a 0
where C  =  C p +  C q ( 10)
P-  C O S #
p
Once the network cost due to real and reactive power is 
separated, the total cost for customer T from its real and 
reactive power flows over network circuits is:




x C , +
£ ( , MVArf )TLf
f ______________________
£ ( £ ( M V A r f )Lf )
T f
xC ( 11)
Fig. 1: Contribution o f  real and reactive power to apparent power
I II .  R e s u l t s  a n d  d is c u s s io n s
The section illustrates the proposed MW+MVAr-Mile 
methodology on a small system. The effectiveness of the 
proposed charging method is demonstrated through the 
comparison with MW-Mile and MVA-Mile methodologies.
The test system is an 8 busbar subset of the practical Western 
Power Distribution network at 132KV voltage level. For 
demonstration purpose, the study illustrates the proposed 
charging principle by only allocating facility Lf cost to 
customers at bus 2 according to their extent of the use of the 
circuit, while the rest of 7 buses are lumped into one load 
taken from bus 1, as shown in Figure 1.
The comparison between different methodologies are carried 




Case 1 forms the base case that only one load customer is 
connected to bus 2 as shown in Figure 1, where the charges 
are laid to customers based on the extent of the use of circuit 
Lf by the load customers. Demand customer 1 has a power 
factor of 0.77, while customer 2 has a power factor of 0.62. 










Figure 2. A base load flow on the reduced 2-busbar system.
Table I presents network charges for the two demand 
customers at bus 2 with all three charging methodologies. 
The table clearly shows that the MW-mile method does not 
distinguish the differences of two customer’s power factor, 
simply assigns the circuit cost according to the real power 
flow. Where both MVA-Mile and MW+MVAr-Mile methods 
acknowledge the poorer power factor of customer 2. hence 
accordingly penalize the customer. Due to the similar nature 
of the two demands, the MW+MVAr-Mile method agrees 
well with that of MVA-Mile method, slight difference lies in 
MVA-Mile method treats real and reactive power the same, 
while MW+MVAr takes their respective true contribution to 
the circuit power flow.
TABLE 1. USE OF NETWORK CHARGES FOR BUS 2 CUSTOMERS
output at the time of system peak is: 20-j20. Figure 3 shows 
the load flows when the generator is connected.
385.79+j297.26
I L f  9 .92+j5l.l3“  52.08 MVA
375.87+j246.13
G:20-j20=28.28 MVA D: 29.66+]31.03 = 42.92 MVA
Figure 3. Power flows on the reduced 2-busbar system the embedded 
generator output - 20-j20.
From the load flow results it has been found that the real 
power drawn by the demand customers has been reduced due 
to the injection caused by the generator, showu by the reduced 
real power flow on the line. But the loading of the connected 
facilities have increased by 21% due to reactive power drawn 
by the same generator. Table II gives the charges to both 
generation and demand customers with three charging 
methods.
TABLE n . USE OF NETWORK CHARGES FOR BUS 2 CUSTOMERS.
WHERE DEMAND DOMINATING L,’S REAL POWER FLOW. BOTH 
GENERATION AND DEMAND CONTRIBUTING TO LINE’S REACTIVE 
POWER FLOW








Cpj = £113347/year 
(Cost due to MW flow)
0.4363 58.775
Cq4 “  £123413/year 
(Cost due to MVAr flow)
0.4549 77.427








Cpj “  £8568/year 
(Cost due to MW flow)
0 8.568
Cqj = £228192/year (MVAr) 
(Cost due to MVAr flow)
89.434 138.758
B) Case 2
The difference between MW+MVAr-mile and MVA-Mile 
charging methodologies becomes apparent when embedded 
generators comes into play. To better demonstrate the benefit 
of the proposed charging methodology, an embedded wind 
generator is introduced at bus 2, while demand customers are 
grouped to one demand D. In this case, the generator’s power
When the MW-Mile methodology is adopted here, the cost 
due to the reactive power will be lost, leading to a favorable 
assessment for embedded generators. While the MVA-Mile 
methodology will ignore the real power contribution from the 
generator, network will charges for its 20MW power injection, 
despite the power has been immediately consumed by its 
neighbour demand customer and has reduced net power flow 
of the circuit from the original 29.68 MW to 9.92 MW. This 
gives poor assessment of contribution from embedded 
generator.
In comparison, the proposed MW+MVAr is able to respect 
both cost and benefit of network users, especially embedded 
generators. Since embedded generator does not use the 
network facility to transport its real power, hence, no charges 
has been assigned to the generation customer for its real 
power provision, however, it uses the network to draw
3
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reactive power. As a result, the generator will be charged for 
its use of the circuit to draw reactive power, charges is 
allocated depends on its share of contribution to the reactive 
power flow of the circuit.
Although the difference between MVA-Mile and 
MW+MVAr-Mile methods are small in this case, still the 
latter reflect the true extent of the use of the network by only 
charging the embedded generator for its reactive power draw 
from the network while MVA-Mile method also charges for 
its power injection.
C) Case 3
Similarly when the generator has operated with its maximum 
generation of 80MW, the loading of the connected facilities 
have increased by 40% due to both generator’s real power 
injection and reactive power drawn, as shown in Figure 4. So 
a charging methodology for both the generator and demand 
customers have been assigned based on their real and reactive 
power drawn/injection. Here, no cost has been assigned to the 
demand customer because it has not used the network to draw 
its real power.
A ,)  325.53+j297.16
T
1
 ^ f -50.34+jJ1.03“  71.68 MVA
375.87+j246.13
('V)
G: 80-j20=84.85 MVA D: 29.66-j31.03 = 42.92 MVA
Figure 4. Power flows on the reduced 2-busbar system, embedded generator 
output = 80-j20.
TABLE in. USE OF NETWORK CHARGES FOR BUS 2 CUSTOMERS, 
WHERE THE CIRCUIT'S REAL POWER FLOW DOMINATED BY 
GENERATION. REACTIVE POWER FLOW CONTRIBUTED BY BOTH 
GENERATION AND DEMAND CUSTOMERS








Cpj = £113867/year 
(Cost due to MW flow)
113.867 0
Cqj = £ 122898/year 
(Cost due to MVAr flow)
48.165 74.728
requirement. As a result, the complete facility cost has been 
assigned to the demand customer only and presented in the 
Table IV.
A A  385.53+j257.16
T  ^ r 9.66+j 11.03“  14.66 MVA
37S.87-r-j246.13
(Ay)
G: 20+j20=28.28 MVA D\ 29.66+j31.03 = 42.92 MVA
Figure S. Power flows on the reduced 2-busbar system with embedded 
generator output as 20+j20.
TABLE IV. USE OF NETWORK CHARGES FOR BUS 2 CUSTOMERS, 
WHERE THE CIRCUIT FLOW DOMINATED BY THE DEMAND 
CUSTOMER








C p j”  £104034/year 0 104.034
C0j  = £132726/year 0 132,726
VI Conclusions
The paper proposed a new MW+MVAr-Mile charging 
methodology to allocate the embedded cost based on network 
users' extent of the use of network facilities. The advantages 
of this technique over existing MW-Mile and MVA-Mile 
methodologies lie in its ability to appropriate account for 
customers’ cost and benefit, especially for embedded 
generators. This ability has been demonstrated over four test 
cases. While the MW-Mile method neglects customers’ poor 
power factors, MVA-Mile and MW+MVAr-Mile 
methodologies will reward customers with good power factor 
and penalize those with poor power factors. For customer 
with similar characteristics, MVA-Mile and MW+MVAr-Mile 
give comparable results. However, when embedded 
generators come into play, MVA-Mile method cannot 
distinguish between generator injecting and drawing reactive 
power from the network, while MW+MVAr-Mile can give a 
full assessment of generators or demands contribution to the 
network. The proposed MW+MVAr-Mile methodology is 
although demonstrated on a distribution network, is equally 
applicable to transmission network where the extra 
computational burden is justifiable.
D) Case 4
Finally when the generator is operated with 20MW and 
20MVAR injection, then the generator supports the demand 
customer at that point for both real and reactive power
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MW+MVAr-Miles Based Distribution 
Charging Methodology
F. Li, Member, IEEE, N.P. Padhy, J. Wang, Student Member, IEEE, B. Kuri, Student Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper describes the principle and 
implementation of a new MW+MVAr-Miles based charging 
methodology for pricing distribution networks. The charging 
methodology was developed with an aim of reflecting the true 
cost and benefit of network users, especially embedded 
generators (EGs). The proposed charging methodology respects 
the cost to a network due to both real and reactive power, U . 
power factor of network users. In addition, the charging model 
can differentiate directions of real and reactive power flow of a 
network user, for example, wind generation prosides real power 
and absorbs reactive power. This differentiation allows the cost 
and benefit to the network of a network user being properly 
accounted for. The charging method is demonstrated on an two- 
busbar system, derived from a practical distribution network. Its 
effectiveness is demonstrated through the comparison with MW- 
Mile and MVA-Mlle charging methodologies.
Index Terms—Distribution network, network charging 
methodologies, embedded generators.
I. In tr o du ctio n
T  HE electrical power supply industry around the world has 
experienced a period of rapid and critical changes, 
regarding the way electricity is generated, transmitted and 
distributed. The need for more efficiency in power production 
and delivery has led to privatization, restructuring and finally 
deregulation of the power sectors in several countries 
traditionally under control of federal and state governments. 
Many countries like Latin America and Chile during 1980. 
England and Wales during 1989. Argentina during 1992. 
Europe during 1996 have undergone the process of 
competitive electricity market resulting in seperate 
Transmission. Distribution and Generation companies from a 
monopoly structurefl 1,14]. Though there are some pitfalls, 
the end users of the deregulated system are enjoying the fruits 
of the deregulated electricity industry tree. Transmission and 
distribution are still considered natural monopolies that 
require regulations to achieve fair competition and also to
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ensure open, nondiscriminatory access to all network users, 
especially small embedded generators [13,15.17],
Distribution network charges are charges against generator, 
large industrial customers and suppliers for their use of a 
distribution network. The charges are set to reflect the cost of 
installation, operation and maintenance of the distribution 
network[18.19].
The current distribution reinforcement model[5.7.21] 
adopted by majority of distribution network operators (DNOs) 
in die UK is based on 500MW reinforcement model. It is 
essentially a post-stage stamp charging methodology across 
the same voltage level.
The charging methodology is under close scrutiny by the 
regulator -  OFGEM (Office of Gas and Electricity Market), 
primarily driven by the following two major concerns:
1) Inability in providing locational signals for the siting of 
future generation and demand
2) Inability to facilitate the potentially significant increases in 
embedded generation.
As an alternative distribution charging methodologies. MW- 
miles methodology [3] has the advantage of acknowledge the 
extensiveness of die use of a network by network users, but 
fails to respect the cost/benefit to the network due to reactive 
power. A charging method based on DC power flow[ 1 ] will 
inevitably introduce errors in reflecting true cost to a network. 
This is particularly problematic for embedded wind generators, 
where they tend to inject real power and withdraw reactive 
power. As a result, if only DC power flow is considered in a 
charging model, it will credit embedded generator’s active 
power contribution[8], but fail to penalise its reactive power 
drawn. This can result in misleading locational signals, hence, 
economic inefficient network charging methodologies[4.20].
MVA-Miles method is an enhanced charging methodology 
over MW-Miles, it considers the extensiveness of the use of 
the network by network users due to their active and reactive 
power injection/drawn. The MVA-Miles method however 
cannot distinguish the direction of real and reactive power 
flow. The methods work well for demand and generation 
where they either withdrawn both real and reactive power or 
inject both. However, In the case of wind generator injecting 
real power and withdrawing reactive power, the MVA-Miles 
method fails to distinguish die difference in the direction of 
the same network user, resulting in misleading network
1 -4244-0493-2/06/S20.00 ©2006 IEEE.
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charges[25-28].
In this paper, a new MW+MVAr-Mile charging 
methodology has been introduced that not only respects the 
power factor of network users but also the leading or lagging 
nature of power factor. By separating the MW and MVAr 
power flows, the proposed charging methodology 
acknowledges the Ml cost-benefit of network users, 
especially embedded generators[9,14]. The principle of the 
proposed methodology is shown on two busbar system and 
validated through the comparison with the MW-Miles and 
MVA-Miles methodologies.
n. M a t h e m a t ic a l  Fo r m u l a t io n
This section firstly gives mathematical formulation for MW- 
Miles and MVA-Miles methodologies and secondly, 
introduces the newly proposed MW+MVAr-Miles 
methodology.
For a given distribution network, a network component /  s 
cost is assumed to be DFC/. the annual fixed rate of return is 
assumed to be AFRRf for the year under study, then the 
annuity cost (AN) for each component can be determined with 
the following equations:
A Uf — AFRRf x DFCf (1)
(2)
and C  = £/year
CcT =
Y ( M V A f )TLf
f_____________
£( X( MVAf ) TLf)
r f
xC
M VAf - y j p /  +Qf
(3)
(4)
A) MW-M ile M ethod 
For die MW-Mile (MWM) method, existing network costs of 
distribution system are allocated proportionally to the MW 
flows caused by a customer in a network[16]. If the MW 
flows in each distribution component /  caused by customer T 
is (MWj) t , the network charges CcT for customer T is given by 
the following equation.
J^(M W f )TLf  




(MVAf)r  MVA flow in network component f  due to customer
T.
Pf. Real power flow in network component f  
Q/. Reactive power flow in network component f
C) M W +M V Ar-M ile M ethod
This new charging model is to reflect three characteristics of 
a customer the extensiveness of the use of a network, its 
power factor and the leading/lagging nature of the power 
factor. Compared with the MVA-Miles methodology, the 
model has the additional capability of reflecting the 
differences in directions of real and reactive power flow, 
thereby is able to reflect the full cost-benefit of a customer, 
especially embedded generators.
D) Principle o f  M W +M VAr -M iles M ethodology
For a network component f ,  the relationship between the 
apparent power flow S and its real and reactive power 
contribution is commonly represented by equation (4). Since 
it cannot distinguish the direction of power flow, this paper 
developed a linear relationship between apparent power and 
its real and reactive power counterparts, shown below:
Sf  = P f - cos d f  +  Q f • sin 6f  (5)
Hence, if the annualized circuit cost associated with Sf is Cf. 
then the extent of the use of the circuit due to real power can 
be determined by:
„  P - cos# _ 
Cpf  = —  -----* Cf (5)
where
C: Total annual revenue requirement per hour f/h 
(MWf)T MW flow in component f  due to customer T.
Lf, Length of network component /
B) MVA -M ile  M ethod
It has been recognized that the cost to a distribution network 
is best measured by monitoring both real and reactive power 
flow. The MVA-Mile charging methodology takes account of 
customers’ power factor as well as die extensiveness of the 
use of a network. In this charging regime, the MVA flows 
due to customer T  is first established, the cost allocation to 
custom J  is subsequently given by the following equation:
where C #  is the extent of the network cost due to the circuit 
real power flow.
Since S/can also be represented by:
Sf =-?— 
cos#
Substitute Equation (6) to (5), leads to:
_ P  cos# _ n2 _ 




Therefore, the total cost due to network’s real power flows is:
0 = I C-., <8>/
Appendices 200
While the extent of the use of network due to reactive power 
is formulated as:
CQf = &  xC/ = sin 6 2 * C f =  (1 -  cos 0 7) * C f  (9)
s in d
This leads to the total cost due to network's reactive powers:
Cq X  ^ QJ
f
where C = Cp + C„
(10)
( ID
Once the network cost due to real and reactive power is 
separated, the total cost for customer T  from its real and 
reactive power flows over all network components is:
'ZWW/hLf









H I. R e s u l t s  a n d  d is c u s s io n s  
The section illustrates the proposed MW+MVAr-Mile 
methodology on a simple test system. The effectiveness of the 
proposed charging method is demonstrated through the 
comparison with DRM. MW-Miles and MVA-Miles 
methodologies.
The test system is a subset of the practical Western Power 
Distribution network with loads connected to buses at 132KV 
voltage level. The study illustrates the proposed charging 
principle by allocating network asset Lf cost to bus 2 
customers and bulk customer according to their extent of the 
use of the circuit. The annuity cost of circuit L/is £236760/yr. 









TABLE I CUSTOMER CHARACTERISTICS WITH 
DIFFERENT CASE STUDIES
Customer 1 Customer 2 Power flow over 1 /
Case 1 14.28-tjll.54 15.38-^19.43 29.68-tj30.97=42.896MVA
Case 2 -20+i20 29.66-t-j3I.03 9 .92+j51.13-52.08 MVA
A) Case 1
Case 1 forms the base case that only demand customers were 
connected to bus 2. where the charges are laid to customers 
based on the extent of the use of circuit Lf by the load 
customers. Demand customer 1 has a power factor of 0.77, 
while customer 2 has a power factor of 0.62.
Table II presents network charges for the two demand 
customers at bus 2 with all three charging methodologies. 
The table clearly shows that the MW-mile method does not 
distinguish the differences of two customer’s power factor, 
simply assigns the circuit cost according to the real power 
flow. Where both MVA-Mile and MW+MVAr-Mile methods 
acknowledge the poorer power factor of customer 2. hence 
accordingly penalize the customer. Due to the similar nature 
of the two demands, the MW+MVAr-Mile method agrees 
well with that of MVA-Mile method, slight difference lies in 
MVA-Mile method treats real and reactive power the same, 
while MW+MVAr takes their respective true contribution to 
the circuit power flow.















MW-Mile 77,763 0 159,000 392 
t lM W /yr









Figure 1. A base load flow on the reduced 2-busbar system.
Two test cases were derived representing changes in 
customer nature of bus 2 customers: (1) demand users only: (2) 
demand and generator users, where the generator reduces the 
circuit’s real power flow but increases its reactive power flow, 
this is shown in Table I.
B) Case 2
The difference between MW+MVAr-mile and MVA-Mile 
charging methodologies becomes apparent when embedded 
generators came into play. To better demonstrate the benefit 
of the proposed charging methodology, an embedded wind 
generator was introduced at bus 2, while demand customers 
were grouped to one demand D. In this case, the generator’s 
power output at the time of system peak is: 20-j20.
From the load flow results it has been found that the real 
power drawn by the demand customers were reduced due to 
the injection caused by the generator. But the loading of the 
connected assets have increased by 21% due to reactive power 
drawn by the same generator. Table HI gives the charges to 
both generation and demand customers with three charging 
methods.
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TABLE IIL USE OF NETWORK CHARGES FOR BUS 2 CUSTOMERS. 
WHERE DEMAND DOMINATING L,'S REAL POWER FLOW. BOTH 
















MW-Mile 77,763 -52613 211,612 521.8
£A1W/yt




94,799 41,501 125,450 £254 
£/SlVA/yrMW: 46.041 MW: -10.022
M VAr 65,271 M VAR 51,522
When the MW-Mile methodology is adopted here, the cost 
due to the reactive power will be lost leading to a favorable 
assessment for embedded generators. While the MVA-Mile 
methodology will ignore the real power contribution from the 
generator, network will charges for its 20MW power injection, 
despite the power has been immediately consumed by its 
neighbour demand customer and has reduced net power flow 
of the circuit from the original 29.68 MW to 9.92 MW. This 
gives poor assessment of contribution from embedded 
generator.
In comparison, the proposed MW+MVAr is able to respect 
both cost and benefit of network users, especially embedded 
generators. Since embedded generator does not use the 
network facility to transport its real power, hence, no charges 
has been assigned to the generation customer for its real 
power provision, however, it uses the network to draw 
reactive power. As a result, the generator will be charged for 
its use of the circuit to draw reactive power, charges is 
allocated depends on its share of contribution to the reacrive 
power flow of the circuit.
VI CONCLUSIONS
The paper demonstrates the newly proposed MW+MVAr- 
Mile charging methodology to allocate die network cost based 
on network users’ extent of the use of network facilities. The 
advantages of this technique over existing MW-Mile and 
MVA-Mile methodologies he in its ability to appropriate 
account for customers’ cost and benefit, especially for 
embedded generators. While the MW-Mile method neglects 
customers’ poor power factors, MVA-Mile and MW+MVAr- 
Mile methodologies will reward customers with good power 
factor and penalize those with poor power factors. For 
customer with similar characteristics. MVA-Mile and 
MW+MVAr-Mile give comparable results. However, when 
embedded generators come into play, MVA-Mile method 
cannot distinguish between generator injecting and drawing 
reactive power from the network, while MW+MVAr-Mile can 
give a fUll assessment of generators or demands contribution 
to the network. The proposed MW+MVAr-Mile methodology 
is although demonstrated on a distribution network. is equally 
applicable to transmission network where the extra 
computational burden is justifiable.
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